THE JOHN MARSHALL
REVIEW OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW

LAW, BRANDS, AND INNOVATION: HOW TRADEMARK LAW HELPS TO CREATE FASHION
INNOVATION
DAYOUNG CHUNG
ABSTRACT
This Article explores the role of trademark law in the fashion industry. For years, the fashion industry has
drawn legal scholars’ attention for its maintenance of creative endeavors within a legal environment that offers
limited protection against design copying. Some influential legal studies argued that copying paradoxically helps
the fashion industry as unregulated copying stimulates the creation of new designs. Yet, this Article observes
that the driver for new design creation is already built into the contemporary fashion industry. The question
should rather be directed at who creates fashion and how the role of the law, if any, aids the subject and
mechanism of making fashion. This Article illuminates on the significant role that established fashion houses
(so-called luxury companies or high-end designers) play in making fashion. This Article also suggests that these
fashion houses require brands to make fashion. On this ground, this Article then demonstrates the capacity of
trademark law to protect established fashion houses’ brands.
The Article begins in Part One with an observation of the contemporary fashion industry and elaborating on
the social mechanism of making fashion. It argues that the creation of design does not simply make fashion until
it is adopted by majority of people. This Article uses the term “fashion innovation” to refer to adopted designs,
distinguished from the created designs that some legal scholars called “innovation.” What trademark law helps
is “fashion innovation,” that is, the law helps the adoption of new designs created by established fashion houses.
An adoption is a communication process that engages the brand, which, I show, works as a semantic mechanism
of making fashion innovation.
Part Two and Three unfolds how trademark operates to protect brands of established fashion houses
throughout case law analysis. Part Two examines the capacity of trademark law in governing iconic designs
associated with established brands, which, under copyright law, would receive limited legal protection. Part
Three identifies the capacity of trademark law to govern consumer associations with established brands. After
all, it is the interplay among trademark law, brands, and innovation that supports the thriving fashion industry.
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LAW, BRANDS, AND INNOVATION: HOW TRADEMARK LAW HELPS TO
CREATE FASHION INNOVATION
DAYOUNG CHUNG*
I. INTRODUCTION
The fashion industry exists within a legal environment that offers only limited
protection for fashion designs. Legal commentators have almost uniformly noted and
criticized the limitation of existing intellectual property protection and its failure to
protect fashion designs and thus fashion designer’s incentives.1 The three core forms
of intellectual property (“IP”) law – copyright law, trademark law, and patent law –
are not specifically tailored to protect fashion design. Copyright law largely denies
copyright protection to the class of useful articles, in which creative expression is
compounded with practical utility such as apparel.2 For years, legislative attempts to
provide a sui generis copyright protection for fashion design have not been successful.3
It was not until March 2017, in its Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc.
decision that the U.S. Supreme Court opened the possibility of using copyright law as
an effective form of protecting fashion design.4
Patent law permits design patents only for a design “embodied in, or applied to
an article of manufacture” upon the meeting of requirements such as novelty and nonobviousness.5 The article of manufacture must not be dictated primarily by its function
and the design patent is granted only to the non-functional, new, original, and
ornamental design.6 A design for surface ornamentation is inseparable from the article
to which it is applied and cannot exist alone.7 The claimed design could be a portion
© Dayoung Chung 2018. Corporate Counsel, CJ CGV. Ph.D., University of Washington.
The Author would like to thank Professor Michael Townsend, Professor Zahr Said, Professor
Susan Gaylard, Professor Robert Gomulkiewz, Professor Yongchul Ha for thoughtful comments
and suggestions. Thanks also to the editors for editorial assistance.
*

Jessica Litman, The Exclusive Rights to Read, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L. J. 29 (1994).
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (defining a “useful article” as “an article having an intrinsic utilitarian
function that is not merely to portray the appearance of the article or to convey information”);
Jack Adelman, Inc. v. Sonners & Gordon, 112 F. Supp. 187 (S.D.N.Y. 1934) (holding that dress per se
is purely functional that it is not eligible for copyright protection).
3 Design Piracy Prohibition Act (DPPA), 110 S. 1957 (2007); Innovative Design Protection and
Piracy Protection Act (IDPPPA), 111 S. 3728 (2010).
4 Star Athletica, LLC v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1002 (2017) (decided on March
22). This Article discusses the contents of the Varsity Brands decision and its possible effect
on the fashion industry in chapter four.
5 35 U.S.C. § 102 (stating design patents are available only for designs that are truly new); 35
U.S.C. § 102 (requiring the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that
the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious).
6 35 U.S.C. § 171 (stating design patents protect how an article looks, not how it functions); 37
C.F.R. § 1.153 (2010) (describing the design patent application as only asking for a description of the
ornamental design of the article).
7 A Guide To Filing A Design Patent Application, USPTO, https://www.uspto.gov/patents-gettingstarted/patent-basics/types-patent-applications/design-patent-application-guide (last visited April 6,
2018). This requirement differs from the copyright law requirement that for a design applied on useful
1

2
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of the design, the entire design, or ornamentation applied to a design.8 The patent
requirements, however, are not an ideal fit for fashion designs, which hardly ever meet
the novelty requirement for fashion designs, since they are a reworking of previously
existing designs most of the time. In addition, fashion trends change relatively quickly
compared to other creative industries with a seasonal change, but on average, it takes
about fifteen months for the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) to
issue a design patent.9 Not surprisingly, the rate of design patents issued for the
fashion industry is low. In 2017, the USPTO issued 2,572 new design patents, but only
over 170 were for fashion related products (nearly 7%).10 Trademark law is also not
tailored for fashion design protection. Trademark law protects designs only when they
come to integrate a source-identifying function as to indicate truthful information
about the producer of products. 11 Even if the design indicates a source, the
functionality doctrine bars trademark law protection to keep the basic designs in the
public domain for competition.
The conundrum of the fashion industry for IP legal scholars was that the U.S.
fashion industry thrives despite the failed legislative attempts for a sui generis
copyright protection and the inadequacy of design patents and trademark law to
regulate design copying. The economic theory of IP law does not provide a satisfactory
explanation for the thriving fashion industry given the low level of IP protection for
fashion designs. The economic incentive theory assumes that intellectual property
rights induce creators to engage in creative activities by granting exclusive property
rights to their works for a limited time period so that they can recoup research, design,
and production costs. According to the incentives approach, limited IP protection and
the ensuing rampant copying culture should discourage investors and designers to
engage in fashion-related creative endeavors. This copying conundrum observed in
the fashion industry has led legal scholars to pose the question as to why rampant
copying does not harm innovation?12
Use of the term “innovation” requires special attention because the main focus of
this Article’s analysis – the role of trademark law in the thriving fashion industry –
centers on capturing what “innovation” stands for in the fashion industry context.
Previous literature attempted to explain the copying conundrum by looking at
“innovation” as if it were isolated from adoption. In earlier discourse, legal scholars
conceptualized innovation as creating an invention, which is a physical, material
production activity. For the purposes of this Article, the previous understanding of
innovation is characterized as the ‘creation of design,’ or ‘design creation.’ This Article
article to be copyrightable, the design feature should be separable from the useful article. More details
will follow about the separability test in copyright law in chapter four.
8 Id.
9 Elizabeth Ferrill & Tina Tanhehco, Protecting the Material World: The Role of Design Patents
in the Fashion Industry, 12 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 251, 278 (2011).
10 Loni Morrow & Jason J. Jardine, 2017 Brings Issuance of New Design Patents for the Fashion
Industry, KNOBBE MARTENS (Feb 26, 2017), https://www.knobbe.com/news/2017/02/2017-bringsissuance-new-design-patents-fashion-industry.
11 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 205 (2000) (holding product designs can only
be protected upon the showing of source). Chapter five discusses how the trademark law grants
protection for designs in detail.
12 Kal Raustiala & Christopher Sprigman, The Piracy Paradox: Innovation and Intellectual
Property in Fashion Design, 92 VA. L. REV. 1687, 1688 – 92 (2006).
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argues that the creation of design is not innovation until the design is adopted by the
majority of people. This Article’s use of the term innovation refers to ‘adopted designs,’
and this essentially is what constitutes the term “fashion” as it is distinguished from
material dress or design. Fashion has to go through an adoption process. So it treats
the term “innovation” and “fashion” as synonymous. This Article combines the two and
uses the term “fashion innovation” throughout. This term better distinguishes the
concept from ‘design creation.’
Some scholars argued that copying is paradoxically beneficial for the fashion
industry, 13 specifically, because it provides a catalyst for design creation. This
argument is based on the view that fashion goods are essentially positional goods in
that they confer social status on the wearer. Copying is said to motivate people to seek
new designs, as dispersed designs can no longer distinguish early adopters from late
adopters or imitators. Thus, the scholars conclude, copying fails to deter design
creation. Some other scholars argue that fashion goods are cultural goods in that
people relate to clothing emotionally as a visual marker expressing their identity.14
Hemphill and Suk argue copying is only helpful for the industry to the extent that it
does not hamper individuals’ ability to differentiate while participating in common
designs or styles.15
But these views do not explain how the fashion industry keeps the producers
engaging in creative endeavors to recoup research, design, and production costs while
they know that copies of their designs (usually at a lower price) will be distributed soon
after they release new designs. Especially given the fact that contemporary copying
technology allows design pirates to be quicker and more accurate than ever in copying
original designs, we should explore how originators recover their associated costs of
production in such a rampant copying culture. Businesses can recoup their investment
in producing new designs because people desire not only to be first to adopt new designs
but also, simultaneously, they want to signal and distinguish their social status,
identity, or personality distinguished from others who will participate in similar styles
a little later with copying. As legal scholars on the previous literature identified, this
Article embraces the premise that clothing bears both positional and cultural aspects,
but suggests that both of these features should be viewed more as a result of a symbolic
creation made through branding rather than naturally given to material clothing. This
Article aims to facilitate our understanding of brands beyond a simple source-identifier
to a crucial means of communication signaling and receiving messages about the
wearer.
This Article calls attention to the capacity of trademark law to protect high-end
houses’ brand image as a luxury goods producer. It argues trademark law’s capacity
to protect fashion contributes to fashion innovation. If the previous legal scholarship
has focused on what has not been protected (design copying) to explain the thriving
fashion industry, this Article explains flourishing fashion innovation by looking to
what is protected (high-end fashion brands’ image). This Article explores how the highend fashion houses’ brand image moves the whole fashion industry forward to fashion
innovation. This Article identifies two important functions of a brand image: one, the
Raustiala & Sprigman, supra note 12.
Scott Hemphill & Jeannie Suk, The Law, Culture, and Economics of Fashion, 61 STAN. L. REV.
1147, 1158 (2008 – 2009).
15 Id.
13
14
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brand image becomes a source of desirability that it induces people to join a trend
either by purchasing branded products or copied designs, and thus contributes to the
trend distribution; and two, the brand helps to maintain the first adopters ability to
distinguish themselves from the later adaptors who may join the trend with copied
products, as the brand image allows wearers to either signal their social or economic
status or express their identity. This Article does not totally reject the beneficial role
of copying within a legal environment that offers low copyright protection for fashion
as argued by some legal scholars. It argues that the role of copying lies in helping
consumers see the result of fashion innovation and thus in speeding up the rate of
adoption.
Brand image, is a sum of mental associations (both positive and negative) that
consists of either branding activities such as naming products and advertising, or
involuntarily constructed images, such as consumers’ feedbacks about the products or
news reports about the company. People associate objects with ideas. Such objects not
only include trade names, logos, and slogans, but also extend to designs or
advertisements, among others. This Article identifies trademark law’s capacity to offer
legal protection for the elements that are capable of identifying their source or origin.
Unlike trademark law, copyright law is incapable of entitling legal protection for
designs upon the finding that copying associates consumers with a particular brand.
The Article consists of three parts. The first part focuses on the fashion industry
per se. More specifically, it discusses the role of fashion goods in trend setting and selfexpression. The first chapter, The Piracy Paradox Debate, introduces how legal
scholars have understood the fashion industry and gauged the role of law within the
industry. The second chapter, A Model of Trend Adoption, offers a new model of trend
adoption. It observes and describes the behavior of actors in the fashion industry,
drawing upon empirical social studies of fashion and other primary sources (e.g.
documentary films, newspapers). It uses what communication scholars refer to as the
diffusion model16 to explain how we perceive what is ‘in fashion’ and adopt them as
new trends. The motivation in building a trend adoption model is threefold. One, it
reveals that the hierarchical structure in the fashion industry – the notion of high-end
and lower-end brands – is a socially constructed reality. Two, trends trickle-down
along this created structure and, in a strict sense, those who are on top of the pyramid
should be viewed as true innovators; the rest play an adopter role. Three, that the
viability of the fashion industry is, in part, attributable to the industry’s uniquely fast
and reliable communication system which fosters the rapid diffusion of new designs
produced by those whom I call “true innovators.”
The third chapter, A Model of Product Diffusion, offers a model of product
differentiation. This model explains how we are persuaded to choose certain fashion
goods as a visible marker of self-expression among other similar alternative designs
by participating in the trends. This Article draws on the marketing scholarship to
suggest that difference is often expressed through the medium of brands. It uses
semiotics to elaborate that the heart of difference lies within the symbolic meaning
that the brand attaches to material goods. The less room there is for counterinterpretation of the brand meaning, the easier it is for the business to differentiate
their new products. It shows that maintaining a consistent and coherent narrative
16

EVERETT M. ROGERS, DIFFUSION OF INNOVATIONS, 11 (The Free Press, 3d ed. 1983).
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about their brands fosters rapid adoption of new fashion goods. Law provides means
both for legitimating and for contesting dominant brand meanings, and the rights
bestowed by trademark law over signifying vehicles – e.g. marks, logos, packages,
designs – play a critical role in this process.
Diffusion scholarship, in the subfield of communication research, acknowledged
difficulties in getting a new idea, practice, or object adopted, even if it has obvious
advantages. Scholars studied the ‘diffusion of new ideas’ across the various disciplines
in sociology, public health, agriculture, marketing, and education, among others. In
the diffusion scholarship context, the term “diffusion” refers to a “process by which an
innovation is communicated through certain channels over time among the members
of a social system.”17 It is a special type of communication in that the messages are
concerned with new ideas. The two models of trend adoption and product
differentiation are rooted in this communication framework that a diffusion theory
offers. A model of trend adoption explains how the fashion industry operates to
communicate what emerging trends are; a model of product differentiation explains
how brands are a mechanism for fashion companies to inform the public about their
products and that their goods are differentiated to be chosen over other goods that are
participating in the same trends. The subsequent part two and three, discuss how
trademark law doctrines tend to help some fashion goods preserve their differentiating
features from other goods.
Part two examines how trademark law has expanded its scope of protection to
basic design elements (e.g. colors, shapes), and thus legitimized them as a source of
signification for the benefit of established firms. Yet the aesthetic functionality
doctrine withholds trademark protection from ornamental features, since the granting
of exclusive rights over designs would significantly hinder competition by
impoverishing other designers’ palettes. This Article describes how courts address this
concern, and ask what role the aesthetic functionality doctrine has (or should have)
played within the courts’ analysis. Traditionally, design belongs to the realm of
copyright law. It also explores the “conceptual separability” test through which courts
decide the copyrightability of the fashion design at issue. This Article demonstrates
that designs that are likely to fall outside the realm of copyright protection are often
recognized as protectable valid trademarks. Part two begins with chapter 4, which
discusses, as the title demonstrates, How Copyright Law Offers Limited Protection for
Fashion Design. Then chapter five examines, as the title suggests, How Trademark
Law has Expanded to Protect Iconic Designs of a Brand.
Part three examines how two kinds of trademark claims, infringement and
dilution, help to preserve a fashion house’s image as a producer of prestigious,
exclusive, or unique fashion goods. Chapter six, How Trademark Infringement Claims
Help Established Brands to Maintain Prestigious Brand Image, shows that although
an infringement claim is based on consumer confusion about the source or sponsorship,
courts routinely protect consumers’ emotional resonance with the established brands,
ostensibly on confusion grounds. Then chapter seven, How Trademark Dilution
Claims Help Established Brands to Maintain Prestigious Brands, explores how the
exercise of trademark rights based on the dilution claim protects consumer association
of an established brand as a producer of luxury goods. The last chapter, How
Trademark Law Protects Prestigious Brands from Parodies, examines the capacity of
17

Id. at 10.
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both confusion and dilution claim to regulate parody works, which in turn prevents
others from transmitting a subversive message to the original meaning of the
established brands.
Trademark dilution occurs when consumers associate an established trademark
with a junior mark. One harm that a dilution claim aims to address is that a famous
mark becomes less distinct if there is a created mental association between two brands.
Even if there is no consumer confusion as to the source, trademark law recognizes that
famous mark holders suffer damage when their marks become less exclusive to identify
one source. This type of dilution is called dilution by blurring. Trademark law also
includes tarnishment as a type of dilution. Tarnishment claims protect famous marks’
reputation when a junior user undermines the image of a famous mark. For example,
the word “Enjoy Cocaine” printed on marketing posters featuring the same typeface
and red and white color scheme as Coca-Cola’s “Enjoy Coca-Cola” advertisements was
found to tarnish Coca-Cola’s famous mark. 18 The line between tarnishment and
legitimate free speech in the form of parody, however, is not always clear-cut. Many
of the cases involve traditional examples of parodies that make fun of trademarks to
socially comment on them. If there are no comments made to the trademark but only
general social comments using the mark, it is classified as satire – not parody – in
which case courts tend to provide limited protection as free speech. Other cases involve
parodies that are used as brands, a situation where a defendant uses parody as a
source designator. For example, Black Bear Roastery sells Charbucks coffee in parody
of the famous coffee brand Starbucks; Dog toy products were named Chewy Vuitton in
parody of the luxury brand Louis Vuitton. Courts have applied a variety of different
doctrinal tools to avoid holding obvious parodies illegal, but for parodies as brands, the
fact that parodies are used as a source indicator complicates legal analysis.
Rosemary Coombe, in her germinal book for the critical cultural legal studies,
writes: “The law’s recognition and protection of some activities of meaning-making
under the guise of authorship . . . and its delegitimation of other signifying practices
of meaning-making as forms of piracy . . . create particular cartographies for cultural
agency.”19 This Article is very much part of this critical study of law: I examine the
operation of trademark law in the interpretive practice of our social life in fashion. I
aim to show through legal case analysis that trademark law helps to build a difference
in favor of established fashion firms, and as a result, these firms’ capacity to inform
and sell their fashion goods is enhanced by trademark law. The firms appeal to
consumers because their designs do not only participate in trends, but also enable us
to signal social status or express individuality.
II. PART I
This Article begins by introducing two influential legal studies that have
particularly addressed the copying conundrum in the fashion industry. 20 These
articles provide a careful analysis to argue that copying is beneficial for the fashion
See Coca-Cola Co. v. Gemini Rising, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 1183 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
ROSEMARY J. COOMBE, THE CULTURAL LIFE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTIES: AUTHORSHIP,
APPROPRIATION, AND THE LAW, 6 (Duke Univ. Press 1998).
20 Raustiala & Sprigman supra note 12; Hemphill & Suk, supra note 14.
18

19
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industry. Chapter one, after a review of these articles, identifies what has been
neglected in these analyses and briefly map out distinction points that my new analysis
will offer. It then offers a model of trend adoption in chapter two and a model of product
diffusion in chapter three.
A. The Piracy Paradox Debate
In their influential Article, The Piracy Paradox, Raustiala and Sprigman argued
that design copying does not stifle design creation, and further claimed that copying
“may actually promote [them] and benefit originators.”21 They offered two interrelated
models to explain how copying functions as an “important – even necessary – element
of the apparel industry’s swift cycle of design creation.”22 Viewing clothing as a statusconferral good, Raustiala and Sprigman claim that with copying, style diffusion 23
spreads to a broader clientele and erodes the positional value of clothing by
diminishing the prestige for the social elites.24 Due to this style diffusion, fashion items
are no longer capable of signifying their status, which drives early-adopters to seek a
new style for the purpose of distinguishing themselves from the mass. The authors
posit style change as a cyclical feature: certain styles become fashionable, copied,
diffused, and then driven by early-adopters, new styles arise. The Piracy Paradox
reduces the fashion cycle to the cycle of design creation, highlighting the role of
copyright law in fostering the fashion cycle by providing for the free appropriation of
fashion designs.25 Raustiala and Sprigman argue that copying hastens the fashion
21 Id. The authors used the term “innovation,” but since they refer to creation of design in contrast
to my definition of innovation as adoption of design, this Article changed the term to design creation.
22 Id. at 1717 – 32.
23 Raustiala and Sprigman do not define the word “diffusion.” Note that their use of the word
“diffusion” is different from how the diffusion scholarship defines and uses the word as a “process by
which an innovation is communicated through certain channels over time among the members of a
social system” as elaborated in the Introduction. Raustiala and Sprigman’s usage of the word
“diffusion” rather seems to refer to an achievement of more visibility for particular designs or styles.
24 Id. at 1720
This process of diffusion leading to dissipation of social value occurs for at least two
reasons. First, the diffusion of cheap, obviously inferior copies may tarnish by association
[of] the original article . . . Second, for the class of fashion early-adopters, the mere fact
that a design is widely diffused is typically enough to diminish its value. It can no longer
signify status if it [is] widely adopted.
Note that when inferior products tarnish the brand reputation of the original article, a
trademark law dilution by tarnishment claim may provide a legal basis to ban such a use of the
mark with inferior quality products. But this claim is not generally applicable to clothing
designs that do not serve a trademark function to indicate source of product origin. Chapter
Seven will discuss tarnishment claims.
25 Raustiala & Sprigman, supra note 12, at 1722 – 24. Free appropriation of clothing designs
contributes to the process of “induced obsolescence” in at least two broader ways.
First, copying often results in the marketing of less expensive versions, thus pricing-in
consumers who otherwise would not be able to consume the design . . . [Second,] copying
contributes to the rapid production of substantially new designs that were creatively
inspired by the original design . . . The many variations made possible by unrestricted
exploitation of derivatives contributes to product differentiation that induces consumption
by those who prefer a particular variation to the original. To the extent that derivatives
remain visibly linked to the original design, they help diffuse the original designs.

[17:492 2018] The John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law

500

cycle by inducing “obsolescence” with the rapid diffusion of styles, and also by
“anchoring” trends, which is a communication function by which new designs become
fashionable, and which informs consumers that the styles have changed. 26 In
summary, as copying accelerates the fashion cycle with the “induced obsolescence” and
“anchoring” function, copying, in turn, offers more cycles to innovate for fashion
designers. It may hurt individual designers, but overall, according to Raustiala and
Sprigman, copying is beneficial for the fashion industry.
In The Law, Culture and Economics of Fashion, Hemphill and Suk seek to refute
the thesis of The Piracy Paradox. Hemphill and Suk argue that fashion items are
better viewed as cultural goods that people use to “signal and communicate about
oneself and of perceiving messages about others.”27 Based on this view, that fashion is
a visible marker of self-presentation, the scholars offer a model of trend adoption and
trend production. To ground their new model, Hemphill and Suk begin by discussing
two principal theories of fashion – Status Theory and Zeitgeist Theory – in an effort to
conceptualize what fashion is.
Status Theory posits fashion as a site of struggle over social status. German
sociologists Georg Simmel articulated this view on fashion, which was influenced by
Thorstein Veblen’s The Theory of the Leisure Class.28 Status theory postulates fashion
as an emulation process. Fashion is adopted by social elites in their motivation to
demarcate themselves as a group from the lower classes. The lower classes desire and
imitate the high society and people belonging to this social stratum. Social elites then
seek a new fashion to set them apart from the lower classes. Thus, change in fashion
is propelled by the desire of class distinction, and the joining trend necessarily involves
emulation. Although this social class account of fashion is criticized for being too
simplistic or one-dimensional, the influence of human desire to signal social status
constitutes a big part of consumer fashion behavior even in today’s supposedly classless
society. And brands play on aspirational idea of class. Hemphill and Suk do not reject
the aspect of fashion as a site of struggle over social status but embrace Zeitgeist
Theory. Herbert Blumber declared that fashion emerges through a “collective
selection” process wherein individuals make their own choices among competing styles
and form collective tastes. According to Blumber, these collective tastes are what we
recognize as trends.29 The driver of fashion is not necessarily the emulation of highstatus individuals, but rather lies in people’s desire to be ‘in fashion’ while expressing
their identity. Therefore, the fashion trend that emerges reflects the zeitgeist. 29
Under the rubric of Zeitgeist Theory, Hemphill and Suk posit two simultaneously
existing desires that constitute trend adoption, individuals’ desire for differentiation
while wanting to participate in common trends. The scholars articulated this dynamic
relationship between the desire to be distinct as individual and the desire to connect

26 Id. at 1718-34. Free appropriation of clothing designs induces obsolescence in two broad ways:
“Copying often results in the marking of less expensive versions, and what was elite quickly becomes
mass”; “Many copies are not “point-by-point reproductions.”
27 Hemphill & Suk, supra note 14, at 1164.
28 THORSTEIN VEBLEN, THE THEORY OF THE LEISURE C LASS (Renaissance Classic, 2012).
29 Id. at 1157, citing Herber Blumer, Fashion: From Class Differentiation to Collective Selection,
10 SOC. Q. 275 (1969) (“The process of trend formation begins vaguely and then sharpens until a
particular fashion is established”). Id. at 1164 (“The rise of a trend may be a “manifestation of a desire
to partake of the collective moment, to be in step with society, or to be in touch with the present”).
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with a collectivity” as a “differentiation” desire within “flocking.”30 They argue fashion
should be viewed as a result of individual choices to express individuality that combine
into collective tastes.
Hemphill and Suk argue that, in this postulation, copies play only a limited role
in the rise and fall of trends because trend joining does not equate to copying or
emulation of the upper classes. 31 “Status does not exhaust the motivations for
fashion,” the scholars write. Copying is “not the engine without which [design creation]
would slow and stagnate.” 32 Identifying human desires of “differentiation” and
“flocking” to constitute the rise of trends,33 Hemphill and Suk argue that what makes
the fashion industry a “creative endeavor is the drive to differentiation” resisting
“sheer replication of existing works even while incorporating them.”34 The impulse to
flock in fashion is expressed in the aspects of fashion that draw on copying existing
works.35 Without the differentiation component, fashion would not be a “form of design
creation.” 36 The scholars further argue, on this basis, for disaggregating the
phenomenon of close copying from the phenomenon of trends. The scholars argue that
close copying should be banned as a matter of policy for copyright law, because lineby-line copying hampers individuals’ differentiation desire.37 And yet, regulation of
derivative reworking of original designs is not desirable because it does not impair
consumers’ ability to differentiate by being visually distinguishable, as well as
consumers’ ability to participate in trends.38 While Hemphill and Suk’s policy stance
is different from Raustiala and Sprigman in drawing a distinction between inspired
works and close copying, both sides share common ground in their analysis at least in
that in a general sense, copying helps to push potential trends to emerge.39
Hemphill and Suk then establish a trend adoption and production model
reflecting “differentiation” and “flocking” desire for both consumers and designers.
Consumers seek goods that contain the trend feature but are differentiated.
Consumers recognize a trend by seeing particular styles or designs in stores or seeing
enough other people buying items. 40 In their recognition of potential trends,
consumers seek other features that could satisfy their own individual taste. 41
Designers also engage in the process of “differentiation” and “flocking.” They flock to
or converge on similar styles in any given season but “the precise result reached by

Id. at 1164 – 68.
Hemphill & Suk, supra note 14, at 1157 – 59.
32 Id. at 1159 – 1161. The authors offer three circumstances that consumers can join trends
without necessarily entailing copying: i) by being influenced to wear clothes in that style that is
recognized as fashionable; ii) by joining trends without an imitation motive but with a motive to join
a collective moment and; iii) for designers, by engaging in interpretation or reference or remixing work
of a fashionable style.
33 Kal Raustiala & Christopher Sprigman, Response: The Piracy Paradox Revisited, 61 STAN. L.
REV. 1201, 1205 (2008 – 2009).
34 Raustiala & Sprigman, supra note 12, at 1166.
35 Hemphill & Suk, supra note 14 ,at 1166.
36 Id.
37 Id. at 1184 – 1195.
38 Raustiala & Sprigman, supra note 34, at 1205.
39 Raustiala & Sprigman, supra note 12, at 1204.
40 Hemphill & Suk, supra note 14, at 1167.
41 Id. at 1166.
30
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each producer is different.”42 Designers can flock from the influences of what society
is experiencing such as war, women’s entry into the professional work place, movies or
dramas. Designers also get inspired by other designers by hearing from fabric
suppliers, stylists, magazine editors, and buyers about what other designers
incorporated into their collections of clothing for fashion shows.43 But since designers
are pressed to cope with a consumer demand to be differentiated, they seek out a
differentiated niche from other producers’ designs.
The problem with the previous analyses is their treatment of consumer psychology
– be that in the form of ‘conferring status’ or ‘differentiating from the group’ – as a
cause of driving new fashion trends in its interaction with rampant copying. This
Article draws three main distinction points from the previous analyses and offers a
new analysis. Firstly, a motivation for design creation is already built into the
industrial practice of holding a fashion event called Fashion Week. Fashion innovation
is set to occur on a regular schedule, rather than copying being the main cause of design
change. The Article restricts the concept of ‘fashion innovation’ to refer to a widely
recognized and informed designs or styles created by designers and ultimately adopted
by adopters. In fact, not every physical production deserves innovation status.
Secondly, this author views the role of copying as speeding up the adoption rate of new
designs rather than being an engine for new production of designs. This view differs
from the perspectives in previous literature that see the role of copying as a catalyst
for innovation. Thirdly, designs alone hardly provide vocabularies of self-expression
to differentiate. It is more likely through the symbolic meaning the brand is believed
to embody. More holistically, one very powerful brand often elevates a whole outfit
when put together with other clothing items. The November 1988 Vogue Magazine
cover was said to have made a symbolic statement of beginning the new era of mixing
low-end fashion items with more expensive pieces. Anna Wintour, the editor in chief,
had the model outfitted in a pair of $50 jeans and a $10,000 jewel-encrusted t-shirt
(Figure 1).44 Lastly, the two major articles I discussed here are published between 2006
and 2009, before fast fashion radically transformed the fashion industry and our idea
of copying.

Id. at 1168.
Id. at 1168 – 69.
44 Meredith Lepore, Anna Winter Has Been Breaking The Rules Since Her First Vogue Cover,
THE GRIND STONE, (2012), http://www.thegrindstone.com/2012/08/14/mentors/anna-wintour-hasbeen-breaking-the-rules-since-her-first-vogue-cover-651/ (last visited Apr. 6, 2018).
42
43
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Figure 1. Vogue Cover, November Issue 1988

The new model may be applicable to other creative industries to explain how
innovation is generated by producers and perceived by consumers. The car industry,
for instance, shares similar innovation patterns with the fashion industry. The new
car design is introduced and recognized from the auto shows. For instance, in 1948
General Motors Company introduced for the first time tailfins on its Cadillac model.
Car designers in the world picked up tailfin styling trends from the US automobile
industry, and soon tailfin styling was adopted by other manufacturers with variations,
such as tailfins growing larger and bolder, peaking between 1957 and 1961. Moreover,
cars serve more than a utilitarian function. There is a message that a car brand sends
to a driver to relate with and for the general public to read. Some brands are more or
less functional than others. Mercedes-Benz may signal high social status; Tesla may
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imply that you are an environment conscious and/or technology savvy person; and
Toyota Camry may be more about economic choices than about a choice for a selfexpression.
B. A Model of Trend Adoption
This Article argues that one should understand the rise of fashion trends as an
institutional practice, endorsed and enforced on a regular timetable, with a seasonal
change marked through the recurring event of “Fashion Week.” It draws upon
empirical social studies of fashion, documentary films, and newspaper interviews with
professionals committed to the fashion business to describe Fashion Week.
Specifically, this article describes groups of professionals working in and for the event,
including fashion houses, the media, fashion buyers, and celebrities among others.
Then, on the basis of institutional theory in sociology, it further explains why this
fashion event should be viewed as an institutional practice through which fashion
trends emerge. Lastly, this article applies diffusion theory from a subfield of
communication to analyze the process of trend adoption and show how we perceive and
ultimately adopt trends alongside Fashion Week.
1. Creation of Possible Trends
Fashion Week marks an important event in the contemporary fashion industry.
The four major fashion capitals, New York, London, Milan, and Paris, each host a
fashion show twice a year to preview the next season’s trends for either
Spring/Summer or Fall/Winter. Other cities around the world such as Los Angeles,
Sao Paulo, Tokyo, Melbourne, have recently begun to host their own fashion weeks.
However, it is Fashion Week in the four major fashion capitals that have the most
influential impact in the change of fashion trends due to their established capacity to
present the shows of famous brands and attract major retailers and members of the
press in attendance. Thus, in this analysis, the term “Fashion Week” is used to refer
to only the four major fashion week events that take place in New York, London, Milan
and Paris.
Given the limited availability of spaces and associated massive expenses, Fashion
Week sets up an entry barrier for emerging, independent, small designers. Usually a
trade association administers the events and functions like a board for Fashion Week.
For New York’s Fashion Week, the Council of Fashion Designers of America works as
a governing body for the event, yet the mega-marketing corporation IMG coordinates
the shows, the venues, and the calendar to arrange showings for about 150 designers
over seven days in a limited space. In theory, fashion designers/houses should be
admitted to the show to present their clothing collections if applicants can afford the
venues, which range from $22,000 to $ 42,000, and if there is space available for them.
In reality, however, even if these designers can afford the affiliated costs, spaces are
granted first to established and famous brands.45 Consequently, high-end designer
45
Josh
Patner,
Fashion
Week
FAQ,
SLATE,
http://www.slate.com/articles/arts/fashion/2004/09/fashion_week_faq.html.

(Sep.

13,

2004),
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brands’ participation in the fashion week events confers a prestigious status on that
particular Fashion Week.
According to Josh Patner, a former assistant designer for a designer brand Donna
Karan, major Fashion Week expenses include: fees for models starting at $2,500 each
(most shows include about 25 models); invitation designing and printing costs running
up to $ 5,000; a team of hair and makeup artists, with top stylists costing more than
$25,000 and each assistant another $250; shoe designs specifically to be paired with
the clothes for the runway show reaching up to tens of thousands of dollars for multiple
pairs, often in collaboration with top shoe designers like Manolo Blahnik and Christian
Louboutin.46 More prestigious fashion houses that sell shoes under their own brand
label, such as Gucci or Prada, tend to use their own shoes for these events.47
A fashion show is essentially a parade of outfits designed around fashion
designers’ visions, ideas, or themes. The selection of models, shoe designs, makeup
and hairstyles, background music during the catwalk, and the runway stage
decorations, all work together with clothing collections to express the designer’s vision.
Fashion editors look for specific trends, and a prevailing mode of styles as they attend
important shows. Editors identify similar styles or colors emerging from each show,
such as, satin shirts and the color violet, for example. Editors at a given magazine or
paper then decide which pieces from which collections to introduce and where and how
to photograph the clothes they choose to publish.
Front row seating at the fashion show venue requires extensive planning by
publicists and sales teams to put the most important guests, such as editors in chief of
the major fashion magazines, presidents of the major retailers, and celebrities, before
other guests. Celebrities usually get invitations months before the show and make a
grand entrance in the photo zone at Fashion Week and are then escorted to their front
row seats. 48 A photo of a celebrity at a show adds glamour or value to the given
designer’s or fashion brand’s reputation. They affect the “cult of the absolutely
fabulous,”49 by fetishizing goods with their celebrity persona. Celebrities today go
further than playing an ambassador role for fashion brands by participating in
designing fashion items in their collaboration with fashion brands,50 and even further,
often utilize their image as a style icon to launch their own brands.51.

Id.
Id.
48 Id.
49 Jennifer Wicke, Enchantment, Disenchantment, Re-Enchantment: Joyce and the Cult of
the Absolutely Fabulous, 29 NOVEL: A FORUM ON FICTION 128, 128 – 137 (Autumn 1995).
50 H&M has collaborated with celebrities such as Madonna (2006, 2007), Kylie Minogue (2007),
David Beckham (2012), Anna Dello Russo (2012), and Beyoncé (2013), For more information, see
H&M,
http://about.hm.com/en/About/facts-about-hm/fashion-for-all/collections/collaborations.html
(last visited Apr. 6, 2018).
51 Top 10 celebrity fashion lines named by Time Magazine include: Jessica Simpson, Nicole
Richie, Victoria Beckham, Mary-Kate and Ashley Olsen, Gwen Stefani, Jay-Z, Justin Timberlake,
Beyoncé, Diddy, and Kanye West. See Nate Rawlings, Top 10 Fashion Lines, TIME (Oct. 3, 2011),
http://content.time.com/time/specials/packages/article/0,28804,2095867_2095865_2095910,00.html.
Brands that celebrities launch are not necessarily limited to fashion brands but expands to a life-style
brand. Gwyneth Paltrow, for example, launched her brand Goop (2008), initially an e-mail newsletter
that introduces her audience to her lifestyle including health-centric recipe, beauty tips, parenthood,
where to shop and go, and whom to see for expert advice on certain issues.
46
47
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The prevailing value that the runway show offers is a value of art. Far beyond its
utilitarian value, a fashion house wants its clothing collections to be viewed as artwork
and the runway show stage becomes a site of performance art. 52 The value of
commerce should refrain from penetrating the catwalk. Deals and sales with buyers
should not draw much media attention, in order to maintain the image of designers’
collections as art and in fact, this aspect receives very little media coverage.53
Commercial transactions take place in a separated, if not segregated, trade
venue.54 The trade venue is located separately but next to the runway show venue and
is a place for buyers from the world to purchase orders of their selected-collections to
sell at department stores or at boutique shops. Buyers are said to usually complete
their purchase orders in advance of the runway shows. This commercial practice also
plays into the idea that ‘unique’ collectibles from Fashion Week are then to be massordered and available to everyone. Thus, Fashion Week is premised on the idea of
promoting copying (although distinguishable) while artificially promoting the aura of
the original artwork.
Drawing on the institution theory in the field of sociology, this article now turns
to argue why and how we can consider the rise of trends as an institutional practice
enacted via the Fashion Week. The concepts of “institution” and “institutionalization”
vary among different approaches. Drawing upon these various approaches, there are
three reasons to view Fashion Week as an institutional practice.
Firstly, Fashion Week gives artwork value or status to the presented clothing
collections. One of the earliest and most influential views of institutionalization
defines it as a process of instilling value.55 To institutionalize is to infuse with value
beyond the technical requirements of the task at hand. By instilling value,
institutionalization promotes stability, persistence of the structure over time. 56
Fashion Week event does more than simply presenting the fashion houses’ works.
Participating fashion houses that present in the show acquire an artwork value for
their clothing collections, which is evidenced by the reactions of participants – the
media, buyers, celebrities, power bloggers – as well as the general public, who love to
be part of the events as participants of a trend. The lack of opportunity for small
designers to present at Fashion Week events contributes to stabilizing the existing
fashion structure.
Secondly, the Fashion Week creates the social reality of what we perceive as a
world of high fashion. Another theory views institutionalization as a process of
creating social reality.57 In seeking an answer to the nature and origin of social order,
52 For discussion on how high end fashion is socially created in comparison to mass fashion, see
Agnes Rocamora, Field of Fashion: Critical Insights into Bourdieu’s Sociology of Culture, 2 J.
CONSUMER CULTURE 341 (2002).
53 Joanna Entwistle & Agnes Rocamora, The Field of Fashion Materialized: A Study of London
Fashion Week, 40 SOC. 735, 739 (2006) (“The ‘creative’ and ‘artistic’ are celebrated through the
privileging of the fashion catwalk to the detriment of the ‘commercial’ exhibition, which receives little
press coverage.”).
54 Id.
55 PHILIP SELZNICK, LEADERSHIP IN ADMINISTRATION (Harper & Row 1957); CHARLES
PERROW, COMPLEX ORGANIZATIONS: A CRITICAL ESSAY (Random House, 3d ed. 1986).
56 Richard Scott, The Adolescence of Institutional Theory, 32 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 493, 493 – 494 (1987).
57 PETER L. BERGER & THOMAS LUCKMANN, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY (Random
House 1966); John W. Meyer & Brian Rowan, Institutional Organizations: Formal Structures as Myth
and Ceremony, 83 AM. J. SOC. 340, 341 (1977).
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scholars have argued that the social order is a human construction coming into being
as individuals take action, interpret that action, and share with others their
interpretations. To institutionalize means to go through a social process by which
individuals come to accept a shared social reality. Berger and Luckmann explain that
institutionalization involves three phases of externalization, objectivation, and
internalization.58 People take action (externalization) and interpret our actions as if
there is an external reality separate from ourselves (objectivation). Further, this
objectified world is internalized by us. 59 Fashion Week evokes the cognitive
convictions of high-end fashion with forms of actions taken by various actors involved
in the fashion show. Entwistle and Rocamora observe London Fashion Week and
write: “[t]he catwalk theater is a particularly visible realm where identities are created
through very visible performances…all players are both subject and object of the gaze
in the game of visibility.”60 This, in turn, allows us to associate participant fashion
houses with a class of high-end producers and create a social reality of what we believe
to exist, a world of high fashion.
Thirdly, Fashion Week serves as a source of legitimacy for the fashion houses to
introduce fashion innovations. Another version of institutional theory emphasizes that
organizations conform to a set of institutionalized beliefs often because they are
rewarded for doing so through increased legitimacy, resources, and survival
capabilities.61 To institutionalize is to cause an organization to change its structure in
ways that make it conform to an institutional pattern.62 Today, Fashion Week has
become a gateway for fashion designers to present their new works and attain status
as an innovator. Designers aim to make a Fashion Week debut and have their name
included in the circle of prestigious fashion brands. But given the high entry barrier
of the Fashion Week events due to the decision-making process by the board, costs,
and space, independent designers think that a Fashion Week debut is a dream that is
unlikely to come true in their lifetime.63
The fast fashion brands further initiated their own Fashion Week outside or
inside the mainstream Fashion Week calendar. The English fashion brand, Topshop,
held their fashion show entitled “The Future of the Fashion Show” in the basement of
the Tate Modern Museum in London in collaboration with Google.64 The show was
broadcast on the Topshop’s YouTube page and each model was equipped with a mini
camera. The Swedish fast fashion retailer H&M had their Paris Fashion Week show

BERGER & LUCKMANN, supra note 57, at 54 – 55.
ROBERT WUTHNOW, ET. AL., CULTURAL ANALYSIS, 39 (Routledge 1984).
60 Entwistle & Rocamora, supra note 53, at 744.
61 Paul J. Dimaggio & Walter W. Powell, The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and
Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields, 48 AM. SOC. R. 147 (1983).
62 Scott, supra note 56, at 498.
63 At the newspaper interview, one of the small designers who participated in New York Fashion
Week said, “[i]t is every designer’s dream to be at the Fashion Week here in New York. I’m so happy
and flattered that I was invited again. Not everybody gets this chance.” See Molar Visaya, Furne One’s
Amato Closes S/S 2015 New York Fashion Week, ASIAN JOURNAL (Sept. 26, 2014),
http://asianjournal.com/aj-magazines/furne-ones-amato-closes-ss-2015-new-york-fashion-week/.
64 Charlie
Byrne, Topshop moves to Tate Modern, THE TIMES (Jan. 17, 2014)
http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/life/fashion/article3978166.ece.
58
59
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in the gardens of the Musee Rodin in Paris.65 This practice may well be understood as
lower-fashion brands’ effort to gain the ‘value of art’ for their goods to create a cognitive
connection of their brand in the high fashion world, and to acquire legitimacy as a
producer of prestigious goods. These marketing efforts aim to promote the idea of
‘accessibility’ and ‘pervasiveness’ in opposition to high-end brands to broaden the range
of customers and markets. Yet, by creating their own runway stage (although outside
the main stream fashion week event), the brands intend to promote the aura of a
luxury goods producer.
2. The Adoption of Trends
How do we perceive newness in dress generated at Fashion Week events and
ultimately adopt them? By tracing this process of fashion trend adoption within the
framework of diffusion theory, in the subfield of communication research. The problem
diffusion studies identify is a difficulty in informing others about new ideas or practices
and getting them adopted because adoption entails uncertainty for consumers who
decide to adopt.66 Rogers defines innovation as an “idea, practice, or object that is
perceived as new by an individual or other unit of adoption.”67 Uncertainty is the
“degree to which a number of alternatives are perceived with respect to the occurrence
of an event and the relative probabilities of these alternatives.”68 It motivates an
individual to seek further information about innovation in order to cope with the
uncertainty. Information is a “difference in matter-energy that affects uncertainty in
a situation where a choice exists among a set of alternatives.”69 Brands become a
medium through which information about fashion goods comes in and out, and
ultimately affect consumers’ purchase decisions among alternatives by reducing
uncertainty about the product. The information exchange about innovation occurs
among communication agencies involved in the process. Adoption is viewed as a
decision process throughout which potential adopters collect information regarding
innovation.
The diffusion scholarship defines “diffusion” as a “process by which an innovation
is communicated through certain channels over time among the members of a social
system.”70 When the public sees celebrities wearing designs from a particular brand
or when designs are featured in influential fashion magazines like Vogue, diffusion
happens by providing information to the public that such design features are trends
now. The word “innovation” carries two dimensions in the fashion industry context.
The conventional understanding of innovation is design as a material production while
diffusion theory allows us to view innovation as design turning into a trend as an
immaterial, social process. Clothing design, in a sense, is a container that captures
the idea of trends. The role of trademark law lies in governing such information that
65 Tina Isaac-Goizé, H&M Puts Its Spin on 300 Years of Fashion Tina Isaac-Goizé's picture,
VOGUE (Apr. 6, 2016) http://www.vogue.com/article/caroline-de-maigret-bianca-brandolini-hm-parismuseum-party.
66 ROGERS, supra note 16, at 1.
67 Id. at 11.
68 Id. at 6.
69 Id.
70 ROGERS, supra note 16, at 6.
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the goods of a prestigious brand carry, which may include desirability, exclusivity,
uniqueness, or quality.
Research on the diffusion of innovations has been conducted independently across
various disciplines. For example, rural sociologists investigated the diffusion of
agricultural technology to farmers; educational researchers studied diffusion of new
teaching methods among schools. The principal diffusion scholar Rogers argued that
although these approaches to diffusion research are distinctive, each uncovered
remarkably similar findings. Rogers defined “rate of adoption” as the “relative speed
with which an innovation is adopted by members of a social system.”71 When the
number of individuals adopting an innovation is plotted on a cumulative frequency
basis over time, the resulting distribution is an s-shaped curve though there is
variation in the slope of the “s” from innovation to innovation as Figure 2 illustrates.
Figure 2. S-Shaped Innovation Diffusion Curve72

At first, only a few adopt an innovation, and the diffusion scholarship includes
innovators as one of the adopter categories since innovators themselves are the ones
who choose to adopt the new idea. Soon the diffusion curve begins to climb as more
and more individuals adopt the new idea. The trajectory of the rate of adoption begins
to level off as fewer and fewer individuals remain who have not yet adopted. Finally,
the s-shaped curve reaches its asymptote, and the diffusion process is finished.
Rogers divided adopters into five categories – innovators, early adopters, early
majority, late majority, and laggards – on the basis of innovativeness. Innovativeness
Id. at 23.
Note that this s-shaped curve graph is a modification from Rogers’ work by Chantelle Garritty,
et. al., Who’s Using PDAs? Estimates of PDA Use by Health Care Providers: A Systematic Review of
Surveys, 8 J. MED. INTERNET RES. 1438 (2006). I used this graph because it incorporated adopter
categories with the innovation diffusion curve. Rogers originally did not put the adopter category
together with the innovation diffusion curve, but explained the category in a separate normal
distribution graph, see ROGERS, supra note 16, at 243.
71

72
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is “the degree to which an individual or other unit of adoption is relatively earlier in
adopting new ideas than other members of a system.”73 For Rogers, innovators are
willing to experience new ideas and bring innovation. Early adopters, Rogers argues,
hold leadership roles in the social system, which means other members come to them
to get advice or information about the innovation. Rogers writes that early adopters
“put their stamp of approval on a new idea by adopting it.”74 Early majority, on the
other hand, do not play the leadership role that early adopters play, but they have
strong interpersonal networks to be informed of innovations. 75 The late majority
adopts after most of their peers adopt the innovation. They tend to share skepticism
about the innovation. 76 Rogers related laggards’ lack of awareness to limited
resources; he claims laggards decide to adopt after observing that the innovation is
successfully adopted by other members in the society.77
This Article applies Rogers’ diffusion of innovations concepts to identify the
process of fashion innovation adoption in terms of an efficient and faster
communication system, arguing that fashion innovation diffusion occurs around the
institutionalized Fashion Week. As showed in the above subchapter, Creation of
Possible Trends, Fashion Week serves as an institutional venue in which participant
designers and fashion companies acquire status as legitimate innovators and introduce
their collections of clothing in expectation of being chosen to emerge as the next
season’s trends. Fashion editors and buyers who participated in Fashion Week play
an early adopter role. Early adopters are opinion leaders who are the “first to adopt
and are willing to maintain their position by evaluating innovations for the others.”78
Buyers are obviously the important opinion leaders; their choice of collections in the
Fashion Week trade venue is displayed at the retail level to be adopted by the public
audience. Fashion editors also play an influential opinion leader role. 79 Fashion
magazines devote much of their editions to cover emerging trends from their business
trips to Fashion Week events. Their choice of which pieces from which collections to
exclude or include, whose collections, and in what manner, affects the rapid adoption
by magazine readers. The degree of “opinion leadership” for major fashion magazines
such as Vogue is particularly high. With a large number of subscribers, they influence
“individuals’ attitudes or overt behavior informally in a desired way with relative
frequency.”80
Editorials provide analysis of reigning trends from Fashion Week, referencing
renowned designer brands and often also identifying their creative directors. The
number of collection pieces presented in a show may be more than thousands. Among
ROGERS, supra note 16, at 22.
Id. at 248 – 51.
75 Id.
76 Id.
77 ROGERS, supra note 16, at 248 – 51.
78 Tahir Ahmad Wani & Syed Wajid Ali, Innovation Diffusion Theory: Review & Scope in the
Study of Adoption of Smartphones in India, 3 J. GEN. MGMT. RES. 105 (2015).
79 See The September Issue, Video, directed by R.J. Cutler, (LA: Roadside Attractions, 2009). A
documentary film, The September Issue, gains unprecedented access to the inner workings of the US
Vogue, a prestigious fashion magazine. The Film reveals how the legendary Vogue editor-in-chief
Anna Wintour and her team of editors making the September issue of the magazine. The Film informs
us of Anna Wintour’s powerful influence over designers and fashion magazine in the selection of styles
for the next season’s collection for Fashion Week shows.
80 ROGERS, supra note 16, at 27.
73
74
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them, some styles distinctively overlap across brands. Fashion editors identify
reigning trends from the collections and enlighten the public as to what is next season’s
“big thing.”81 Fashion magazine Allure claims, for example, that 2016 Spring trends
are “Wearing heart on Your Chest” (Figure3), “Tudor Style” (Figure 4), “Super Stripes”
(Figure 5), “Dresses over Pants” (Figure 6), among others, by identifying repeated
patterns of styles across brands from their collections.82
Figure 3. Wearing Heart on Your Chest: Rodarte, Gucci, Proenza
Schouler (from left)

81 See, e.g., Nikki Ogunnaike & Justine Carreon, A Comprehensive Guide to Spring 2016 Fashion
Trends, ELLE, (Oct. 7, 2015) http://www.elle.com/fashion/trend-reports/g26822/spring-2016-fashiontrends/; Kerry Pieri, Spring 2017 Trend Report: New York Fashion Week, HARPERSBAZAAR (Sept. 20,
2016) http://www.harpersbazaar.com/spring-fashion/.
82 Kristen Bateman & Seunghee Suh, A Guide to the Most Wearable Spring 2017 Fashion
Trends, ALLURE, (Oct. 5, 2016) http://www.allure.com/gallery/spring-2017-fashion-trends.
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Figure 4. Tudor Style: J.W. Anderson, Burberry, Gucci (from left)

Figure 5. Super Stripes: Rosie Assoulin, Proenza Schouler, Ports 1961
(from left)
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Figure 6. Dresses over Pants: Sportsmax, Rodarte, Derek Lam (from left)

Once collections are released during Fashion Week, some designs in collections
become an object of rampant copying, ranging from derivative/inspired works to
identical copies by many layers of lower-end manufacturers or counterfeiters. Fashion
magazines also contribute in proliferating collection designs with articles providing
information on where one can get a cheaper version of fashionable clothing.83 Figure
7 shows a fashion feature that introduces tapestry as the trend from the runway
collections and then informs the reader of a way to participate in this trend of style on
a budget with a price under $200, displaying a range from high-end designer brand
Tory Burch to fast fashion manufacturers Zara and Mango.

83 Lynn Yaeger, The Ultimate Guide to Fall Fashion Shopping on a Budget, VOGUE, (Sept. 9,
2015) http://www.vogue.com/13332282/best-fall-fashion-trends-budget/.
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Figure 7. Tapestry Style in the Runway (Top) and Alternative Items from
the Lower-end Brands/Prices (bottom)

Zara fringed scarf, $70; Topshop premium geo jacquard flares, $85; Scotch & Soda
reversible jacket, $199; Tory Burch printed cotton jersey long-sleeve T-shirt, $125; Joe
Fresh print pleat skirt, $44; Mango floral print top, $50 (from the top left to right then
to bottom from right to left; emphasis added to brand names).
These Fashion Week inspired copies communicate to us which designs are
fashionable.84 The practice of rampant copying in the fashion industry plays a key role
in that it allows innovators to rapidly proliferate their new styles or designs to the
public. Copying enhances the “degree to which the results of an innovation are visible
to others.” Rogers termed this as “observability,” and identified it one of the qualities
84 Some argue that fast fashion brands democratize fashion for everyone to participate in trends
at a less cost without having to buy high-end designer brands. See Liroy Choufan, Fashion’s
Democratic Disease, BOF (Mar. 25, 2013), https://www.businessoffashion.com/articles/opinion/op-edfashions-democratic-disease (citing Sarah Jessica Parker, a fashion icon celebrity: “I think it makes
luxury available for people and I think that's wonderful and very democratic.”).
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that affect adoption rates.85 The easier it is for individuals to see the results of an
innovation, the more likely they are to adopt it.86 A low level of copyright protection
contributes to the distribution of trends, and yet the law is not capable of preserving
early adopters’ interest to be the first to adopt trends, as well as to differentiate
themselves from others participating in trends with copying works. In this context,
the lower-end brands’ power to diffuse their products derives almost exclusively from
the fact that their innovations follow common trends already in existence.
Once the designs inspired by Fashion Week collections reign in the market, the
early majority adopts: these are usually trendsetters sensitive to the emerging trends,
such as celebrities, fashion bloggers, fashion models, and stylists. Then the late
majority and laggards adopt. The reign of the fashion week inspired innovations
extends far to the second-hand clothing store. The manager at a Seattle thrift shop
informed this author how she and her merchandiser colleagues decide what clothing
to buy when their customers come to sell used clothing:
We look for styles that align with what we think is fashionable at the moment
confirmed from our little field trip to department stores and/or fast fashion
manufacturers. If clothes are from well-known brands, they still sell because
of the brand name even though they are outdated season. We can see that
the trend has gone through almost a full cycle by the time we buy those usedclothing.87
This Article’s trend adoption model sheds lights on the fashion industry’s unique
faster communication system. Communication channels themselves – e.g. fashion
magazines, celebrities – simultaneously serve an innovation adopter role and further
the rampant copying practice of the industry by promoting “observability” of the result
of innovation to speed up the adoption rate. During the relatively short life cycle of
innovation, such an organized communication system fosters the diffusion of
innovation. Distinguished from the previous analysis, I treat innovations directly
made by Fashion Week participants and Fashion Week inspired innovation differently.
Innovator status must be earned through having their collections on the Fashion Week
stage. Those designers or manufacturers who make Fashion Week inspired designs
did not earn that status; they merely adopted innovations made by high-end fashion
brands that presented their collections in a major Fashion Week show. The copycats
play an adopter role helping trends become visible to the public more quickly and to be
distributed with copied designs.
But if copying is around soon, how come originators of possible trends, that is,
Fashion Week participants recoup their investment for their collections of new
designs? What makes consumers want to buy goods from a more expensive designer
brand than more affordable copies? Steve Madden produced its BTotally bag at the
price of $108, while its allegedly original design Falabella bag from the designer brand
Stella McCartney costs at $1,100 (Figure 8).

ROGERS, supra note 16, at 16.
Id.
87 Jessica Abel (thrift store manager) in an interview with the author of this Article, September
2016.
85
86
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Figure 8. Stella McCartney (left) and Steven Madden (right)88

What difference does the famous Kelly bag (over $8,000), which Hermes originally
designed for Grace Kelly (a Queen of Monaco), make compared to other persuasive
copies or parody bags (over $40) (Figure 9)? Why would you choose sneakers from Gucci
over Guess if they share an almost identical look and feel (Figure 10)

88 Lydia Dishman, How Stella McCartney, Tory Burch, Hermes are fighting ‘cheap knockoffs,’
FORTUNE, (Oct. 24, 2015) http://www.thefashionlaw.com/home/longchamp-sues-bed-bath-beyondover-fake-handbags.
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Figure 9. Grace Kelly with Hermes Kelly Bag (left)89 and Parody Bag
from Jelly Kelly (right)90

Figure 10. Guess (left) and Gucci (right) 91

The following section of this chapter argues that it is the brand meaning that a
set of branding effort attaches to clothing that makes products desirable and
differentiates them from other similar products. The legal mechanism intended to
highlight throughout the Article is that trademark law is well suited to help, and it
89 Jenny Mearns, 1950s Handbags, Purses, and Evening Bag Styles, VINTAGE DANCER, archived
at http://vintagedancer.com/1950s/1950s-handbags-purses-styles/.
90 See
NOW, http://www.nowcollection.my/product/bag-of-parody-jelly-kelly-pink/ (last
visited Apr. 6, 2018).
91 Chantal Fernandez, Gucci Loses Trademark Infringement Case Against Guess in France,
FASHIONISTA (Feb. 2, 2015) http://fashionista.com/2012/05/guess-ordered-to-pay-4-7-million-to-gucciin-trademark-infringement-case.
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actually does help to maintain brand meanings created by the relatively established
brands. The next subchapter elaborates on a mechanism of how brands can operate
as a vehicle to attach symbolic meanings to material goods, thus enabling us to express
our social status (e.g. the rich or powerful), personality, or identity apart from others.
In the subsequent chapters, this Article unfolds how trademark law operates and
protects the self-expressive side of goods. The current thriving fashion industry may
be attributable to the combined role of copyright law and trademark law. Limited
copyright protection for fashion design allows us to rapidly adopt trends with copying.
Trademark law prevents the kind of copying that associate a consumer with a product
source, which helps to preserve the innovators or early adopters’ interest in
differentiating themselves from others. Trademark law does not completely bar
copying; it allows copying that does not indicate a product source. This, in turn, helps
to distribute new fashion trends in line with copyright law, while keeping the early
adopters' interest in signaling their leisure status. Trademark law helps to maintain
original designs’ capacity to differentiate the wearer from others by protecting brand
meaning for the established firms.92
C. A Model of Product Diffusion
The previous subchapter focused on a model of trend adoption reflected in
features of fashion goods that tend to share a component of collective trends. It
illustrated the emergence of trends identified by fashion magazines, such as “Wearing
Heart on Your Chest, ” “Tudor Style,” “Super Stripes,” “Dresses over Pants,” in Figures
2 through 5. These figures showed that each brand presented their own designs that
came to share features with designs made by other brands. However, what makes
people choose, for example, the Gucci version of Tudor style over Burberry? How can
we distinguish ourselves as distinctive individuals while we participate in common
trends? This subchapter provides a model of product diffusion that reflects another
feature of fashion goods, that is, their use as a visible marker of self-expression either
to signal wearer’s social status or identity. Drawing on the marketing scholarship,
brands become a mechanism of diffusing products by making differences among other
competing goods. Further, based on semiotics, this subchapter elaborates how
difference is created via branding. This model complements a model of trend adoption
in terms of providing explanation on how Fashion Week participants manage their
identity as high-end fashion producers. The aim here is to provide a mechanism to
explain what makes consumers choose one product over another when these products
share many similar design features.
Marketing scholar Kornberger claims that the formula of a brand is
“brand=functionality + meaning.” 93 Nike is performance (not just running shoes);
Burberry is English classic (not just trench coat); Gucci is Italian luxury (not just
handbag); Apple is innovation (not just electrical device) and so on.94 Early marketing
92 Part Two will cover in detail legal battles between originators and copyists that were previously
mentioned in the examples provided in Figure 7 (Bag with stitched chains around), Figure 8 (Hermes
Kelly bag parody) and Figure 9 (Sneakers, among other cases).
93 MARTIN KORNBERGER, BRAND SOCIETY, xii (Cambridge Univ. Press 2010).
94 Id. at 13.
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practice focused on the functionality of goods to appeal to consumers and based their
marketing on the scientific facts and statistics. 95 Then, marketing commentators
began to understand that people relate to goods emotionally and unconsciously, and
marketers attempted to attribute symbolic meaning to goods without changing their
functionality.96 Trademark law expanded from its initial purpose of protecting a mark
to convey truthful information about the source, qualities, or characteristics of a
product, towards including the symbolic meaning of products too.
Edward Barney, in the course of working to find a way to sell cigarettes and make
women smoke, used the following strategy, as described by Kornberger:
He organized a group of women at the New York City Easter Day Parade to
have cigarettes strapped to their legs; at a signal, they would all light up
during the parade as a sign of resistance against a male-dominant society.
The cigarette would become synonymous with an act of rebellion – it would
be seen as a torch of freedom.97
Goods turn into a brand when they come to embody a symbolic dimension to represent
a certain meaning. The soap manufacturer Ivory, for instance, branded its goods to
represent purity and cleanliness to differentiate their more expensive Ivory Soap from
other cheaper soap products: what consumers bought was not a bar of soap but the
idea of purity.98 Likewise, what draws the line between high fashion brands and nonhigh fashion brands is whether the fashion house has successfully acquired symbolic
meaning via a brand so that consumers come to believe purchased goods carry certain
meaning within.
The symbolic meaning that a brand offers is critical for the high fashion brands
to recoup the investment for their research, design, and manufacturing. In the age of
close copying technology, high fashion brands have lost their first-to-market advantage
because imitators can instantly capture images of collections with their cell-phones
and reproduce the latest catwalk creations with a modicum of variations. In earlier
days, imitators had to sneak in to the fashion show theater, sketch the styles from
memory, and then send the sketches to the factory to reproduce designs. This time lag
allowed high fashion houses to recoup the investment in production before copies
become available in the market. Today, once the date is set for a Fashion Week show,
high-end designers showcase their collections months before they go on sale, and the
fast-fashion retailers can usually get runway inspired designs to the market much
faster. In addition, the fast-fashion retailers such as H&M and Forever 21 have a
faster cycle of design change, producing a new clothing line within two or three weeks.
If it were not for branding, the meaning and value a brand offers to consumers, the
high-fashion houses would likely witness a decline in sales in our current technological
context.
People not only desire to be first in adopting new styles, but also want new styles
to affiliate them with a leisure status. Trademark law is well suited to serve these
innovators and early adopters’ desire with its capacity to protect features of a product
Id. at 53 – 60.
Id. at 6.
97 KORNBERGER, supra note 93, at 6.
98 Id. at 16.
95
96
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designating a source. Luxury brand products enable consumers to send messages to
others about their power, wealth, and prestige compared to others who possess copied
works. To take an example from Figure 2 of identified emergent trends, one may want
to be first to adopt the style of “Wearing Heart on Your Chest,” but she/he wears not
just any heart. It is the Gucci heart, which will help the wearer to signal her/his leisure
status as distinguished from others who also wear a heart on their chest.
1. Brands as Diffusion Mechanism
Marketing scholars analyze brands with different perspectives and there is no
single definition scholars and practitioners would agree on for what we mean by
brands. In the early days, brands were narrowly understood as product features or an
additional implement in management’s toolbox. 99 Brands were considered to be a
managerial tool for the individual organization to use to simply market its products
and services. The brand, according to this view, is simply a logo, mark, slogan,
advertisements, or one of the techniques or tactics used to promote a company’s goods
and services. Challenging and expanding this view, other scholars shift the focus from
the product to understand brands in relation to the corporation. Scholars argue that,
as the key strategic principle that organizes the corporation and its employees, brands
affect the internal structuring of the organization. Brands force businesses to rethink
and restructure around how they view themselves around brand identity.100 Although
these two streams of thoughts on brands differ in their understanding, they both focus
on the organizational level to analyze what brands are. In extension of this view, this
Article aligns with other marketing scholars to conceptualize brands as a tool to
actively create and manage the identity of an organization. Brands are identities built
and managed through language. 101 The brand and identity become mutually
constitutive concepts.
Semiotics provides a useful conceptual tool to understand how brands create
identity through language. This Article urges to think of brand identity as what
semiotics describes as signs. A sign can be defined by looking at ‘what it does’ rather
than asking for ‘what it is.’ 102 One of the principal founders of semiotics, Charles
Sanders Peirce (1839-1914) defined a sign as “something which stands to somebody for
something in some respect or capacity.”103 The Swiss linguist Ferdinand de Saussure
(1857-1913), writes that the sign is “the whole that results from the associating of the
signifier with the signified.”104 Saussure’s dyadic sign model explains that the sign is

DAVID AAKER, BUILDING STRONG BRANDS (The Free Press 1996).
MAJKEN SCHULTZ & MARY JO HATCH, TAKING BRAND INITIATIVE: HOW COMPANIES CAN ALIGN
STRATEGY, CULTURE, AND IDENTITY THROUGH CORPORATE BRANDING (Jossey-Bass 2008).
101 For the broader understanding of brands, see generally MARCEL DANESI, OF CIGARETTES,
HIGH HEELS, AND OTHER INTERESTING THINGS: AN INTRODUCTION TO SEMIOTICS (SEMAPHORES AND
SIGNS) (Palgrave Macmillan, 2d ed. 2008); KORNBERGER, supra note 93, at 31; CELIA LURY, BRANDS:
THE LOGOS OF THE GLOBAL ECONOMY (Routledge 2004).
102 Barton Beebe, The Semiotic Analysis of Trademark Law, 51 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 621, 630 (2004).
103 Id. at 636.
104 Id. at 634.
99

100
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a “double-entity” formed by the relation between a “signifier” and the “signified,” as
the Figure 11 illustrates.105

Figure 11. The Saussurean Sign106
Signifier

Signified
Generally speaking, the signifier is the “perceptible form of the sign (e.g. the sound of
a word, the visual appearance of a street sign).” 107 The signified consists of the
particular mental idea for which the perceptible form stands. For example, in the sign
BOOK, for example, the sound or appearance of the word “book” (the signifier) typically
stands for the concept of a book (the signified).108 The sound “book” is not itself a “sign”
of the concept of a book. Rather, the sound and the concept together form the sign.
Structuralists conceive of identity “not as something intrinsic, but rather as
something depend entirely on extrinsic, oppositional relations, that is, on relations of
differential value to other identities in a system.”109 The value of any one element
depends on the simultaneous coexistence of all the others.110 Value describes placevalue, context, and situation: “Signs function . . . not through their intrinsic value but
through their relative position.”111 The meaning of book, for example, is not located in
the thing itself. Rather, difference is more fundamental in the construction of
meaning; that is, the meaning of book is based on non-books such as a piece of paper,
journals, magazines, or newspapers.
In semiotic terms, the brand identity is a relational construct enacted in
language. The brand meaning emerges out of the relation with other brands: CocaCola is different from Pepsi; Seven-Up is non-cola; Apple is not IBM or Microsoft and
so on. As a key point, this Article, suggests that brand value be understood as a
“commodity’s differential value as against all other commodities, and thus the
commodity’s capacity to differentiate its consumer.”112 Brands do not consist of single
language (e.g. words, designs) but of complex stories.113 Language is part of the grand
narrative. Heilbrunn writes: “a brand acts as a narrative programme, which must
promote a system of material and discursive differences so as to justify and legitimize

Id. at 633.
Beebe, supra note 102, at 634.
107 Id.
108 Id. at 633 – 34.
109 Id.
110 Barton Beebe, The Semiotic Analysis of Trademark Law, 51 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 621, 640 (2004).
111 Id. at 640.
112 Id. at 643.
113 KORNBERGER, supra note 93, at 108.
105
106
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its existence among other brands and so as to create consumers’ preferences.” 114
Because the brand consists of language, brand identity can be stable and change at the
same time. The stability of brand identity is a temporary illusion. Identity is a fluid
concept. The final meaning is always socially constructed by people through their
interpretation of brands to contest and/or confirm to reach a mutual agreement on
what the brands stand for. There are many fragmented identities and realities and
the organization strives to achieve congruence between the identities viewed by the
company and the perceived image by the public by lessening the gap between the
two.115 The image is how people outside the organization perceive its brand identity,
and it is likely to de-stabilize and challenge identity. Because brand identity emerges
within the link between the self-identified identity and perceived image, identity lies
in constant flux, Kornberger writes, “the brand becomes the arena in which those
clashes occur, and at least temporary, resolved.”116
2. How Brands Operate on Our Lives
The fine line between ‘reality’ and ‘appearance’ (how brands describe themselves
through language) gets blurred as the organization successfully situates the brand in
context and into one consistent narrative. Advertising stimulates the consumer to
experience the story of the brand as opposed to the product. For example, the luxury
jewelry company Tiffany’s advertising turns layers of rings into layers of love to show
off. On its official website, the company displays many pictures of rings to choose from,
and these words appear in the middle of the product options, "This one. Or that one?
With so many sophisticated options, choosing more than one is often the only course.
After all, love has many layers—and so does a modern stack." 117 By targeting
customers looking to buy rings as a gift, through these words Tiffany generates
symbolic meaning that buying more than one ring and having them layered equates to
show many layers of a purchaser’s love. The luxury car company BMW placed their
car in the James Bond films to use as 007’s vehicle of choice.118 The English fashion
brand Burberry featured a short musical film telling the tale of a young couple falling
in love against a theatrical backdrop of London. In 1984, the technology company,
Apple, launched a commercial during the Super Bowl which did not even show or
describe the actual product it intended to promote, the Macintosh personal
computer.119 The commercial features images of mindless drones brainwashed by the
tyrant on the screen. A girl runs into the screen and throws the sledgehammer, which
114 Id. See also, ROLAND BARTHES, THE FASHION SYSTEM (Univ. of Ca. Press,1983). Barthes
took fashion as a field to study workings of language or sign. He analyzed the descriptions in the
fashion magazines, Elle and Le Jardin des Modes, for the years 1958-59 through the semiology and
showed how fashion, as a meaning people perceive, has changed.
115 KORNBERGER, supra note 93, at 111.
116 KORNBERGER, supra note 93, at 112.
117 See Tiffany’s social media webpage, FACEBOOK, http://www.tiffany.com/gift-guide?omcid=smus_facebook
owned_valentines+day&utm_medium=social_media&utm_source=facebookowned&utm_campaign=us-valentines+day (last visited Apr. 6, 2018).
118 KORNBERGER, supra note 93, at 109.
119 Robert Cole, Apple 1984 Super Bowl Commercial Introducing Macintosh Computer, YOUTUBE
(Oct. 08, 2011), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2zfqw8nhUwA.
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then crawls up the screen to liberate the drones from the tyrant’s speech. Apple, in
this commercial, intended to portray itself as breaking through as a liberator and true
innovator.120 The commercial creates what it means for you to possess a Macintosh
computer: you are not just another drone in the crowd but a unique and different
being. From the brand point of view, products are vessels carrying a brand meaning,
narrative, or story.
A powerful collection of brand stories is what consumers seek to buy today instead
of a meaning-emptied commodity. Usually, high fashion houses are the ones who can
deliver their own brand story from their history: It is the founder designer Coco
Chanel’s legacy that adds value to the brand Chanel in freeing woman’s body from
physically restrictive dress back in the day; Dior’s value is significantly rooted in the
founder designer Christian Dior’s accomplishment in reviving the feminine shape after
World War II. But this does not imply that a fashion house must wait ten to a hundred
years to attain actual history or to make a legacy to grow to become a high fashion
house. This is because the nature of a brand is not about “capturing a timeless essence,”
but about creating one and gradually “grow[ing] it to be a reality.”121 As Saussure
rejected a notion that “ready-made ideas exist before words,”122 brands as a form of
language can create and manage reality through signifiers such as names, logos,
slogans, and advertisement.123
Take the relatively young (compared to a hundred-year-old European luxury
brands) American high-end fashion house, Ralph Lauren, for example. Over forty
years, the company has nurtured its brand to embody a prestigious image in modeling
clothing styles imagined as worn at America's Ivy League colleges. The founder
designer Ralph Lauren created a dream of living an upscale, elite life in its iconic
preppy look. The flagship store in Manhattan, the Rhinelander Mansion, seeks to
provide an actual experience that is coherent with their brand through the customer’s
shopping experience in their themed interior and décor in accordance with its brand
identity.124

120 Bloomberg, The Real Story Behind Apple's Famous ‘1984’ Super Bowl Ad Computer, YOUTUBE
(Dec. 3, 2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PsjMmAqmblQ.
121 KORNBERGER, supra note 93, at 102 – 04.
122 Beebe, supra note 102, at 635.
123 KORNBERGER, supra note 93, at 87 – 114.
124 Stephanie Cliffordoct, At Polo Store, the Feel of a Mansion to Bolster a Brand, N.Y. TIMES (Oct.
13, 2010), archived at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/14/business/14polo.html.
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Figure 12. Ralph Lauren’s Iconic Preppy Look (left)125 and the Interior of
the Flagship Store, New York City (right)126

This is the performing power of brands in our life. The brand identity
(appearance) becomes reality (essence) because people perform the brand as it
describes and enact it in every speech and every interaction. It creates what it is
imagined to be described.
Today, luxury businesses increasingly claim their brands to be a lifestyle brand,
expanding their production line beyond their original focus of apparel. Many luxury
apparel brands expanded into fragrances (starting in the 1930s); jewelry, watches, and
home products (early 2000s); and in the last few years, the luxury business expanded
to open restaurants, hotels, and cafés.127 With a notion of lifestyle, brands provide a
dominant blueprint that shapes the way people live their lives.128 Lifestyle is said to
offer a growth opportunity beyond a traditional sales category. By depicting a luxury
lifestyle consistently across multiple communication channels, including, not only
fashion magazines but also social media, language weaves products into one grand
narrative by association with a luxury lifestyle. Figure 13 is a “Core Values” campaign

125 Polo Ralph Lauren Spring/Summer 2013 Campaign, THE WILD SWANS, (Feb. 28, 2013),
http://www.thewild-swans.com/fashion/polo-ralph-lauren-springsummer-2013-campaign/.
126
Ralph
Lauren
Through
the
Years,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Sept.
29,
2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/09/29/business/Ralph-Lauren-career.html.
127 Linda Dauriz & Thomas Tochtermann, Luxury lifestyle: Beyond the buzzwords, MCKINSEY &
CO., (Mar. 2013), archived at http://www.mckinsey.com/industries/retail/our-insights/luxury-lifestylebeyond-the-buzzwords.
128 KORNBERGER, supra note 93, at xiv.
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of the Louis Vuitton brand in its effort to place its products in slightly broader contexts
sending a lifestyle message regarding travel.
Figure 13. Selected Ads from the Core Value Campaign by Louis
Vuitton129

Larisa Latynina and Michael Phelps

Angelina Jolie
129
See
Louis
Vuitton
social
media
website,
FACEBOOK,
https://www.facebook.com/ILVOELV/photos/a.10151120463123028.468116.76210553027/101
51120469133028/?type=3&theater (last visited Apr. 6, 2018).
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Francis Ford Coppola and Sofia Coppola
On Louis Vuitton’s Facebook page, the description about this campaign goes as
follows:
Travel is a fundamental and defining value of Louis Vuitton’s more than 150year heritage. The Core Values campaign was launched in 2007 as a longterm restatement of Louis Vuitton's legacy as the pioneer of the Art of Travel.
Travel is much more than the physical act of going from one place to another
or the discovery of a new destination. Travel is an emotional experience, a
process of self- discovery. We all have the potential to accomplish our own
personal journeys. Louis Vuitton has a long tradition of associations with
exceptional people. Naturally, the Core Values campaign features
personalities of truly global stature ranging in professions and backgrounds.
Above and beyond their celebrity status, they are individuals who are widely
recognized to have lived full and interesting lives – people who have
accomplished personal journeys of their own.130
As the brand offers experiences and meaning beyond utilitarian products, over
time, it affects our mental maps of the world and informs our actions. Appearance
effectively becomes the reality we believe to exist. The executives of luxury brands are
aware of the risk of brand dilution in expanding their brand name to new product
130

Id.
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categories and customer base. Marketing experts advise brands to remain tied to their
brand identity to successfully offer a broad spectrum of products and experiences. The
brand exercises power in that the language it deploys creates identity, and with it we
enact our life and constitute our world. The question for law is, thus, how the law
governs the language of brands that create and manage their identity. The case law
analysis will demonstrate how trademark law intervenes in brand identity
construction by controlling language and our interpretations of brand meaning. Before
moving on, however, this Article will touch briefly on the luxury brand design process
through the case of Dior to offer reflections on the link between brands and innovation,
and particularly for the purpose of this Article, fashion innovation.
3. Brands and Fashion Innovation
Brand identity may operate as a critical source of innovation for high-end fashion
producers. Dior and I,131 a documentary film, provides the opportunity to observe the
prestigious French fashion house Dior’s Fashion Week preparation process. Basically,
the film reveals that designers create collections strictly upon how they reinterpret
their brand identity as Dior. The newly appointed creative director Raf Simon takes a
considerable amount of time to understand the legacy of the company Dior passed
down to generations of creative directors since the founder designer Christian Dior.
He reviews previous Dior collections to read and find out what Dior employees see as
the Dior “code.” 132 Simon also visits Christian Dior’s house to get a better
understanding of the founder designer. The efforts to reinterpret Dior’s identity and
reinvent designs are based strictly upon his interpretation of the Dior brand. As a
creative director, and a visionary of the company, Simon exercises his full autonomy
to create a contemporary version of the Dior look, which will be manifested through
his collections. And yet, his creativity is bound to Dior’s brand identity, which the
company claims to bring “something new to every season” with “its vision through
elegant, structured, and infinitely feminine collections.”133 In fact, a fashion critic in
the film interview says that the appointment of Simon as the visionary of Dior was a
surprise to the industry because he was known as a minimalist whose design
philosophy would reduce clothing design to its necessary elements.134 However, his
collections demonstrate that his design is all about reinventing Dior’s iconic New Look
that focuses on a female curvy body shape accentuating the waist, the volume of the

131 Dior and I, Video, directed by Frederic Tcheng (Paris: CIM Production, 2015). The film
features pressures of the new Creative Director of Dior, Raf Simon, in the process of creating collection
for his first Haute Couture show with dedication of group of collaborators including talented artisans
in the fashion house.
132 But the employees did not define the word “code” when they used it.
133 See Identity LVMH, https://www.lvmh.com/houses/fashion-leather-goods/christian-dior/ (last
visited Apr. 6, 2018).
134 The interviewee did not provide the meaning of ‘minimalist’ when she said the word.
Minimalism is a philosophy of dressing that has endured for decades, and we may understand it in
general that the clothing style is reduced to its necessary elements. Raf Simon was a designer at Jil
Sander, a fashion house known for its minimalism designs and Simon himself was considered to be a
minimalist.
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hips, emphasizing the bust.135 In addition to the collections themselves, the models
should also best represent the spirit of Dior in the runway show. The film reveals
behind-scenes of model casting: judges happily comment on a female model that she
looks like ‘Miss Dior,’ – who seems to exist in their imagination – and she gets the
casting vote for the show. Indeed, the film lends the insight that company identity
precedes clothing design in the course of making fashion.
Dior is not the only prestigious fashion house proclaiming their identity as a
creator who constantly invents designs upon the basis of their heritage. Many other
prestigious fashion houses do the same: Louis Vuitton is a “spirit of adventure”
“expressed through its unique heritage, values, and rigorous spirit of innovation and
ingenuity;”136 Bulgari says by “nurturing its hallmarks, it invents new ways to express
its creativity;”137 Gucci is “about reinventing a wholly modern approach to fashion,”
emphasizing the “eclectic, contemporary, romantic,” or “Italian craftsmanship.”138 The
implication is that the prestigious fashion houses create designs based on how they
view or define their brand identity. Designs constantly change and get reinvented
every other season; brand identity stays through time. Brand identity becomes a
source of guidance and simultaneously a limit for a prestigious fashion house in its
course of creating new designs. The high fashion houses seem to generate brandidentity-driven design creation: the brand identity precedes design and governs the
whole process of designing. Figure 14 shows variations of Dior’s iconic New Look by
Simon in the Paris Couture Haute Week in 2012 and the original New Look by
Christian Dior in 1947. The pieces well demonstrate the brand-identity-driven
designing practice of the high fashion brand.

135 See The New Look, A Legend, LA MAISON DIOR, http://www.dior.com/couture/en_us/thehouse-of-dior/the-story-of-dior/the-new-look-revolution (last visited Apr. 6, 2018).
136 See Identity, supra note 133.
137 Id.
138 See About Gucci, GUCCI https://www.gucci.com/us/en/st/about-gucci (last visited Apr. 6, 2018).
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Figure 14. Christian Dior’s Iconic New Look (far left)139 and Variations
by Raf Simon140

Moreover, marketing scholarship seems to support this real-world observation
with the explanation that how the organization defines its brand identity affects the
way it derives design creation.141
III. PART II
Part Two demonstrates how trademark law is capable of protecting designs that
consumers associate with a design producer while allowing the free copying of designs
that do not designate any source or origin of the product. Copyright law does not offer
protection for designs unless they are conceptually separable from the useful article to
qualify as a work of art. However, designs that fall outside the scope of copyright
protection may be eligible for trademark protection upon the showing that the design
indicates source. Chapters Five and Six provide specific examples of design features
protected under trademark law, which would have not qualified for legal protection
under copyright law. As a caveat to trademark protection, the aesthetic functionality
doctrine exists to balance competitors’ interest in using basic design elements to create
their own works and thus to keep free and fair competition in the market. If designs

139 The New Look, A Legend, LA MAISON DIOR, http://www.dior.com/couture/en_us/the-houseof-dior/the-story-of-dior/the-new-look-revolution (last visited Apr. 6, 2018).
140 Tim
Blanks, FALL 2012 COUTURE Christian Dior, VOGUE (July 1, 2012),
http://www.vogue.com/fashion-shows/fall-2012-couture/christian-dior/slideshow/collection.
141 LURY, supra note 101.
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are found to be “functional,”142 that is, contributing to utilitarian purpose of the object,
then even if they have acquired secondary meaning, the designs belong to the public
domain for subsequent users to use and appropriate from for their creative works.
Both copyright law and trademark law attempt to avoid granting monopoly rights
over utilitarian function. Then why does the analysis differ? This may be in part due
to the fact that there is a fundamental distinction between copyrights and trademarks
as a matter of policy.143 Copyright law has a constitutional basis under a specific grant
of power in the Constitution to “promote the progress of science and the useful arts.”144
Trademark protection, however, is not concerned with the development of new
technology or skills, but rather focuses on the protection of identifying symbols and
consumer confusion about the origin of products. The Supreme Court in the TradeMark Cases rejected the idea of a Constitutional basis for trademark protection under
the Copyright Clause.145 The Court held that Congress has power over trademarks
only under its Constitutional power to regulate commerce with foreign nations, among
the States, and with Native American Tribes.146 Given the fundamental differences
between copyright law and trademark law, the Supreme Court in Sony writes that the
Court does not look to the standard set forth in trademark cases in a copyright case.147
The Court writes: “[I]n this copyright case we do not look to the standard for
contributory infringement set forth in [Ives Laboratories], which was crafted for
application in trademark cases.”
Chapter Five, How Trademark Law Has Expanded to Protect Iconic Designs of a
Brand, intends to show how the secondary meaning requirement offers a competitive
legal advantage for the established brands to control their iconic designs. I also
illuminate that the courts reject or limit the use of aesthetic functionality by
preventing a wide interpretation to find the existence of aesthetic functionality.
Before examining the role of trademark law, Part Two begins with looking at, as
the title suggests, How Copyright Law Offers Limited Protection for Fashion Design.
In the eyes of copyright law, fashion goods are defined as a” useful article” that is
deemed to serve an utilitarian function. The Copyright Act protects only literary,
artistic, or musical expressions and utilitarian function is deferential to patent law.148
The useful article rule puts fashion goods into a non-protectable subject matter
category under the domain of copyright law. However, copyright law does not
completely bar protection of designs on fashion goods. If a design feature can
142 The definition of the term “functionality” and the uncertainty problem of its meaning will be
discussed in detail in chapter five of Part Two.
143 Also note that the Supreme Court in TrafFix made it clear that duplicate protection does not
exist with a utility patent and trade dress. The Court writes, “[a] utility patent is strong evidence
that the features therein claimed [for trade dress protection] are functional . . . [thus] one who seeks
to establish trade dress protection must carry the heavy burden of showing that the feature is not
functional [to be trade dress protected].” TrafFix Devices, Inc., v. Marketing Displays, Inc., 532 U.S.
23, 29 – 30 (2001).
144 U.S. CONST. art. I § 8, cl 8.
145 Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879).
146 U.S. CONST. art. I § 8, cl. 3.
147 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984) (“We have consistently
rejected the proposition that a similar kinship exists between copyright law and trademark law”).
148 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1976). The Copyright Act defines useful article as an “article having an
intrinsic utilitarian function that is not merely to portray the appearance of the article or to convey
information.”.
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“independently exist” and is “conceptually separable” from the utilitarian aspect of a
useful article, then the design feature, though not the whole article is copyrightable.149
To draw the line between protectable designs from the useful article, the courts apply
a conceptual separability test. The recently released Supreme Court case Star
Athletica, LLC v. Varsity Brands, Inc., which attempts to resolve the inconsistency of
the conceptual separability test applied by the circuit courts.150 This article analyzes
the case and identifies the tests that have been applied at lower-level courts that the
Supreme Court negated and also predict the effect of the Supreme Court decision on
the fashion industry. The gap will be revealed between copyright law’s understanding
of fashion goods as serving purely utilitarian function and the real-world operation of
fashion goods as goods with social meaning, as I have elaborated through Part One.
A. How Copyright Law Offers Limited Protection for Fashion Design
1. The Useful Article Rule Renders Fashion Design Not Copyrightable
American copyright law is predominantly based on the utilitarian purpose to
promote social benefit by conferring a reward upon authors. 151 The Constitution
grants Congress the power to enact copyright laws in order to “promote the Progress
of Science and useful Arts.”152 In Mazer v. Stein,153 Justice Stevens commented, “the
limited grant [of monopoly upon creative works] is a means by which an important
public purpose may be achieved.”154 It is intended to motivate the creative activity of
authors and inventors by the provision of a special reward, and to allow the public
access to the products of this genius after the limited period of exclusive control has
expired. In Twentieth Music Corp. v. Aiken, 155 Justice Stewart also described the
ultimate goal of the Copyright Act is to “stimulate artistic creativity for the general
public good” through its immediate effect “to secure a fair return to an author’s creative
labor.”156 Thus, copyright law strives to achieve an optimal balance between keeping
incentives for creators to engage in creative endeavors and securing use and
dissemination of such works for the public to benefit from them.157
The threshold for copyright protection is that the work should be original and
fixed in a tangible medium.158 The standard of originality is not novelty, ingenuity, or
Id.
137 S. Ct. 1002 (2017).
151 But see Alfred Yen, Restoring the Natural Law: Copyright as Labor and Possession, 51 OHIO
ST. L.J. 517 (1990) (tracing roots of natural law in American copyright law); Justin Huges, The
Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287, 350–53 (suggesting personhood justification).
152 U.S. CONST. art. I § 8, cl. 8.
153 347 U.S. 201 (1954).
154 Mazer, 347 U.S. at 219.
155 422 U.S. 151 (1975).
156 Twentieth Music Corp, 422 U.S. at 156.
157 ROBERT P. MERGES, PETER S. MENELL, & MARK A. LEMLEY, I NTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE
NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE, 437 (Wolters Kluwer, 6th ed. 2012).
158 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (“Copyright protection subsists . . . in “original works of authorship fixed
in any tangible medium of expression, now or later developed, from which they can be perceived,
reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device”).
149
150
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aesthetic merit. 159 Rather, if the work is an independent creation that reflects a
modicum of creativity not copied from another source, it is an original work.160 The
fixation requirement is satisfied when the work’s embodiment in a “copy” or
“phonorecord” by or under the authority of the author and sufficiently communicated
for a period of more than transitory duration.”161
Copyright law protects literary, musical, and artistic expression as its own subject
matter, not its ideas, concepts, or discovery.162 Copyright law protects the expression
of ideas; patent law protects the utilization of ideas. American law does not protect
ideas themselves. The idea-expression dichotomy in copyright law was developed in
the case of Baker v Selden.163 Selden argued that Baker’s use of his particular bookkeeping system that Selden described in his book infringed Selden’s copyright. The
Court held that “[t]he copyright of a book on book-keeping cannot secure the exclusive
right to make, sell, and use account-books prepared upon the plan set forth in such
book.”164 The Court does not deny copyright over Selden’s book, which is the way he
159 See Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251–52 (1903) (“It would be a
dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law to constitute themselves final judges of the
worth of pictorial illustrations, outside of the narrowest and most obvious limits”).
160 There is an important distinction between patent and copyright law in understanding
‘independent creation.’ See Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 103 (2d Cir.
1951)
The alleged inventor is chargeable with full knowledge of all the prior art, although in fact
he may be utterly ignorant of it. The “author” is entitled to a copyright if he independently
contrived a work completely identical with what went before; similarly, although he
obtains a valid copyright, he has no right to prevent another from publishing a work
identical with his, if not copied from his.
See also Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 54 (2d Cir. 1936) (“If by some magic a
man who had never know it were to compose anew Keats’ Ode on a Grecian Urn, he would be an
“author” and, if he copyrighted it, others might not copy that poem, though they might of course copy
Keats.’”); But see Fiest Publ’ns. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991) (holding that facts
contained in a telephone book such as names, addresses, telephone numbers are not copyrightable as
the mechanical arrangement does not require creativity).
161 17 U.S.C. § 101
“Copies” are material objects, other than phonorecords, in which a work is fixed by any
method now known or later developed, and from which the work can be perceived,
reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or
device. The term “copies” includes the material object, other than a phonorecord, in which
the work is first fixed
(“Phonorecords” are material objects in which sounds, other than those accompanying a motion picture
or other audiovisual work, are fixed by any method now known or later developed, and from which
the sounds can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid
of a machine or device. The term “phonorecords” includes the material object in which the sounds are
first fixed).
162 17 U.S.C. § 102(a); listing eight categories of protectable works of authorship as
(1) literary works; (2) musical works, including any accompanying words; (3) dramatic
works, including any accompanying music; (4) pantomimes and choreographic works;
(5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural; works; (6) motion pictures and other audiovisual
works; (7) sound recordings; and (8) architectural works
17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (“In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship
extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or
discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in
such work”).
163 Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879).
164 Baker, 101 U.S. at 103.

[17:492 2018]

Law, Brands, and Innovation:
How Trademark Law Helps to Create Fashion Innovation

533

expressed his idea. The Court ruled, however, that a copyright on the book does not
prevent Baker’s use of the forms because that would in effect create a monopoly over
the accounting system in question.
Copyright law protects expression not utility. In particular, the Copyright Act
does not protect so-called useful articles as a whole. The Act defines a useful article as
an “article having an intrinsic utilitarian function that is not merely to portray the
appearance of the article or to convey information.” 165 Examples of useful articles
include an “airplane, ladies’ dress, food processor, television set, or any other industrial
product” according to the House of Representatives Report accompanying the 1976
Act.166 Although useful articles as a whole do not receive copyright protection, artistic
expression upon the useful article may qualify for copyright protection. The line
between useful article (unprotectable) and artistic expression (protectable) is drawn
by the conceptual separability test. The lower courts have used a variety of tests based
on the statutory language that says: “the design of a useful article…shall be considered
a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work only if, and only to the extent that, such design
incorporates pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features that can be identified separately
from, and are capable of existing independently of, the utilitarian aspects of the
article.”167
In the early days, some courts viewed the separability test narrowly, requiring
that artistic elements be physically separable from the utilitarian article.168 A design
element is considered to be physically separable from the useful article “if it can stand
alone from the article as a whole and if such separation does not impair the utility of
the article.”169 But the House Report on the 1976 Act opened the door to a broader
view by “indicating that not only physically separable features, but also “conceptually
separable features could qualify for protection.” 170 Since then, most courts have
accepted conceptual as well as physical separability as a ground for protection.171 The
notion of conceptual separability exists to protect work of authorship, for example,
“pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works,” one of the protectable categories that the
copyright law intends to protect.172 The Act further writes that pictorial, graphic, and
sculptural works “shall include works of artistic craftsmanship insofar as their form
but not their mechanical or utilitarian aspects are concerned.”173

17 U.S.C. § 101.
Committee on the Judiciary, H.R. Rep. No. 94–1476, 94th Cong, 2d Sess. 55 (1976).
167 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2018).
168 Esquire, Inc. v. Ringer, 591 F.2d 796, 803 – 04 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (finding that the overall shape
of an outdoor lighting fixture was not copyrightable because it was not physically separable from the
lighting fixture itself); But see Mazer, 347 U.S. 201 (finding that the statue used to embellish the lamp
is copyrightable applied art).
169 MERGES, MENELL, & LEMLEY, supra note 157, at 490.
170 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT § 2:74 (Wolters Kluwer, 3d ed. 2016).
171 See id. at § 2:74 n. 113.
172 17 U.S.C. § 101 (“Pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works include two-dimensional and threedimensional works of fine, graphic, and applied art, photographs, prints and art reproductions, maps,
globes, charts, diagrams, models, and technical drawings, including architectural plans”).
173 17 U.S.C. § 101.
165
166
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2. When Does A Design Become a Copyrightable Work of Art?
The conceptual separability test is not straightforward. Courts have applied
various inconsistent approaches. To resolve the disagreement over the proper test for
implementing the separability inquiry, the Supreme Court recently released its
decision in Star Athletica, LLC v. Varsity Brands, Inc.,174 and addressed how Section
101’s separability requirements should be interpreted. The article of clothing at issue
was the cheerleading uniform and the issue in Star Athletica was whether some design
elements (stripes, chevrons and color blocks) on the cheerleading uniforms are
copyrightable (Figure 15).
Figure 15. Designs Registered by Varsity Brands with the Copyright
Office175

At the appellate level, the Sixth Circuit majority opinion viewed the utilitarian
function of cheerleading uniforms is to “cover the body, wick away moisture, withstand
the rigors of athletic movements.”176 Following their determination on the utility part
of the conceptual separability analysis, the majority went on to hold that the design
elements do not enhance or contribute to the function of cheerleading uniforms, and
hence are conceptually separable and eligible for copyright protection. 177 The
dissenting opinion, however, framed the utility part of their analysis for the
cheerleading uniforms as serving to “identify cheerleaders” in their team, and that
certain design elements serve this function, so they cannot be conceptually separable,
and are thus not copyrightable.178
The Sixth Circuit’s analysis demonstrates the importance of framing the
utilitarian function of garments in deciding conceptual separability.179 By framing the
137 S. Ct. 1002 (2017).
Stephen Carlisle, Gimme a “©”! A Court’s Conclusion on Cheerleader Clothing Copyright,
NOVA S.E. UNIV. (Aug. 28, 2015), http://copyright.nova.edu/cheerleader-clothing/.
176 Varsity Brands, Inc. v. Star Athletica, LLC, 799 F. 3d 468, 491 (6th Cir. 2015).
177 Id.
178 Id. at 493 (McKeague dissenting).
179 Previous lower court decisions are also based on separability. See also Chosun Intern., Inc. v.
Chrisha Ceations, Ltd., 2004 WL 962906 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 2004) (“Chosun I”) (concluding that the
utilitarian function of Halloween costume is to “allowing the wearer to pretend to be something else”);
174
175
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utility of garments in terms of its social meaning, the chances for designs to be
copyrightable decrease because the design feature of the article is evaluated to enhance
that function and thus, not conceptually separable. Furthermore, it could be a very
subjective test. One legal commentator expressed the concern as: “social meaning
changes over time, and is different from culture to culture, that how we define social
meaning remains to be far more subjective test than the counter-approach taking
fashion goods strictly in a utilitarian sense.”180 On the other hand, if the utility of
garments is framed solely by focusing on their practical functionality, then the design
elements will likely receive broader protection since the design can be said to serve an
ornamental function separate from the useful function.
The Supreme Court held that Respondent Varsity Brands’ design features on
cheerleading uniforms are valid copyrightable subject matter that meets the
conceptual separability requirements. As an initial matter, the Court addressed
whether separability analysis was necessary in this case.181 Varsity Brands claimed
that the surface decorations in this case are two-dimensional works that appear on
useful articles but are not of useful articles. Therefore, they argued, there is no need
to apply the separability test. William Patry supports this argument in his treatise on
copyright law, but the Court rejected Patry’s opinion and the respondents’ underlying
claim that relied on Patry’s argument.182 The Court’s test seems to direct a focus away
from the importance of framing the utilitarian function of garments to focus on the
design features themselves as to whether they qualify as an artistic expression. The
Court defines the conceptual separability test as the following:
A feature incorporated into the design of a useful article is eligible for
copyright protection only if the feature (1) can be perceived as a two-or threedimensional work of art separate from the useful article, and (2) would
qualify as a protectable pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work – either on its
own or fixed in some other tangible medium of expression – if it were imaged
separately from the useful article into which it is incorporated.183
For the (1) separate-identification requirement, the Court’s instructions were to
“look at the useful article and spot some two or three dimensional element that appears
to have pictorial, graphic, or sculptural qualities.”184 For the (2) independent-existence
requirement, the Court instructs decision makers to examine whether the “separately
identified feature has the capacity to exist apart from the utilitarian aspects of the

Chosun Intern., Inc. v. Chrisha Ceations, 413 F. 3d 324 (2d Cir. 2005) (“Chosun II”) (concluding that
a costume’s utilitarian function as ‘clothing’ to the contrary of the district court’s view as a device with
which to masquerade). See also Jovani Fashion, Ltd. v. Fiesta Fashions, 2012 WL 4856412 (2d Cir.
Oct. 15, 2012) (viewing prom dresses as serving both a clothing function and decorative function and
that these two functions cannot be detached).
180 Robert Welsh & Chad Rutkowski, How Will the Supreme Court Function With the Varsity
Brands
Test?,
BAKERHOSTETLER
(May
6,
2016),
https://www.copyrightcontentplatforms.com/2016/05/how-will-the-supreme-court-function-with-thevarsity-brands-test/.
181 Varsity Brands, 137 S. Ct. at 1006.
182 Id. at 1010.
183 Id. at 1011.
184 Id. at 1010.
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article.”185 The Court elaborated that to qualify as an art of work, the feature cannot
itself be a useful article or part of a useful article, nor could someone claim a copyright
merely by creating a replica of that article in some other medium like a cardboard
model of a car.186
The Court further applied this test to surface decorations at issue on the
cheerleading uniforms and concluded that separability is “straightforward.” 187 The
Court states:
First, one can identify the decorations as features having pictorial, graphic,
or sculptural qualities. Second, if the arrangement of colors, shapes, stripes,
and chevrons on the surface of the cheerleading uniforms were separated
from the uniform and applied in another medium – for example, on a painter’s
canvas – they would qualify as two-dimensional . . . works of . . . art. And
imaginatively removing the surface decorations from the uniforms and
applying them in another medium would not replicate the uniform itself.188
Star Athletica and Justice Breyer in dissent argued that “the designs are not
separable because imaginatively removing them from the uniforms and placing them
in some other medium of expression . . . would create pictures of cheerleader
uniforms.”189 The majority stated that this does not bar copyright protection. Taking
a fresco painted on a wall, ceiling panel, or dome, as an example, the Court explains,
“just as two-dimensional fine art corresponds to the shape of the canvas on which it is
painted, two-dimensional applied art correlates to the contours of the article on which
it is applied.”190
The Supreme Court’s new test shifts the focus of analysis from the problem of
defining the utility of the article to the qualification of a design feature as a work of
art. However, the independent-existence requirement does not provide meaningful
guidance on deciding the design feature’s ability to exist alone. The Court’s instruction
to examine the independent-existence requirement by looking to whether the
“separately identified feature has the capacity to exist apart from the utilitarian

Varsity Brands, 137 S. Ct. at 1010.
Id.
187 The Court writes that a separability inquiry is “not a free-ranging search for the best copyright
policy, but rather ‘depends solely on statutory interpretation.’” The Court claims that their
interpretation to grant copyright protection to works of art of useful articles is supported by the
statute as a whole, especially in the two provisions of the Copyright Act, § 113(a) (protecting “a work
of art first fixed in some tangible medium other than a useful article and subsequently applied to a
useful article”) and § 101 (protecting “art first fixed in the medium of a useful article”). The Court
also supports their claim through relying on the history of the Copyright Act (that Congress eliminated
the old “fine arts’ requirement in 1901 Act; the Supreme Court in Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954),
determined that under 1909 Act, otherwise copyrightable work does not lose its copyright protection
if incorporated into a useful article; the Copyright Office responded to the Mazer ruling and created
the separability standard in regulation (37 C.F.R. § 202.10(c) (1960)) which was later codified in
the1976 Copyright Act. See id. at 1008 – 10.
188 Id. at 1012.
189 Id. at 1011.
190 Id.
185
186
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aspects of the article” does not say anything about how one should decide an article’s
capacity to exist alone, nor does it say how to define the utility of garments.191
Although the Court seems to shift the focus away from the utility of an article to
the design feature’s qualification as artwork, given that the Court expressly bars
copyright to any feature that qualifies as a useful article, the decision maker must still
define the utility of a useful article. The Court’s instruction for the independentexistence requirement is no less than a restatement of the statutory provision. In his
dissent, Justice Breyer points out that the likely result of this interpretation is that
almost always find that the design can exist alone from the useful article. Justice
Breyer writes, “virtually any industrial design can be thought of separately as a work
of art.”192 Mentioning Marcel Duchamp’s “ready-made” series, that is, the functional
mass-produced objects the artist designated as art, Justice Breyer asks “what is there
in the world that, viewed through an esthetic lens, cannot be seen as a good, bad, or
indifferent work of art?”193
After applying the suggested test, the Court considered several objections raised
by Star Athletica. First, Star Athletica contended that the independent-existence
requirement is met only if a feature can “stand alone as a copyrightable work and if
the useful article from which it was extracted would remain equally useful.”194 Star
Athletica viewed the function of a cheerleading uniform to be an identifier of the sports
team and that by taking away the decoration, a plain white cheerleading uniform
remains, which is not as equally useful as before. The Court, however, makes it clear
that the debate over the relative utility of the article is unnecessary.195 Justice Thomas
writes for the majority of the Court: “The focus of the separability inquiry is on the
extracted feature and not on any aspects of the useful article that remain after the
imaginary extraction.” 196 The Court emphasized that Congress did not intend to
distinguish between purely aesthetic articles and useful works of art to provide
copyright protection in both the 1909 and 1976 Act. Relying on Mazer, the Court
further rejected the argument that the only protectable features are those that play
absolutely no role in article’s function.197 In Mazer, for example, the Supreme Court
held that a statuette depicting a dancer that was intended for use as a lamp base can
be copyrightable.
Secondly, the Court considered Star Athletica’s objection that the test should
consider whether the design element reflects “the designer’s artistic judgment
exercised independently of functional influence.198 In Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories
by Pearl, Inc.,199 the Second Circuit considered methods of a design in conducting the
separability analysis of a belt buckle design. The Court looked into a set of facts,
including the fact that that the designer “carved [the buckle] by hand,” “worked from
original renderings which . . . [the designer] had conceived and sketched” and

Varsity Brands, 137 S. Ct. at 1007.
Id. at 1033 (Breyer dissenting).
193 Id.
194 Id. at 1013.
195 Id.
196 Varsity Brands, 137 S. Ct. at 1014.
197 Mazer, 347 U.S. 201, 214, 218 – 19.
198 Varsity Brands, 137 S. Ct. at 1016.
199 632 F.2d 989 (2d Cir. 1980).
191
192
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“inspired by a book on design of the art nouveau school.”200 Based on this set of facts,
the court inferred the designer’s intent that his work was meant to be art as well as a
commodity. From the inferred producer’s intent, the Court goes on to assume wearers’
intent in using the belt at issue as primarily being ornamental over the subsidiary
utilitarian purpose of keeping tops of trousers at waist level.
The Court essentially shut down the possibility of considering the method behind
or intent of the article’s design process in the separability inquiry. The Supreme Court
confirmed that the separability inquiry is “limited to how the article and feature are
perceived, not how or why they were designed.”201 The Court cited the concurring
opinion of Justice Winter in the case of Brandir Int’l, Inc. v. Cascase Pacific Lumber
Co. in which the Second Circuit found that the bicycle RIBBON rack design shape is
not conceptually separable from the utility of the article (Figure 16).202
Figure 16. Brandir Brand Bicycle Ribbon Rack203

Star Athletica also urged the Court to consider the marketability of the design
feature following the approach of the Fifth Circuit,204 which applied the ‘likelihood of
marketability’ test in its separability inquiry. According to the marketability test,
conceptual separability exists where there is a “substantial likelihood that even if the
article had no utilitarian use, it would be still be marketable to some significant
segment of the community simply because of its aesthetic qualities.”205 The Supreme
Court rejected this approach in reasoning that “asking whether some segment of the
Id. at 990.
Varsity Brands, 137 S. Ct. at 1016.
202 834 F.2d 1142, 1152 (2d Cir. 1987) (Winter concurring in part and dissenting in part). But see
Klauber Bros., Inc. v. Target Corp., 2015 WL 4393091 (S.D.N.Y. July 16, 2015) (New York Southern
District Court stated that designer’s intent is not even a dispositive matter to acquire art status).
203 The Original Ribbon Bike Rack BRANDIR, http://www.ribbonrack.com/ (last visited Apr. 7,
2018).
204 Galiano v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 416 F.3d 411 (5th Cir. 2005) (adopting the likelihood of
marketability standard only for garment design, because it appears firmly rooted as the implicit
standard courts have been using for quite some time).
205 Id. at 419.
200
201
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market would be interested in a given work threatens to prize popular art over other
forms, or to substitute judicial aesthetic preferences for the policy choices embodied in
the Copyright Act.” 206 The Supreme Court’s decision seems to resolve the
inconsistency of lower courts in applying their own separability requirements as it
clearly states that one must ignore design process, intent, or methods and only focus
on perception. Yet, the ordinary observers’ perception is a legal fiction that will
inevitably engage subjective evaluation.
The Court writes that the new conceptual separability inquiry is consistent with
the history of the Copyright Act. In Mazer, the Court decided that under the 1909
Copyright Act the respondents owned a copyright in the statuette depicting a dancer
even though it was intended for use as a lamp base.207 The Copyright Office, shortly
thereafter, enacted a regulation implementing Mazer and introducing modern
separability to copyright law.208 The Court further notes that “Congress essentially
lifted the language from the post-Mazer regulations and placed it into Section 101 of
the 1976 Act.”209
The real world effect on the fashion industry and designers of the Varsity Brands
decision remains to be seen since we do not know yet how the lower courts will apply
the Supreme Court’s new separability test. The case provides a legal instrument for
the fashion business along with design patent and trademark law to protect designs
from copying that does not indicate its source (required by trademark law) or meet the
high-novelty bar (required by patent law). This will provide an effective tool for high
fashion brands to regulate fast fashion houses’ rampant copying of Fashion Week
designs. To take an example from Figure 3, Wearing Heart on Your Chest in Part One
identified as one of the new trendy styles, the new separability test from Varsity
Brands210 would find that Gucci’s heart on the dress is copyrightable because it can be
identified as decoration and could independently exist. Gucci’s heart adds the
designer’s artistic expression on the simple heart shape with some decorations of a
knife design crossing the heart and roman letters within the heart. The heart design
on the dress of Rodarte and Proenza Schouler may be separable from the dress and yet
the court will find there is a lack of originality because they are just a basic heart
shape.
However, copyright eligibility alone does not determine copyright infringement;
it merely allows courts to further proceed and analyze whether the designs at issue are
substantially similar to each other to decide whether the defendant copied the
206 Varsity Brands, 137 S. Ct. at 1016 (citing Bleisten v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S.
239, 251 (1903) that says “[i]t would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law
to constitute themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations, outside the narrowest and
most obvious limits.”).
207 Id. at 1006.
208 Id. citing the regulation of 37 C.F.R. § 202.10(c) (1960)
If the sole intrinsic function of an article is its utility, the fact that the article is unique and
attractively shaped will not qualify it as a work of art. However, if the shape of a utilitarian
article incorporates features, such as artistic sculpture, carving, or pictorial
representation, which can be identified separately and are capable of existing
independently as a work of art, such features will be eligible for registration.
209 Id. at 1012. However, Justice Breyer in his dissent cites the House Report for the Copyright
Act of 1976 to highlight that the concept of separateness should look to physical or conceptual
separability and is not created by a mental picture of a uniform.
210 Varsity Brands, 137 S. Ct. at 1002.
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plaintiff’s work. Although a focus of this subchapter is the conceptual separability test,
it will briefly illuminate how courts evaluate the substantial similarity of designs
drawing upon Knitwaves, the case which involved designs on children’s sweaters using
leaves and squirrels as dominant elements in its autumn back-to-school theme (Figure
17 and 18).211
Figure 17. Knitwaves’ Leaf Sweater212

211 Knitwaves, Inc. v. Lollytogs Ltd. (Inc.), 71 F.3d 996 (2d Cir. 1995). The parties did not dispute
the copyrightability of the sweater design, nor did the Defendant deny copying Plaintiff’s designs. The
issue was whether the Defendant had sufficiently altered designs to make them not substantially
similar. Note that “fabric designs” are considered “writings” for the purpose of copyright eligibility
and distinguished from “dress designs” which fall into the useful articles category. The word “writing”
is broadly construed, including “all its forms that may be used to the end that the author’s ideas are
tangibly expressed.”) For a discussion on what constitutes writing, see Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co.
v. Savory, 111 U.S. 53, 56–58 (1884).
212 Knitwaves, 71 F.3d at 1014.
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Figure 18. Lollytogs’ Leaf Sweater (left)213 and Squirrel Sweater (right)214

This case captures design practice in the rampant copying culture of the fashion
industry. A high-end brand becomes a desirable object and has its styles or designs
appropriated by lower- end brands. A design executive from the Defendant company
Lollytogs, testified that he presented his design department with Knitwaves’ sweater
designs at issue and “instructed to design sweater sets with the same feel as the
Knitwaves.” 215 Knitwaves testified that because of the direct competition from
Lollytogs, they had to reduce the price of their Leaf Sweaters and Squirrel Cardigans,
resulting in lost profits.216 The Second Circuit compared the “total concept and feel” of
the works, and in applying the “ordinary observer” test, it concluded that “an average
lay “observer viewing the sweaters side by side” would perceive overwhelming
similarity of the sweaters.217 The Defendant contended that the district court should
have used the “more discerning” test, which would extract the unprotectable elements
of design, such as the use of common stripes and colors from a protectable original
creation, and in this instance, the Plaintiff’s “placement of leaves, squirrels, and other
original elements.”218 The Defendant argues that the sweater design is substantially
dis-similar when viewed without the unprotectable background of stripes and colors.219
The Defendant made this claim relying on Follio Impression,220 a case addressing the
copying of a fabric design consisting of an arrangement of styled roses on a complex
background. The Court in Follio Impressions found there was a lack of originality on
Id. at 1015.
Id. at 1016.
215 Id. at 1000.
216Knitwaves, 71 F.3d at 1000.
217 The ordinary observer test asks whether “an average lay observer would recognize the alleged
copy as having been appropriated from the copyrighted work.” See also Follio Impressions, Inc. v. Byer
Cal., 937 F.2d 759, 766 (2d Cir. 1991); Knitwaves, 71 F.3d at 1003 (holding what is original and
protectable is “[t]he original way in which the author has ‘selected, coordinated, and arranged’ the
elements of his or her work,” citing Feist Publications, 499 U.S. at 358 (1991).
218 Knitwaves, 71 F.3d at 1003.
219 Id.
220 Follio Impressions, 937 F.2d at 763.
213
214
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the background part of fabric based on the fact that the pattern was photographed.
They extracted the background from their analysis and “compared only the protected
portion of the design, namely, the roses and the way they were arranged.”221 The
Second Circuit distinguished the Follio Impression from Knitwaves, stating that Follio
Impression had rather “specialized facts,” in its rejection of the Defendant’s claim to
“dissect [designs] into their separate components,” and compare only those
copyrightable elements.222 The Court stated that what is protectable is “the original
way in which the author has “selected, coordinated, and arranged elements of his or
her work,” and found substantial similarity in the defendant’s design choices “to
feature the same two fall symbols of leaves and squirrels in a virtually same manner,”
as well as its choice of background designs and using the same color scheme.223
Despite Knitwaves, the scope of copyright protection is thin for fashion designs.224
Even if the design passes the separability test to be a valid copyright subject matter,
the designs at issue must be substantially similar to find copying. Also, when there
are only a few ways of expressing an idea, courts find that the idea behind the work
merges with its expression and is thus not copyrightable (the merger doctrine).
B. How Trademark Law Has Expanded to Protect Iconic Designs of a Brand
Unlike copyright law, which preempts state law, the federal legislation governing
trademark protection, the Lanham Act, does not replace state laws. Historically,
trademarks have been protected under state common law. It was not until the late
1840s that the first state statute was passed to prevent fraud in the use of false stamps
and labels.225 Congress enacted the first federal trademark statute in 1870, but the
Supreme Court struck down the law, holding that Congress had no power to enact laws
to regulate trademark due to the copyright clause of the U.S. Constitution.226 Congress
reenacted a limited federal trademark statute in 1881, this time based on the
Commerce Clause. Building upon the modification of the Act of 1905, and further
amendment in 1920, the Lanham Act was enacted in 1946 and serves as the governing
body of law for trademark today.227 For the purpose of discussion in this chapter,
trademark law refers only to the Lanham Act.
The history of the Lanham Act has been about the expansion of trademark rights.
This chapter draws attention to the fact that the trade dress doctrine has expanded to
offer legal protection for designs that would fall short of legal protection by copyright
law under the useful article rule. The trade dress doctrine, with its secondary meaning
Id. at 765.
Knitwaves, 71 F.3d at 1003.
223 Id. at 1003 – 04.
224 The scope of copyright protection can be limited as courts distinguish protected expression
from unprotected expression. See Follio Impressions, 937 F.2d 759 (Fabric design was not
substantially similar); Computer Assoc. Int’l., Inc., v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992)
(Distinguishing between protected and unprotected in computer programs by applying the
abstraction-filtration-comparison method); Howard v. Sterchi, 947 F.2d 1272 (11th Cir. 1992)
(holding particular type of house design was not protectable for others’ use of architectural plans of
this type).
225 MERGES, MENELL, & LEMLEY, supra note 157, at 764.
226 Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. at 94.
227 15 U.S.C. § 1051 et seq. (1946).
221
222
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requirement to offer exclusive control to mark holders, provides a way to protect
source-designating designs. Also, with aesthetic functionality, the trademark law tries
not to prevent free copying of basic designs by competitors.
1. The Trade Dress Doctrine Protects Design Features Upon Proof of Secondary
Meaning
To acquire trademark status, the mark should perform a designating function
that distinguishes the product from other sources. The term “trademark” includes any
word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof that producers use to
identify their goods.228 The Lanham Act also protects “trade dress,” which initially
included packaging, labeling, or container of a product, but further stretched the
subject matter to include the design and shape of a product itself if they serve a sourceidentifying function.229 The Supreme Court acknowledges trade dress to encompass
the total image or overall impression of a product or feature of a product, such as size,
shape, color, or color combinations, texture, graphics. 230 Whether the mark is
distinctive enough to identify a unique product source turns on classification of the
mark. If marks are labeled as “inherently distinctive,” then they are considered to
serve source-designating function. 231 But if marks are deemed “not inherently
distinctive,” the Lanham Act requires proof that a mark has acquired a secondary
meaning to acquire valid trademark status.232
The policy rationale requiring a secondary meaning for a non-inherently
distinctive mark is that trademark law only concerns itself with the protection of
marks that could identify the source of products. In doing so, trademark law balances
the risk of granting monopoly rights over the use of descriptive words. Take as an
15 U.S.C. § 1127.
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (stating most trade dress and product configurations are protected without
registration).
230 See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 501 U.S. 763 (1992) (finding that the overall image
of a Mexican restaurant, including décor and festive color schemes, is inherently distinctive trade
dress).
231 Judge Friendly set out the classification of marks in Abercrombie & Fitch v. Hunting World
Inc., 537 F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 1976). Inherently distinctive marks are subdivided into fanciful marks,
arbitrary marks, and suggestive marks. Fanciful and arbitrary marks bear no relationship to the
product it describes, such as Kodak for camera (Eastman Kodak Co. v. Weil, 137 Misc. 506, 243 N.Y.S.
319 (1930). (holding that Kodak is a fanciful term for photographic supplies)) and Ivory for soap
(Abercrombie & Fitch, 537 F.2d at 9 n 6 (holding that Ivory is an arbitrary term)). Suggestive marks
suggest some characteristic of the goods to the consumer’s mind. The Court held that Coppertone in
regard to sun tanning products to be a suggestive mark (Douglas Labs., Inc. v. Copper Tan, Inc., 210
F.2d 453 (2d Cir. 1954)).
232 Marks that are not inherently distinctive are subdivided into descriptive marks, and generic
marks. The example includes Alo with reference to products containing gel of the Aloe Vera plant
(Aloe Crème Labs., Inc. v. Milsan, Inc., 423 F.2d 845 (5th Cir. 1970)). While descriptive marks can
acquire trademark status upon the proof of secondary meaning, generic marks can never achieve
trademark protection. A generic term is “the name of a particular genus or class of which an individual
article or service is but a member.” (Vision Ctr. V. Opitick Inc., 596 F.2d 111, 115 (5th Cir. 1979)). For
example, the drug manufacturer Bayer sold their product under the name of Aspirin, but then the
term becomes generic as to refer to painkiller in general that the mark lost its trademark status
(Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co., 272 F. 505 (S.D.N.Y. 1921)).
228
229
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example the descriptive word “best.” When applied to coffee, it connotes to buyers a
self-serving assertion of quality. If the seller of BEST COFFEE, over a period of time
with advertising and sales, developed a new, secondary meaning as a trademark other
than the primary meaning of high-quality coffee, then the word would have acquired
a mark status that is capable of designating the source of a coffee product.
The nature of secondary meaning is that buyers only need to know that a product
or service comes from a “single source.” They need not know the identity of the
source.233 The pleading of secondary meaning can be supported by facts indicating
both direct and circumstantial evidence. Direct evidence may consist of the testimony
of random buyers in court or by the results of a professionally conducted consumer
survey. 234 Circumstantial evidence consists of the seller’s effort in advertising the
mark throughout a wide group of prospective buyers. The courts look at the “size of
the seller, the number of actual sales made, large amounts spent in promotion and
advertising, the scope of publicity given the mark, and any similar evidence showing
wide exposure of the buyers’ class to the mark in question.”235 The fact specific analysis
on whether the mark has acquired a secondary meaning creates a competitive
advantage for famous mark holders to protect their signature designs. Established
brands not only have economic capacity to rigorously invest in advertising but also
receive unsolicited media attention, from newspapers and fashion magazines to
individual bloggers and social media.236 Given the lack of economic capacity to market
their products and decreased probability of eliciting media attention, designs from
independent or relatively small designers are unlikely to meet the secondary meaning
requirement.
For trade dress protection, the requirement for proof of secondary meaning
depends on whether or not the trade dress is categorized as “inherently distinctive.”
Prior to the 1992 Two Pesos decision, all types of trade dress required proof of
secondary meaning to establish the validity of a mark.237 In Two Pesos, the Supreme
Court held that inherently distinctive trade dress is protectable without showing

233 Fleischmann Distilling Corp v. Maier Brewing Co., 314 F.2d 149, 155 (9th Cir. 1963)
(observing that few buyers of consumer products know the name of the maker of a brand they
recognize; concluding that BLACK & WHITE beer confuses consumers as to sold by the company
that made BLACK & WHITE whiskey); A.J. Canfield Co. v. Honick-man, 808 F.2d 291 (3d Cir.
1986) (describing the secondary meaning exists when buyers know “single though anonymous
source”). For more cases that confirmed association with a single, though anonymous source, see
15 MCCARTHY, MC CARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION 8 (Thomson Reuters, 4th
ed. 2016).
234 MCCARTHY, supra note 236 at § 15:8.
235 Id.
236 See supra Part I, Chapter Two, A Model of Trend Adoption, describing how Fashion Week
events operate in the real world.
237 MCCARTHY, supra note 233, at § 8:12.50.
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secondary meaning.238 In Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros.,239 the Supreme Court
ruled that secondary meaning is always required for trade dress in product design.240
The Court ruled that trade dress in product design can never be classified as
“inherently distinctive.”241 The Wal-Mart decision is viewed as the Court’s effort to
prevent misuse or over extension of trade dress claims by innovators, which could bar
fair competition with alleged imitators.242
After Wal-Mart, parties fought over the issue of whether the design claimed as
trade dress is product design or packaging. 243 The Supreme Court’s attempt to
distinguish product packaging and product designs are based on assumptions about
consumer perception.244 While consumers use word marks or packing to identify a
source, product designs and shapes are not used to designate the source. Thus,
secondary meaning is not required for inherently distinctive trade dress in packaging,
but product design must be proven to have acquired secondary meaning since the
Supreme Court assumed that “product design almost invariably serves purposes other
than source identification.”245
In the Wal-Mart decision, the Supreme Court categorized children’s clothing
“decorated with appliques of hearts, flowers, fruits, and the like” as product design,
which required proof of secondary meaning (Figure 19). 246 In this case, the Court
extended unregistered247 trade dress protection to fashion design (children’s clothing),
238 Two Pesos, 501 U.S. 763 (finding that the overall image of a Mexican restaurant including
décor and festive color schemes is inherently distinctive trade dress that requires no proof of
secondary meaning). For cases after Two Pesos concerning service related trade dress, see Best
Cellars, Inc. v. Wine Made Simple, Inc., 320 F. Supp. 2d 60, 70 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (“Method of
displaying wine bottles in a retail wine shop was distinctive and thus protectable trade dress it is
not necessary to consider the question of secondary meaning.”); Happy’s Pizza Franchise, LLC v.
Papa’s Pizza, Inc., 2013 WL 308728 (E.D. Mich. 2013) (“Décor of pizzeria was not so unusual as to
qualify as “inherently distinctive.”). Courts realized that the word mark spectrum of distinctiveness
does not work when deciding distinctiveness for non- word trade dress. Most courts have moved to
use the Seabrook test from Seabrook Foods, Inc. v. Bar-Well Foods Ltd., 568 F 2d 1342 (CCPA 1977),
which asks: (1) whether the design or shape is a common, basic shape or design; (2) whether it was
not unique or unusual in a particular filed; (3) whether it was a mere refinement of a commonlyadopted and well-known form of ornamentation for a particular class of goods which consumers
would view as mere ornamentation. Also, trade dress used to identify service does not comfortably
fit into the Supreme Court’s product or package distinction in Wal-Mart.
239 529 U.S. 205 (2000).
240 Id. at 213.
241 Id.
242 MCCARTHY, supra note 233, at §8:12.50.
243 The Federal Circuit has rejected the argument that to be classified as product design, the trade
dress must encompass the whole product, not just a separate design feature of a product. See In re
Slokevage, 441 F.3d 957 (Fed. Cir. 2006). The following cases are the examples of categorizing trade
dress as product or packaging: Yankee Candle Co., Inc. v. Bridgewater Candle Co., LLC, 259 F.3d 25
(1d Cir. 2006) (decorative candle product line and catalog layout are product design not packaging);
Fedders Corp. v. Elite Classics, 268 F. Supp. 2d 119 (D. Mass. 2000) (curved design on the decorative
front of a room air conditioner is product design); Fiji Water Co., LLC v. Fiji Mineral Water U.S.A.,
LLC, 741 F. Supp. 2d 1165 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (square plastic bottle for FIJI mineral water is packaging,
not product). For more cases, see MCCARTHY, supra note 233, at § 8:12.50.
244 MCCARTHY, supra note 233, at § 8:12.50.
245 Wal-Mart, 529 US at 213.
246 Id. at 213, 207.
247 Federal registration is not a prerequisite to protecting a trademark.
However, federal
trademark registration confers several significant benefits. Registration on the Principal Register is

[17:492 2018] The John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law

546

which, under copyright law would unlikely to receive legal protection. Under Varsity
Brands, 248 decorations might be identified and independently separated from the
children’s clothing to pass the separability test to be copyrightable. Whether the Court
will find that the decorations meet the substantial similarity test is hard to predict,
but at least under the Second Circuit’s substantial similarity analysis in Knitwaves,249
the court could possibly find there was improper copying here. The Second Circuit in
this case compared the works’ total concept and feel in viewing the sweaters side by
side and found that the average lay observer would perceive overwhelming similarity
of the sweaters. Following this method, the average lay observer would likely to find
decorations with fruits and the like similar.
Figure 19. The Dresses at Issue: Samara Brothers (left) and Wal-Mart
(right)250

prima facie evidence that the mark in question is valid and owned by the registrant (§§ 7(b), 33(a)).
The filing of the application constitutes constructive use of the mark, conferring nation-wide priority
with respect to the goods or services for which the mark is registered (§ 7(c)). Registration on the
Principal Register also constitutes constructive notice of the registrant’s ownership of the mark, giving
the registrant priority over junior owners even in markets where the registrant has not yet used the
mark (§ 22). For details and more benefits, see MARY LAFRANCE, UNDERSTANDING TRADEMARK LAW,
87 – 88 (Carolina Academic, 3d ed. 2016).
248Varsity Brands, 137 S. Ct. at 1002.
249 Knitwaves, 71 F.3d at 996.
250
Michel
G.
Akins,
Trade
Dress
Protection
in
the
US,
SLIDESHARE,
https://www.slideshare.net/mikeatkins/alicante-presentation-7504041 (last visited Apr. 6, 2018).
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The courts also recognized trade dress for the shape of the Hermes Birkin Bag
and its design features over the allegedly copying Jelly Kelly Bag despite the
differences in design features between the two products, such as materials in calf
leather versus rubber, keyhole cutout designs, and strap designs (See Figure 9 in Part
I). 251 The Court found that these design features were “strongly associated with
Hermes” and granted a permanent injunction against the sale of Jelly Kelly Bag along
with an undisclosed settlement. 252 The high-end sportswear brand Adidas also
successfully protected its SUPERSTAR Trade Dress that consists of its famous three
stripes on the side of the shoe along with a rubber “shell toe,” a flat sole, and a portion
on the outer back heel section including a design (Figure 20)253 from mass-retailer
Target, which was selling shoes with four stripes on the side.
Figure 20. Adidas Brand Superstar Shoes254

Adidas claimed that their design was product packaging, but the Court classified
it as product design. Nonetheless, the Court found that it has acquired secondary
meaning.255 With trade dress protection, Adidas obtained a monopoly over the overall
look and feel of the shoe. Under copyright law, these design features would likely fall
outside legal protection. According to the Supreme Court’s new separability test from
Varsity Brands,256 the three stripes and designs on the outer back heel would qualify
as a copyrightable subject since these designs could be identified and separated from
the shoes, but the basis for copyright protection is very thin because there is only a
small modicum of originality, especially for the three stripes. The design on the outer
back heel may have enhanced copyright protection in comparison to the simple stripes,
but the design would have to pass the substantial similarity test to prove copying of
their design from others. Other examples that courts acknowledged of trade dress
status, among others, include the appearance of the ROYAL OAK model of
251
252

2014).
253

Hermes Int’l v. Steven Stolman, Ltd., No. 03 Civ. 3722 (E.D.N.Y. 2003).
Farella Braun & Martel LLP, The Devil Wears Trademark, 127 HARV. L. REV. 995, 1011 (Jan.
Id. at 1010.

ADIDAS,
http://www.adidas.com/us/superstarshoes/C77124.html?pr=CUSTOMIZE_IMG_Superstar%2520Shoes (last visited Apr. 7, 2018).
255 Adidas-Salomon AG v. Target Corp., 228 F. Supp. 2d 1192, 1207 – 09 (D. Or. 2002).
256 Varsity Brands, 137 S. Ct. 1002.
254
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AUDEMARS PIGUET luxury watches (Figure 21); GUCCI “GG diamond motif” on
handbags and luggage (Figure 22).257
Figure 21. Audemars Piguet Brand Royal Oak Model258

Figure 22. Gucci Brand GG Diamond Motif Trade Dress (left)259 and the
Trade Dress on Handbag (right)260

257Audemars Piguet Holding S.A. v. Swiss Watch Intern., Inc., 46 F. Supp. 3d 255 (S.D.N.Y. 2014)
(finding infringement of the registered trade dress appearance of the watch with an octanol bezel with
eight hexagonal screw heads); Gucci Am., Inc. v. Guess?, Inc., 868 F. Supp. 2d 207, 246 (S.D.N.Y. 2012)
(holding that GUCCI diamond motif design possess holds strong secondary meaning).
258 AUDEMARS PIGUET, https://www.audemarspiguet.com/en/watch-collection/royal-oak/ (last
visited Apr. 7, 2018).
259 Staff Writer, Gucci versus Guess: The Sequel Fashion & Beauty, LUXURY INSIDER (May 8,
2013), http://www.luxury-insider.com/luxury-news/2013/05/gucci-versus-guess-the-sequel.
260 GUCCI, https://www.gucci.com/us/en/pr/women/womens-handbags/womens-shoulder-bags/ggsupreme-hobo-p
414930KLQHG8526?position=337&listName=ProductGridComponent&categoryPath=Women/
Womens-Handbags/Womens-Shoulder-Bags (last visited Apr. 7, 2018).
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2. The Aesthetic Functionality Doctrine Allows Free Copying For Basic Design
Elements and Yet the Courts Narrow the Wide Interpretation of Aesthetic
Functionality
Even if a trademark or trade dress serves a source-designating function,
trademark law does not give exclusive rights to “functional” features. Congress
codified the functionality principle by amending the Lanham Act in 1988. The
philosophical ground of trademark is to promote fair competition in the market.261 One
of the policy reasons for the functionality bar to trademark protection lies within the
law’s ultimate goal to “preserve free and effective competition by ensuring that
competitors can copy features that they need to compete effectively.”262 The other
reason for the functionality bar, McCarthy identifies, along with the concern with free
competition, is that patent law is the only source of exclusive rights in functional and
utilitarian features.263
The Supreme Court did not provide a comprehensive definition on what it means
to be “functional.” The Supreme Court in Inwood Labs, Inc. v. Ives Labs, Inc., (1982)264
focused on utilitarian functionality, writing that a product feature is functional if it is
“essential to the use or purpose of the article or affects costs or quality.”265 Later, in
Qualitex Co. v Jacobson Products Co., Inc. (1995),266 the Supreme Court interpreted
the Inwood rule as saying that a product feature is functional if the “exclusive use of
the feature would put competitors at a significant non-reputation-related
disadvantage.”267
In Qualitex, Qualitex colored their dry-cleaning press pads with a shade of greengold. Defendant Jacobson used a similar color on their dry-cleaning press pads.
Qualitex filed a lawsuit claiming that Jacobson’s use of the green-gold color confuses
consumers as to the source of the product. The issue in Qualitex was whether color
alone could serve as a trademark, having an ability to acquire secondary meaning to
“act as a symbol that distinguishes a firm’s goods and identifies their source,” without
serving another significant function beyond source-identification to make it nonfunctional. The Court quoted the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition: “A
design is functional because of its aesthetic value only if it confers a significant benefit
that cannot practically be duplicated by the use of alternative designs.” 268 The
261 Unlike patent law or copyright law, trademark law does not aim to promote innovations for
the public to benefit from.
262 MCCARTHY, supra note 233, at § 7:36.
263 Id. See also Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 164 (1995) (“It is the province
of patent law, not trademark law, to encourage invention by granting inventors a monopoly over new
product designs or functions for a limited time.”); Jay Franco & Sons, Inc. v. Franek, 615 F.3d 855,
857 (7th Cir. 2010) (“The functionality doctrine polices the division of responsibilities between patent
and trademark law by invalidating marks on useful designs.”).
264 Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844 (1982).
265 Id. at 850.
266 514 U.S. 159 (1995).
267 Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 165.
268 Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 170, citing Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 17. See also Jay
Franco & Sons, Inc. v. Franek, 615 F.3d 855, 857 (7th Cir 2010) (holding that circular beach towel is
functional and is not a valid trademark) (“So if a design enables a product to operate, or improves on
a substitute design in some way (such as by making the product cheaper, faster, lighter, or stronger),
then the design cannot be trademarked”).
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Supreme Court concluded that the green-gold color serves no function. The green-gold
color serves no need in competition, such as being used to avoid stains, because other
colors are equally usable for that purpose.269
The Qualitex court did not address the ambiguity between utilitarian
functionality and aesthetic functionality.270 In TrafFix (2001),271 the Supreme Court
adhered to the Inwood rule to say that Qualitex’s characterization of principal
functionality should not be taken as a comprehensive definition of functionality.272
Under the TrafFix test, when a design feature is either “essential to the use or purpose”
of the article or affects its “cost or quality,” it is deemed to be functional. There is no
need to probe further to examine whether competitors need the feature in order to
compete in the market. If the feature does not fall into either of those two categories,
then its exclusive use must put competitors at a “significant non-reputation-related
disadvantage” to be aesthetically functional.273
The idea of aesthetic functionality is nebulous and does not search for what
constitutes aesthetic design. Rather, it is just another name to explore utilitarian
functionality or what is necessary for competition. Commentators criticize the theory
of aesthetic functionality for its uncertain nature.274 Professor McCarthy argues that
aesthetic functionality is an “unwarranted expansion of the utilitarian functionality
policy.” 275 McCarthy points out that appending both terms, “utilitarian” and
“aesthetic,” to the same base word “functionality,” is misleading semantics; ornamental
aesthetic designs are the antithesis of utilitarian designs.276 The Second Circuit in
Louboutin, 277 while admitting that the Court had long accepted the doctrine of
aesthetic functionality, calls out its counter-intuitiveness by asking, “how can the
purely aesthetic be deemed functional?” 278 In another case, with respect to the
trademark validity issue on china plate designs, the Second Circuit said that “even
when the doctrine is referred to as ‘aesthetic functionality,’ it still seems an apt
description only of pleasing designs of utilitarian features.”279 The Ninth Circuit in
Pagliero280 adopted a wide interpretation of aesthetic functionality. In Pagliero, the
court held that Wallace China’s floral designs on plates are “functional” because they
satisfy “a demand for the aesthetic as well as for the utilitarian,” and that competitor
Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 166.
Note that a theory of “aesthetic functionality” is said to stem from a comment in the 1938
Restatement of Torts: When goods are bought largely for their aesthetic value, their features may be
functional because they definitely contribute to that value and thus aid the performance of an object
for which the goods are intended. See MCCARTHY, supra note 233, at § 7:78.
271 TrafFix Devices, Inc., v Marketing Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23 (2001).
272 Id. at 33.
273 TrafFix, 532 U.S. at 32-33.
274 See also MCCARTHY, supra note 236 at § 7:81.
275 MCCARTHY, supra note 236 at § 7:81 (“When it uses the label “aesthetic functionality,” a court
transforms an extra-statutory value judgment that certain features are needed by competitors into a
statutory Lanham Act “functionality” defense; “[E]ven if there is evidence that a valid trademark or
trade dress is being infringed and is confusing the public, the judge can say that not having this
feature would disadvantage competitors.”).
276 Id.
277 Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent Am. Holding, Inc., 696 F.3d 206 (2d Cir. 2012).
278 Id. at 220 – 21.
279 Wallace Intern. Silversmiths, Inc. v. Godinger Silver Art Co., Inc., 916 F.2d 76, 80 – 81 (2d
Cir. 1990).
280 Pagliero v. Wallace China Co., 198 F.2d 339 (9th Cir 1952).
269
270
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Pagliero is free to copy floral designs for their use in selling plates. The court
paraphrased the 1938 Restatement that “…if the particular feature is an important
ingredient in the commercial success of the product, the interest in free competition
permits its imitation in the absence of a patent or copyright.” 281 This, so-called
“important ingredient test” is criticized for its broad language as the standard finds
the feature aesthetically functional if it plays any role in the sale of a product. If read
literally, McCarthy argues, this “would wipe out the law of trademarks” because
deprivation of a right to copy a popular trademark would substantially hinder
competitors in competition.282 Most courts abandoned the Pagliero test and adopted a
different test or expressly rejected the theory of aesthetic functionality.283
The Fifth Circuit rejects the theory of aesthetic functionality since the “important
ingredient in the commercial success standard would almost always permit a junior
user’s free copy of a distinctive trade dress.284 The Third Circuit rejected the notion of
aesthetic functionality, addressing the concern that if the Court applies the Pagliero
test, then the result would be that “[t]he more appealing the design, the less protection
it would receive.”285 It is not clear whether the Sixth Circuit ever adopted the aesthetic
functionality. In Maker’s Mark,286 the Court held that the bottle top configuration of
MAKER’S MARK bourbon whiskey with dripping red wax seal (Figure 23) was not
aesthetically functional, reasoning that there were numerous alternative methods to
seal a bottle to make it look appealing, and thus other competitors were not put a
competitive disadvantage.287

Id. at 343.
MCCARTHY, supra note 233, at § 7:79.
283 Note that the Supreme Court has never directly addressed aesthetic functionality as a
dispositive issue in a case and that some comments about the aesthetic functionality the Court has
made are viewed as dictum. See MCCARTHY, supra note 233, at § 7:80. That is why lower courts could
reject aesthetic functionality (it does not mean that they reject the functionality principal as a whole.).
The Fourth and Fifth Circuit rejected the aesthetic functionality theory. The Ninth Circuit appears
to have not totally given up use of the theory. See Auto-Tomotive Gold, Inc. v. Volkswagen of America,
Inc., 457 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that defensive aesthetic functionality did not permit a
maker of key chains and auto license plate holders to use the Volkswagen trademark on those items).
See also Wallace Intern Silversmiths, Inc. v. Godinger Silver Art Co., Inc., 916 F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1990)
(“We rejected Pagilero in Sportsac,”and “reiterate that rejection here.”), citing LeSportsac, Inc. v. K
Mart Corp., 754 F.2d 71, 77 (2d Cir. 1985); Louboutin II, 696 F 2d at 221 (“We have rejected, however,
the circular ‘important ingredient’ test formulated by the Pegliero court, which inevitably penalized
mark holders for their success in promoting their product.”) (holding that the design on hotel china
was not functional). The Sixth Circuit characterized the issue as “ornamentally” not aesthetic
functionality (WSM, Inc. v. Tennessee Sales Co., 709 F.2d 1084 (6th Cir. 1983)). For various positions
of the federal circuits on the aesthetic functionality issues, see MCCARTHY, supra note 233, at § 7:80.
284 Sicilia Di R. Biebow & Co. v. Cox, 732 F.2d 417 (5th Cir. 1984) (a case concerning a lemon juice
bottle shape was remanded for determination under the utilitarian functionality standard).
285 Keene Corp. v. Paraflex Industries, Inc., 653 F.2d 822 (3d Cir. 1981).
286 Maker’s Mark Distillery, Inc. v. Diageo N. Am., Inc., 679 F.3d 410, 418 (6th Cir. 2012).
287 Maker’s Mark, 679 F.3d at 418 (“Even assuming we were to recognize aesthetic functionality
doctrine, regardless of which test we would apply under that doctrine, the outcome is the same. Under
either test, Cuervo’s appeal on this claim does not succeed”).
281
282
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Figure 23. Dripping Red Wax Seal: Maker’s Mark (left) and Jose Cuervo
(right)288

The Ninth Circuit and Second Circuit have developed prominent approaches for
the aesthetic functionality doctrine, while other federal circuits have rejected the
doctrine and thus have not developed discernable jurisprudence.289
The Ninth Circuit appears to have limited the use of aesthetic functionality
theory since its creation of a wide application of aesthetic functionality in Pagliero. In
Pagliero, the Court used aesthetic functionality analysis in its consideration of
whether a feature played any role in the commercial success of a product. In the later
Vuitton decision,290 the Ninth Circuit examined whether copying the Louis Vuitton
“LV” on luggage amounted to trademark infringement. The Court limited the
application of aesthetic functionality by defining “functional” to connote only features
“which constitute the actual benefit that the consumer wishes to purchase, as
distinguished from an assurance that that a particular entity made . . . [the]
product.”291 The Court concluded that the “LV” pattern was not functional because it
was not appealing beyond identifying the luggage with a Vuitton brand. One
commentator noted that the Court seemed to presume that the luggage sales are
mainly attributed to the strength of the “LV” mark or the “prestige associated with the
brand” and “required more proof that there was some appeal beyond this sourceidentification.”292
In Au-Tomotive Gold,293 the Ninth Circuit significantly limited the instances in
which aesthetic functionality would apply to only those features serving an “aesthetic
288 Mark, Maker's Mark Locks Up Dripping Red Wax as a Trade Dress for Alcohol,
TRADEMARK’EM (June 22, 2012), http://trademarkem.com/makers-mark-locks-up-dripping-red-waxas-a-trade-dress-for-alcohol.
289 Margot E. Parmenter, Loubutins and Legal Loopholes: Aesthetic Functionality and Fashion,
40 PEPP. L. REV. 1040, 1049 (2013).
290 Vuitton et Fils v. J. Young Enterprises, Inc., 644 F.2d 769 (9th Cir. 1981).
291 Id. at 774.
292 Parmenter, supra note 289, at 1052 n. 70.
293 Au-Tomotive Gold, 457 F 3d at 1062.
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purpose wholly independent of any source-identifying function.”294 In the case, AuTomotive Gold (Auto Gold) sold automobile accessories, including key chains, license
plates bearing the unique insignia of Volkswagen and Audi. Auto Gold used the
aesthetic functionality theory in its defense, suggesting that the insignia were
functional because they provided an “actual benefit” that consumers wished to
purchase beyond their associated source-identity. 295 The Court found that the
aesthetic functionality doctrine should be applied only to those features serving an
“aesthetic purpose wholly independent of any source-identifying function.”296 Based
on this formula, the Court concluded that they found “no evidence that consumers buy
Auto Gold’s products solely because of their ‘intrinsic’ aesthetic appeal,” and thus did
not find the insignia to be functional.297
The Second Circuit adopted the “alternative design” approach for aesthetic
functionality theory. According to the Second Circuit formulation, a design feature is
functional only when the stakeholders cannot compete in the market without access to
the design feature at issue. In Wallace,298 although the Court ultimately found the
baroque design on china plates to be aesthetically functional, it refused to adopt the
Ninth Circuit’s “important ingredient” test in Pagliero. The Court expressed its
concern that the Pagliero test would discourage originators from developing pleasing
designs.299 The Court found that the baroque design used upon the china plates for
which Wallace sought trademark protection was a basic design element. The Court
writes that the precise expression of the decorative style would have been protected
but found in this case that the plaintiff was seeking trademark protection for basic
elements that are necessary for others to make baroque designs.300
Five years later, in Knitwaves, the Second Circuit again applied the alternative
design test, but this time found that the design feature at issue was not functional. In
Knitwaves, the court considered whether the design features on Knitwaves line of “fall
motif” children’s sweaters, that is, leaves, acorns, and squirrels, were barred from
trademark protection because of functionality. Defendant Lollytogs contended that
“Knitwaves sweaters are functional in that their primary purpose is aesthetic – to
enhance the sweater’s ornamental appeal – rather than to identify the sweaters as
Knitwaves’ products.”301 Under the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning that design appeals to
customers beyond source-identification, Lollytogs might have won the case. But the
Second Circuit applied its alternative design test and concluded that the designs at
issue would not prevent Lollytogs from creating a unique design composed of the same
basic elements to express a “fall motif” in its sweaters. 302 The court distinguished
Wallace, finding that Wallace sought to monopolize the basic elements of the baroque
style, while Knitwaves sought to protect compilation of specific designs, which did not

Id. at 1073.
Id. at 1066.
296 Au-Tomotive Gold, 457 F.3d at 1073.
297 Id.
298 Pagliero, 198 F.2d at 339 (9th Cir. 1952).
299 But it is questionable whether this a legitimate concern in light of the purpose of trademark
law that does not aim to promote creative works.
300 Parmenter, supra note 289, at 1095 n. 98.
301 Id. at 1006.
302 Id. at 1004.
294
295
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prevent Lollytogs from using the same basic elements to create alternative designs
using fall colors and images of leaves, acorns, and squirrels.303
The difference between the aesthetic functionality theory under trademark law
and the conceptual separability test under copyright law lies in how each law defines
the meaning of functionality. The aesthetic functionality theory is concerned with
competition. It asks whether a design feature is necessary for competition or if an
alternative design is available. Any feature related to competition is considered
functional –ornamentally or aesthetically functional – under trademark law. Under
copyright law’s separability test, however, an ornamental feature may be
copyrightable as a work of art which is defined as a protectable expression of ideas.
The separability test’s analysis of function focuses on the utilitarian function of a
useful article.
The Southern District Court of New York took into account the uncertain guidance
of the aesthetic functionality doctrine in other courts in reaching its decision in the
high-profile case between two famous designer shoemakers. The French high-end shoe
designer Louboutin lacquered the bottom sole of high heels with the color red to its
sale products, and the company registered Red Sole as a trademark at the U.S. Patent
and Trademark Office (“USPTO”). American competitor Yves Saint Laurent (YSL)
introduced a Monochrom line of shoes in a variety of colors, including purple, green,
yellow, and red. The red version of YSL’s monochrome shoes featured all red on the
entire shoe, including the insole, heel, upper, and outsole (Figure 24).
Figure 24. Louboutin’s Red Sole (left) and YSL’s Red Shoe (right)304

Knitwaves, 71 F.3d at 1006 – 07.
Christian Louboutin v. YSL: The Battle over the Red Sole, WALL STREET FAB (Jan 26, 2012),
https://wallstreetfab.wordpress.com/category/fashion/shoes.
303
304
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Louboutin claimed trademark infringement for the red Monochrome shoe because
YSL used a red sole. The Court denied Louboutin’s claim. YSL responded by seeking
cancelation of Louboutin’s registered Red Sole Mark based on the aesthetic
functionality doctrine by rebutting the presumption of the color mark’s validity.
The Southern District of New York accepted the premise that Louboutin has
created a secondary meaning in the red sole in reference to pop culture, consumer
studies, and recognition by other high fashion designers. Before going into the
functionality analysis for the color red used on the bottom of the shoes, the Court
abruptly concluded that a single color per se is aesthetically functional in the fashion
industry and that it cannot be trademark protected:
[I]n fashion market color serves not solely to identify sponsorship or source
but is used in designs primarily to advance expressive, ornamental and
aesthetic purposes,” thus “there is something unique about the fashion world
that militates against extending trademark protection to a single color.305
Then the Court begin to analyze aesthetic functionality based on the Supreme
Court guidance on Qualitex, 306 defining functionality as forbidding the “use of a
product’s feature as a trademark when doing so will put a competitor at a significant
disadvantage because the feature is “essential to the use or purpose of the article” or
“affects cost or quality.”307 The district court found that trademarking Louboutin’s
color mark would “significantly hinder competition” by preventing other designers
from “achieving those stylistic goals necessary to effective competition in the
industry.”308 The Court reasoned that the use of the red outsoles serves non-trademark
functions, because the choice of the color red is “to attract, to reference, to stand out,
to blend in, to beautify, to endow with sex appeal.”309 Louboutin appealed to the Second
Circuit.
When it comes to the fashion industry, the district court seemed to solely rely on
the Supreme Court’s Qualitex decision that held that color alone is a valid mark. In
the fashion industry, where color is crucial to create visually pleasing ornamentation,
color may almost always be found to have a competitive need compared to other
industries. For other industries, the courts seem to apply aesthetic functionality with
less difficulty to show the competitive need for color. For example, in Qualitex,310 the
Supreme Court noted that the use of any one particular color is not necessary for
effective competition in the dry cleaning pads manufacturing industry because “other
colors [are] equally useable” to achieve the primary purpose of the color on the cleaning
pads, which is, to “avoid noticeable stains.”311 In In re Owns-Corning,312 the court

305 Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent Am. Holding, Inc., 778 F. Supp. 2d 445, 451,
453 – 57 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (“Louboutin I”).
306 Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 169.
307 Louboutin I, 778 F. Supp. 2d at 453.
308 Id. at 454.
309 Id. at 453-54.
310 Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 159.
311 Id. at 166.
312 In re Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 774 F.2d 1116 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
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found no competitive need for the color pink in fiberglass insulation because the color
bore “no relationship to the production of fibrous glass insulation.”313
Of course, there are some cases where the courts have found that there is a
competitive need for color in non-fashion industries, but the analysis on functionality
is clearly grounded on specific competitive needs. In Deere & Co.,314 the Court found
the color green was functional in the tractor industry based on the consumer’s
(farmers) need to match their loaders and their tractors. In Brunswick Corp,315 the
color black in the outboard marine engine industry filled a competitive need because
applying the color black to the engines rendered the engines compatible with many
different boat colors and made them appear smaller.316
Unlike in these other industries, the fashion industry’s success mainly depends
on aesthetic appeal or pleasing ornamentation, so there is a higher bar to trademark
protection for color marks. The district court in Louboutin asked whether the Red Sole
Mark protection would “significantly hinder competition” by “permitting one
competitor…to interfere with legitimate (non-trademark-related) competition
through . . . exclusive use of an important product ingredients.”317 The Court noted
that the threat to competition is significant when allowing the Red Sole Mark
trademark protection since it may prevent other designers from achieving their
various “stylistic goals” like “[referencing] traditional Chinese lacquer ware, [making]
a cohesive look consisting of color-coordinating shoes and garments.”318 The Court’s
analysis represents the application of Qualitex guidance on the aesthetic functionality
in reference to the peculiar industry at issue to decide what constitutes a hindrance to
competition. However, it fails to account for the TrafFix formula of determining
whether and to what extent the Red Sole Mark would put competitors in any
significant non-reputation-related disadvantage.
The Second Circuit reversed in part and found that color per se is functional in the
fashion industry. 319 This may be a correct realignment with the Supreme Court
Qualitex decision. And yet, the Second Circuit affirmed that the Louboutin red outsole
acquired a secondary meaning limited to the part that the outsole “contrasts with the
remainder of the shoe.”320 Having decided that Louboutin’s Red Sole Mark is a valid
mark only when it contrasted to other colors of the upper part of the shoe, the Court
concludes that consumer confusion as to the source of the shoe does not exist because
YSL used the red color on the bottom sole with the monochrome red body of the shoe.
Thus, the Second Circuit writes, it need not consider aesthetic functionality.
In Louis Vuitton Malletier v. Dooney & Bourke, Inc.,321 the Second Circuit presents
a way that trademark law could expand to control use of a similar color combination
without evaluating whether the color combination has acquired a secondary meaning
or is merely functional. Louis Vuitton collaborated with Japanese artist Takashi
Murakami to create new designs for their fashion products. Murakami re-designed
Id. at 1123.
Deere & Co. v. Farmhand, Inc., 560 F. Supp. 85, 91 – 92 (S.D. Iowa 1982).
315 Brunswick Corp. v. British Seagull Ltd., 35 F.3d 1527 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
316 Id. at 1531.
317 Louboutin I, 778 F. Supp. 2d at 454 (citing Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 170).
318Id. at 454.
319 Louboutin II, 696 F.3d at 206.
320 Id. at 212.
321 Louis Vuitton Malletier v. Dooney & Bourke, Inc., 454 F.3d 108, 115 (2d Cir. 2006).
313
314
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the LV Monogram mark, which has been a famous mark indicating a Louis Vuitton
brand, by adding thirty-three bright colors on it against the background of either white
or black canvas (“LV Monogram Multicolor” or “Murakami Color”). Louis Vuitton
claimed trademark infringement for the LV Monogram Multicolor against Dooney &
Bourke, a handbag manufacturer, for putting interlocking DB initials in a repeating
pattern on their handbag product.322
Figure 25. Louis Vuitton (left) and Dooney & Bourke (right)

Louis Vuitton did not claim separate trademark protection for the colors alone; it
emphasized instead that the color combination display is an “essential part of a mark
design” and that one cannot “dissect the colors from the pattern.”323 Louis Vuitton also
claimed that “other handbag manufacturers are free to create their own brightlycolored handbags so long as they do not do so in a manner confusingly similar to the
Vuitton combination of color and defined design.” 324 Although the Second Circuit
found no likelihood of confusion, it did not invalidate the Multicolor mark, which could
result in Louis Vuitton’s exclusive use of the color combination on the mark.325 The
Court relied on the reputation and fame that the LV Toile Monogram had established
as an indicator of Louis Vuitton, and extended that fame to validate the new Multicolor
mark, if asked. The Court held that the Murakami color was “created as a sourceidentifier for Vuitton in the new millennium.”326
If the Plaintiff were Dooney & Bourke – if the DB mark were registered and they
modified it with colors and claimed trademark infringement against Louis Vuitton, the
Court would not have recognized the mark design to be a valid trademark The DB
Id.
Id. at 115.
324 Id. at 115 – 16.
325 Farella Braun & Martel LLP, supra note 252, at 1003 – 1005.
326 Id.
322
323
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mark has not acquired sufficient fame as to indicate Dooney & Bourke as a source, and
in the public’s imagination, this color combination is not associated with the Dooney &
Burke brand. Courts recognize exclusive rights of logos, even though they are design
choices or color combinations, for the relatively more established companies because
their fame has accumulated through time and marketing. In a way, the Louis Vuitton
identity contained in their re-invented designs over their old classic LV Monogram
could become an exclusive source of brand elements.
Under copyright law, the Multicolor Monogram design will not be offered
recognition to be eligible for copyright. Under the conceptual separability analysis, the
Multicolor mark design will face the question of whether the design is separable from
the utilitarian function of a handbag, which will likely be defined based on its practical
function. Within this frame of functionality, design is likely to be viewed as serving
an ornamental function, not enhancing utility. However, if separated, the design
feature is nothing more than color combinations with letter designs for LV, and a court
will find the basis for copyright for the Multicolor Monogram very thin and not worth
protecting. This illustrates that copyright law is not a good fit for protecting early
adopters’ status to distinguish them from later adopters wearing copied products since
the design that indicates the source as a Louis Vuitton product is not expressive
enough to be copyrightable. Legal protection based on source-indication, rather, is well
served by the operation of trademark law.
Throughout Part Two, this Article has demonstrated how trademark law operates
via trade dress doctrine to offer legal protection for designs that identify their source,
while allowing free copying of basic design elements through the aesthetic
functionality doctrine. With the tendency of circuit courts to limit the application of
aesthetic functionality doctrine, however, the established fashion brands are evidently
capable of acquiring control over color, color combination, or shapes for their designs,
thus reinforcing their iconic status. Part Three explores how the reputation of
established brands as a prestigious, exclusive, or luxurious goods producer is protected
under the two types of trademark law claims, infringement and dilution.
The irony is that trademark law does not work to promote competition, at least
for the fashion industry, in direct contrast to the Law’s existential purpose. Some
design features, colors, or color combinations fall into the private property category
and thus exclude competitors from using them for their creative works. Chances are
higher for established fashion companies than small and independent designers to
acquire property rights over their designs or color choices, with the secondary meaning
requirement for designs to receive trade dress protection. While global companies that
can afford marketing, expenses are able to acquire secondary meaning, small designers
usually lack capital to invest in advertising. The risk in granting property rights over
designs or colors is the depletion of creation tools that are supposed to remain in the
public domain for others to use. Moreover, the aesthetic functionality doctrine has not,
as of this time, played a meaningful role in the analysis of most courts.
IV. PART III
Part Three argues that trademark law doctrines contribute to maintaining the
established fashion houses’ image as a producer of prestigious, exclusive, or luxurious
goods by offering a legal device to control associations with their famous marks. Part
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One argued that a brand image consists of a sum of associations in the consumer’s
mind. Additionally, the brand image of a luxury goods producer, plays a significant
role in the fashion industry because it works as a sematic driver towards a new cycle
of trends. Thus, this part draws attention to trademark law’s capacity to govern
associations of consumers via brand signifiers. There are largely three operations of
trademark law doctrines: first, the expansion of trademark confusion theory, which is
the trademark infringement test asking whether the defendant’s use of a mark is likely
to confuse consumers as to the affiliation, connection, or association of the user with
the senior user (chapter six); second, the anti-dilution claim, which specifically aims to
govern association with a famous mark (chapter seven); and third, the prevention of
parody works that would possibly subvert an original meaning of the brands (chapter
eight).
A. How Trademark Infringement Claims Help Established Brands Maintain Their
Prestigious Brand Image
Trademark law has expanded the actionable type of infringement claims.
Previously, trademark law primarily existed to protect against consumer deception
when one producer attempts to pass off its products as those of another. By ensuring
truthful product information, trademark law sought to promote competition in
markets. Truthful source indication is said to reduce consumer search costs and allow
producers to invest in the quality of products to maintain their reputation.327 Whether
the junior user’s mark infringed upon the senior user’s mark is governed by the
likelihood of confusion test, which asks whether the defendant’s use of a mark is “likely
to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation, connection,
or association” with the senior user.328 Initially, the Lanham Act required “confusion,
mistake or deception of purchasers as to the source of origin of such goods and
services.”329 The scope of the likelihood of confusion test was limited to purchaser
confusion of source, which occurs at the time of purchase. This is called point of sale
confusion or direct purchaser confusion. In 1962, Congress struck down this language
in the Lanham Act, and several courts have interpreted Congress’s amendment as an
expansion of consumer confusion to include non-purchasers beyond as to the source of
origin.330 In 1989, the broad scope of “confusion” was codified to allow infringement
claims even when the non-purchasers are likely confused about not only the source,
but also the affiliation, connection or sponsorship.331

327 William M. Landes and Richard Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective, 30 J.L. &
Econ. 265 (1987).
328 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a).
329 Lanham Act § 32(1), 15 U.S.C.A. § 1114(1), amended 1962, 76 Stat. 769.
330 See, e.g., Checkpoint Sys., Inc. v. Check Point Software Techs., Inc., 269 F.3d 270 (3d
Cir. 2001) (noting that likelihood of confusion includes confusion other than by a purchaser
at the point of purchase and thus initial interest confusion is actionable).
331 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a).
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1. Expansions on Actionable Types of Infringement with Lanham Act Amendments
Even though no actual sale is completed as a result of the confusion, a party could
bring an infringement claim based on initial customer interest. 332 This is pre-sale
confusion, which occurs when one party has used another’s mark in a manner
calculated to capture initial consumer attention, even though no actual sale takes place
as a result of the confusion. 333 In one of the cases developing the initial interest
confusion theory, the Southern District of New York said (and the Second Circuit
agreed) that there was a likelihood of confusion when a potential customer of an
expensive piano would be attracted to the defendant piano maker’s piano based on the
mistaken impression that the plaintiff maker is somehow affiliated or connected to the
defendant piano maker “even though later investigation revealed that there was no
connection.” 334 The Fifth Circuit found there was confusion in using the name of
VELVET ELVIS for a sixties theme nightclub, noting that the name could cause people
to believe that the place was connected or licensed by the estate of Elvis Presley and
thus induce patrons to enter, even if they later realize there is no connection.335
The confusion theory expansion to post-sale confusion helps to confer exclusivity
over the established brands’ products by enjoining sales of imitations, whose quality
oftentimes is inferior compared to the established brands. The post-sale confusion
doctrine finds infringement when viewers are confused, even if the purchaser is not
confused and actually knows that he or she is buying an imitation. 336 The denim
apparel manufacturer Levis Strauss was able to prevent sales of pants by a defendant
imitator with allegedly similar arcuate stitching design logo on the rear pocket (Figure
26).

332 See Charles E. Burzga, Sophisticated Purchaser Defense Avoided Where Pre-Sale Confusion is
Harmful, 78 T.M.R. 659 (1988).
333 LAFRANCE, supra note 247, at 151 – 52.
334 Gortrian, Helfferich, Schulz, Th. Steinweg Nachf. v. Steinway & Sons, 365 F. Supp. 707, 717
(S.D.N.Y. 1973), aff’d, 523 F. 2d 1331, 1342 (2d Cir. 1975) (“We decline to hold, however, that actual
or potential confusion at the time of purchase necessarily must be demonstrated to establish
trademark infringement under the circumstances of this case”).
335 Elvis Presley Enters. Inc. v. Capece, 141 F.3d 188 (5th Cir. 1998) (“Once in the door, the
confusion has succeeded because some patrons may stay, despite realizing the bar has no relationship
with EPE.”). See also Cartier, Inc. v. Deziner Wholesale, LLC., 98 Civ. 4947 (RLC), 2000 WL 347171
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 3, 2000) (“The label improperly triggers customer’s interest in Deziner’s product by
capitalizing on the good will associated with the Cartier name.”).
336 The post-sale confusion therefore is non-purchaser confusion, whereas pre-sale confusion (or
initial customer interest) concerns purchasers who were drawn to products because of a similar mark
but later recognize a different source at the point he/she makes a purchase decision.
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Figure 26. Levis Strauss Brand Arcuate Logo337

The Second Circuit 338 and Ninth Circuit 339 took into consideration a post-sale
setting and found there could be confusion among potential buyers who see the design
on the infringing pants when worn by others. The Fourth Circuit also applied the same
principle of confusion to the public seeing the mark in use from an imitator’s product.
In Polo Fashions, Inc. v. Craftex, Inc.,340 the defendant sold a shirt with an imitation
of the plaintiff’s polo player logo on the front of the shirt, with a label having the
defendant’s name on the inner neck of the shirt. The court concluded that the
attachment of the defendant’s label does not prevent confusion by observers who see a
buyer wearing the shirt.
In Payless Shoesource, Inc. v Reebok Int’l, Ltd., 341 the sportswear and shoes
manufacturer Reebok sued retail shoe chain Payless for infringing on their trade dress
in the design of several models of Reebok sports shoes because of the possibility of postsale confusion. Reebok claimed that when the public viewers observed someone
wearing a pair of the Payless shoes in question, they would mistakenly believe that
the shoes were made by Reebok. Reebok pointed out the possibility that any
association of perceived inferior quality of the Payless shoes with Reebok may damage
its reputation and good will. The Court acknowledged, “an action for trademark
infringement may be based confusion of consumers other than direct purchasers,
including observers of those wearing an accused article.”342
337 Wesley Scott, Why The Famous Levi’s Arcuate Was Painted: The 1944 S501XX, ROPE DYE,
(May 25, 2013), https://www.ropedye.com/2014/01/in-depth-look-arcuate/.
338 Lois Sportswear, U.S.A., Inc. v. Levi Strauss & Co., 631 F. Supp. 735 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), aff’d,
799 F.2d 867 (2d Cir. 1986).
339 Levi Strauss & Co. v. Blue Bell, Inc., 632 F.2d 817 (9th Cir. 1980) (“Wranger’s use of its
projecting label is likely to cause confusion among prospective purchasers who carry even an
imperfect recollection of Strauss’ mark and who observe Wranger’s projecting label after the
point of sale.”). See also Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Moose Creek, Inc., 486 F.3d 629 (9th Cir.
2007) (holding that the district court erred in ignoring post-purchase confusion over a logo on
wearing apparel.).
340 816 F. 2d 145 (4th Cir. 1987).
341 998 F. 2d 985 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
342 Payless, 998 F.2d at 989. See also, Rolex Watch U.S.A., Inc. v. Canner, 645 F. Supp. 484 (S.D.
Fla. 1986). The district court finds post-sale confusion is actionable even though a copier informs the
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The courts acknowledge that lessened scarcity or exclusivity of a product due to
imitations causes harm to the original producers. In the case where a defendant sold
copies of plaintiff Hermes’ high fashion accessories fully informing buyers that the
goods are copies, the Second Circuit nonetheless noted that a “loss occurs when a
sophisticated buyer purchases a knockoff and passes it off to the public as the genuine
article, thereby confusing the viewing public and achieving the status of owing the
genuine article at a knockoff price.”343 The key point we should note here is trademark
law’s capacity to protect the consumer’s status. The Court further noted:
The creation of confusion in the post-sale context can be harmful in that if
there are too many knockoffs in the market, sales of the originals may decline
because the public is fearful that what they are purchasing may not be an
original . . . [T]he purchaser of an original is harmed by the widespread
existence of knockoffs because the high value of originals, which derives in
part from their scarcity, is lessened.344
The following cases show that the courts unintentionally acknowledge that highend brands carry symbolic meaning. In Mastercrafters Clock & Radio Co. v. Vacheron
& Constantin-Le Coultre Watches, Inc.,345 the Court found that there was infringement
by an alleged copyist manufacturer because some customers would buy its cheaper
product “for the purpose of acquiring the prestige gained by displaying what many
visitors at the customers’ homes would regard as a prestigious article.”346 In another
luxury brand case, Ferrari S.P.A. Esercizio Fabriche Automobili E Corse v. Roberts,347
the Court took into consideration Ferrari’s reputation as a luxury car maker and
acknowledged that when the viewers (who are non-purchasers) see the cheap replica
on the road, Ferrari’s reputation for rarity and quality could be damaged. In justifying
a finding of infringement, the Sixth Circuit protected the luxury car brand’s “image of
exclusivity” and “uniqueness.”348
Confusion can result even if plaintiff’s product is no longer being made. In another
Ferrari case,349 the defendant sold a replica of a Ferrari sports car made from 19691974, which Ferrari no longer produced. While the purchaser may know that it is not
a genuine car, the court held that he may think that the replica is sponsored, approved,
or licensed by Ferrari. In Gucci America, Inc. v. Dart, Inc.,350 the Court found that
lessened prestige is a reason to find confusion. The Court said “[o]thers will be
discouraged from acquiring a genuine Gucci because the items have become too
commonplace and no longer possess the prestige and status associated with them.”351
buyer who purchases $25 value Rolex watch that the goods are copies not original. The direct
purchaser confusion is not necessary for the sale of counterfeit goods to be illegal.
343 Hermes Intern. v. Lederer de Paris Fifth Ave., Inc., 219 F.3d 104, 109 (2d Cir. 2000).
344 Hermes Intern., 219 F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 2000).
345 221 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1955).
346 Id. at 466.
347 944 F.2d 1235 (6th Cir. 1991).
348 Ferrari S.P.A. v. Roberts, 944 F.2d 1235, 1237 (6th Cir. 1991).
349 Ferrari S.P.A. Esercizio Fabriche Automobilie Corse v. McBurnie, 11 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1843, 1989
(1989).
350 715 F. Supp. 566 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
351 Id.
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The question of the likelihood of confusion depends on the kinds of goods and
services at issue. If the parties’ goods are directly competitive, the question turns to
whether the mark is sufficiently similar to confuse consumers. If the parties’ goods
are totally unrelated, there is no confusion. When the goods of the parties are not
directly competitive but “related” goods, buyers are likely to assume or believe that
there is a connection, affiliation, or sponsorship between the two goods at issue.352 The
meaning of “related” looks to the mind of the consuming public. The goods are related
if consumers are “likely to believe that such goods, similarly marked, come from the
same source, or are somehow connected with or sponsored by the same company.”353
This is often referred to as the “related goods or services rule.” Congress partially
codified the related goods rule in 1989 by rewriting Lanham Act § 43(a)(1)(A) to state
that competition is not necessary for the alleged infringer to infringe the mark. In
early cases, the Seventh Circuit found that there could be no trademark infringement
when goods are not directly competing.354 The modern trademark law requires no
competition to find a likelihood of confusion as long as the goods are related.355 The
rule comes from the Aunt Jemima Mills Co. v. Rigney & Co.,356 which both provided a
relatively expansive scope of protection for trademarks in noncompetitive fields. The
Second Circuit protected the mark Aunt Jemima on the plaintiff’s pancake batter from
the defendant’s use for pancake syrup. The Court rejected the competitive goods rule
and held that the mark would be protected on any goods that buyers would be likely to
think came from the same source as plaintiff’s goods:
[W]e think that goods, though different, may be so related as to fall within
the mischief which equity should prevent. Syrup and flour are both food
products, and food products commonly used together. Obviously, the public,
or a large part of it, seeing this trademark on a syrup, would conclude that it
was made by the complainant.357
But how far can the expansive nature of the test of likelihood of confusion as to
sponsorship, affiliation or connection go? The so-called “collateral uses of a mark” on
unauthorized apparel, such as t-shirts and caps, particularly raises this question. For
example, when an unauthorized third party sells t-shirts with a Seahawks logo and
the buyer purchases products from the unauthorized vendor to show his or her support
for the football team, does the Seahawks trademark owner have a right to prevent such
a use of a mark? Throughout the 1970s-1980s, trademark owners increasingly

352 Commentators criticized that the test of confusion over sponsorship or affiliation is too broad
and vague. See Lemley & McKenna, Irrelevant Confusion, 62 STAN. L. REV. 413, 427 (2010).
353 MCCARTHY, supra note 233, at §§ 23:1; 23-14.
354 Borden Ice Cream Co. v. Borden’s Condensed Milk Co., 201 F. 510 (7th Cir. 1912) (finding no
infringement of BORDEN milk by BORDEN ice cream).
355 See Fleischman Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 314 F.2d 149 (9th Cir. 1963).
356 247 F. 407 (2d Cir. 1917) cert. denied, 245 U.S. 672 (1918). For discussion of the development
of the “related goods” rule, see Lunsford, Trademark Infringement and Confusion of Source, 35 VA. L.
REV. 214 (1949). See also MCCARTHY, supra note 233, at §§ 24:5 – 24:8. Professor McCarthy mentions
the Seventh Circuit decision on Zazu Designs v. L’Oreal S.A., 979 F.2d 499 (7th Cir. 1992) as a “strange
and inexplicable” decision. In Zazu, the Court held that the senior user’s trademark ZAZU for a hair
salon was not infringed by the junior user’s use of ZAZU for a hair care products.
357 Aunt Jemima, 247 F. at 409.
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exercised their trademark rights to achieve exclusive control over merchandising.358
In the 1975 Boston Hockey decision, 359 the Fifth Circuit appeared to create new
merchandising rights by granting control over the trademark of a sports team by
barring the unauthorized sales of cloth patches bearing sports team’s logos. The Court
required evidence that customers recognized the defendant’s patches as bearing the
logos of the sports teams to find infringement and did not require a proof of likelihood
that customers would be confused as to the source or sponsorship.360 The First Circuit
court enjoined the sale of unauthorized T-shirts with a BOSTON MARATHON
mark.361 The Fifth Circuit found that the fact that customers were likely to believe
that the product is officially sponsored (not whether a customer cares about the official
sponsorship) triggered infringement.362
Judicial recognition of merchandising rights continued through the 1990s and the
turn of the century. In 2006, the Sixth Circuit in Audi AG v. D’ Amato363 and the Ninth
Circuit in Au-Tomotive Gold, Inc. v. Volkswagen of America, Inc.,364 both ruled that the
unauthorized sale of promotional goods bearing the marks of a car manufacturer
amounted to trademark infringement. In 2008, the Fifth Circuit in Board of
Supervisors of Louisiana State University v. Smack Apparel Co., 365 held that
defendant’s selling of Sugar Bowl t-shirts infringed upon the plaintiff Louisiana State
University’s trademark solely because of likely consumer association with the color
schemes and slogans.366
Commentators conclude that trademark owners’ claims for the general right to
control merchandising is based on the logic of preventing free riders or unjust
enrichment: trademark owners derive product desirability from the allure of their
mark and others should not reap the benefits of that desirability. 367 Legal
commentators have criticized the courts’ expansion of trademark infringement claims
on the basis of consumer association and the tendency to acknowledge general
358 To trace the growth of the merchandising right theory, see Stacy L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley,
The Merchandising Right: Fragile Theory or Fait Accompli, 54 EMORY L.J. 461, 466 (2005). Professors
acknowledge that claims to merchandising rights to ban sale of merchandise with their name by third
parties did not happen until the 1970s-1980s.
359 Boston Prof’l Hockey Ass’n, Inc. v. Dallas Cap & Emblem Mfg., Inc., 510 F. 2d 1004 (5th Cir.
1975). See also Univ. of Georgia Athletic Ass’n v. Laite, 756 F. 2d 1535 (11th Cir. 1985); Nat’l Football
League Props., Inc. v. N.J. Giants, Inc., 637 F. Supp. 507, 515 (D.N.J. 1986)). But see Bd. of Governors
of the Univ. of North Carolina v. Helpingstine, 714 F. Supp. 167 (M.D.N.C. 1989) (rejecting the
university’s suit against a t-shirt manufacturer based on the failure to prove consumer confusion);
United States v. Giles, 213 F.3d 1247, 1250 (10th Cir. 2000) (criticizing the Boston Hockey court’s
broad interpretation of the confusion); Univ. of Pittsburgh v. Champion Prods. Inc., 686 F.2d 1040,
1048 (3d Cir. 1982) (denying infringement on the grounds that unlicensed merchandise had been sold
for over forty years and consumers did not seem to attach importance to their sponsor or endorser).
360 Boston Prof’l Hockey, 510 F.2d at 1012.
361 Boston Athletic Ass’n v. Sullivan, 867 F.2d 22 (1d Cir. 1989).
362 Bd. of Supervisors for Louisiana State Univ. Agric. & Mech. Coll. v. Smack Apparel Co.,
550 F.3d 465, 458 (5th Cir. 2008) (finding infringement of the identifying colors of several
universities by use on t-shirts celebrating various college football championships).
363 469 F.3d 534 (6th Cir. 2006).
364 457 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir. 2006).
365 550 F.3d 465 (5th Cir. 2008).
366 Id. at 478 (The public would “perceive the university as the source or sponsor of the goods
because consumers want to associate with that source”); See also Univ. of Kansas v. Sinks,
F. Supp. 2d 1216 (D. Kan. 2008) (similarly found infringement of defendant’s t-shirts).
367 Dogan & Lemley, supra note 358, at 478 – 95.
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merchandising rights to trademark holders. Professor Dogan and Lemley point out
that trademark law has never been about preventing all forms of free riding but
promoting competition.368 If courts grant general merchandising rights to trademark
owners, consumers would have no choice but to purchase licensed merchandise, losing
the opportunity to choose between licensed and unauthorized cheaper version of
products, which in turn, hinders competition even when the use of the mark is not for
designating source of product.
Contemporary fashion business practice has the established brands extending
their brand name to different categories of merchandise such as cosmetics, eyewear,
watches, shoes, and home décor. This extension may influence any claims these brands
may have based on the consumer’s belief that these new items are connected to their
brand. The Italian fashion house Armani, for example, has extended its brand name
from the apparel category to furniture (Armani/Casa), food (Armani/Dolci), flower
(Armani/Fiori) and hotels (Armani/Hotels). 369 Some prestigious fashion brands
collaborate with mass-retailers. The fast fashion manufacturer and retailer H&M, for
instance, has continued the high-end designer collaboration series since 2004, 370
beginning with its first collaboration with Karl Lagerfeld, the creative director of the
prestigious fashion brand Chanel. Most of the collaboration merchandise sold out in
hours or minutes.371
As the established brands extend beyond their established sale products and
collaborate with mid-price range mass retailers, consumers will likely believe there is
official sponsorship to a product category at issue. Thus, these brands may be able to
bring infringement claims more easily to control inferior quality merchandising from
unauthorized producers. Courts also observed that strong marks cover a wide scope of
goods and services. As a result, the established brands may have a relatively high
chance of winning merchandising rights claims in comparison to less-famous brands.
The Sixth Circuit observed: “The stronger the mark, the more likely it is that
encroachment on it will produce confusion.”372 The Third Circuit also acknowledged
“under the Lanham Act, stronger marks receive greater protection.”373 For example,

368 Professors evaluate that the effect “the move from protecting trademark as label to trademark
as mixed label-and-product” would bring is ambiguous: “While it can potentially reduce search costs
by facilitating product identification and reducing marketplace confusion, it can also directly hinder
competition ‘on the merits in the sale of products,” see id. at 461, 483, 470.
369 Within the apparel product category, Armani created many lines of a brand: Armani Privé
(haute couture line), Giorgio Armani (ready-to-wear line aimed at a younger age group), Emporio
Armani (ready-to-wear and Milan Fashion Week collections), EA7 (sportswear line), Armani
Collezioni (business suits aimed at an older age group), Armani Jeans (denim line), and Armani Junior
(kids line), and Armani Exchange (street-inspired accessible line).
370
For the history of the H&M collaboration with designers, see H&M,
http://about.hm.com/en/About/facts-about-hm/fashion-for-all/collections/collaborations.html
(last
visited Apr. 8, 2018).
371 Stephanie Clifford, Demand at Target for Fashion Line Crashes Web Site, N.Y. TIMES (Sept
13, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/14/business/demand-at-target-for-fashion-line-crashesweb-site.html?_r=0; Matthew Schneier, Lilly Pulitzer for Target: They Came, They Waited, They Went
Home Mad, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 22, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/23/fashion/is-target-in-theconsumers-bulls-eye-after-the-lilly-pulitzer-dustup.html.
372 Champions Golf Club v. Champions Golf Club, 78 F. 3d 1111 (6th Cir. 1996).
373 A & H Sportswear, Inc. v. Victoria’s Secret Stores, Inc., 237 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2000).
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the use of famous alcoholic beverage marks, such as JOHNNIE WALKER cigars,374
BLACK LABEL cigarettes,375 were held to be infringements.
2. Likelihood of Confusion Multifactor Test
In answering the question of whether the defendant’s trademark is likely to cause
consumer confusion as to the true source or connection of the defendant’s goods, each
circuit requires the district court to conduct a multifactor analysis of the likelihood of
consumer confusion according to the factors set out by that specific circuit.376 Each
circuit developed its own formula for its confusion analysis,377 originated either directly
or indirectly from the 1938 Restatement (First) of Torts.378 Though there is overlap
among some of the factors each court considers, Professor Beebe points out that there
is also great diversity “not just in which factors are employed but in how they are
employed.”– Some circuits heavily weigh factors ignored by other circuits, and nearly
every factor or combination of factors has been called the most important by one court
or another.379 Among the diverse formulations of the confusion test, common to all of
the circuits are four factors: the strength of the plaintiff’s mark, the similarity of the
marks, the proximity of the goods, and evidence of actual confusion.380 With only one
exception, the ‘intent of the defendant’ factor is found in every court’s test.381 The
influential test is the Second Circuit’s non-exclusive multi factor Polaroid test, which
the Court developed in Polaroid Corp. v. Polaroid Elecs. Corp.382
This section argues that the strength of the mark exerts a strong influence on
courts finding a likelihood of confusion,383 and thus the likelihood of confusion test
effectively operates as an effective tool for the established brands to protect their brand
image from unwanted associations. The case of Gucci America 384 showcases this
argument. In Gucci America, the district court used the Polaroid analysis to find
infringement of the global fashion house Gucci’s mark (“Big Gucci”) by defendants
Jennifer and Gemma Gucci use of their mark (“Little Gucci”). 385 Jennifer Gucci
married Paolo Gucci, whose grandfather was Guccio Gucci, the founder of the Big Gucci
today. Gemma Gucci is the daughter of Jennifer Gucci and Paolo Gucci. Jennifer and
Gemma run their own business and give license to use their name on many lines of
products, including fashion and foods. This case not only provides a good example to
John Walker & Sons, Ltd. v. Bethea, 305 F. Supp. 1302 (D.S.C. 1969).
Carling Brewing Co. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 297 F. Supp. 1330 (N.D. Ga. 1968).
376 Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of the Multifactor Tests for Trademark Infringement, 94
CAL. L. REV. 1581, 1582 (2006).
377 MCCARTHY, supra note 233, at § 24:30.
378 Id. at § 23:19.
379 Beebe, supra note 376, at 1538.
380 Id. at 1589.
381 Id. at 1590.
382 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961). Discussions will follow in the following paragraph with a case
applying the Polaroid test.
383 The empirical evidence supports this result. See Beebe, supra note 376, at 1612, 1620.
384 Gucci Am., Inc., v. Gucci, 07 CIV. 6820 RMB JCF 2009 WL 8531026, *3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 5,
2009).
385 At trial, Jennifer Gucci referred to the global fashion house Gucci, as “Big Gucci” and herself
as “Little Gucci,” see id.
374
375
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show the influence of the strength of the mark test but also demonstrates the effect of
legal battle to bar competition to the detriment of small designers. The Second Circuit
applies the “non-exclusive multi-factor test” developed in Polaroid Corp. v. Polaoiad
Elecs. Corp.386 to examine whether a defendant’s use of a trademark is likely to confuse
consumers as to the source of products. The test contains eight factors to consider: i)
the strength of the mark; ii) the similarity of the . . . marks; iii) the proximity of the
products; iv) actual confusion; v) the likelihood of plaintiff’s bridging the gap; vi)
defendant’s good faith in adopting its mark; vii) the quality of defendant’s products;
and viii) the sophistication of the consumers.
The first factor, “strength of the mark,” influences two subsequent factors of the
test: the “similarity of the mark” and the “proximity of the product.” In Gucci America,
the Court begins its analysis by evaluating the first prong of the test, “the strength of
the mark.” The Big Gucci mark, with its trademark registration for over five years, is
“deemed to be strong and have developed secondary meaning,” and thus the Court
weighed in favor of Big Gucci for the ‘strength of the mark’ factor. For the second
factor, the Court also found strong similarity between the Gucci Word Mark and the
names Jennifer Gucci and Gemma Gucci, finding that “confusion is not avoided by
adding the words.” The Court referred to USPTO’s logic in its denial for the
defendants’ mark based on Big Gucci’s fame. The USPTO denied registering the
trademark “Jennifer Designed by Jennifer Gucci” for use with their jewelry,
housewares, and clothing business. The logic of USPTO in its denial flows from “the
fame of the Gucci line of marks” and concluded that this fame gave them little doubt
that there would be consumer confusion as to the source of the goods.387 Trademark
registration for a “Gemma Gucci” trademark was also denied on the same grounds,
and the USPTO added that the “mere addition of a term,” that is, Gemma, is “not
sufficient to overcome a likelihood of confusion.”388 Therefore, the evaluation of the
similarity between marks, the second factor, in significant part, depends on the first
factor, how strong the plaintiff’s mark is.
The Court then proceeds to the third factor, proximity of the products, which
concerns both “market and geographic proximity.” Market proximity asks “whether
two products are in related areas of commerce,” and geographic proximity looks to the
“geographic separation of the products.”389 Defendants Jemma and Jennifer Gucci
were found to compete in the same market with Big Gucci in selling their product lines
of handbags, apparel, jewelry, and fragrances. Defendants also licensed and/or sold
wine, coffee, gelato, and water, which do not directly compete with Big Gucci.
Nevertheless, the Court held that “direct competition is not a prerequisite to relief.”390
The Court emphasized the fact that Big Gucci had a “strong and well known mark,” to
broaden protection for famous mark holders from alleged infringers: “The significant
strength of the Gucci Trademark requires that they be given broad protection against
infringers.”391 Here, the Court notably recognized the possibility of emotional harm to
the meaning of the Gucci mark and thus to its brand value, stating that: “the concern
287 F.2d at 495 (2d Cir. 1961).
Gucci Am., 2009 WL 8531026 at *6.
388 Id.
389 Id. at *15.
390 Id. at *17.
391 Gucci Am., 2009 WL 8531026 at *6.
386
387
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is not direct diversion of purchasers but indirect harm through loss of goodwill or
tarnishment of reputation.”392 Through the similarity test, the power of a strong mark
determines the analysis for the proximity of the products: “because the Gucci
Trademarks are famous and well known . . . there is a greater likelihood that use of
the Jennifer Gucci or Gemma Gucci names on noncompetitive products will cause
confusion.”393
The mark of fame also gives advantage to evaluate defendant’s bad faith for the
sixth factor, given that the Court asks whether the defendant was “aware of the mark:”
“Bad faith can be demonstrated through a showing of actual or constructive knowledge
of the prior user’s mark.”394 Because it is hard to be unaware of a famous mark, an
alleged infringer is unlikely to escape the bad faith charge.395
The fourth factor, “actual confusion,” does not require plaintiff to submit evidence
showing actual confusion. The test is based on the likelihood of actual confusion, even
if confusion has not happened yet. Naturally, if plaintiff has evidence of actual
confusion, the strength of the actual confusion evidence will weigh in favor of the
plaintiff to find a likelihood of confusion. 396 The likelihood of confusion can be
generally shown through consumer’s surveys, anecdotal evidence of confusion,
empirical studies, or expert testimony. 397 In Gucci, Big Gucci did not present any
expert testimony as to actual confusion but the Court nonetheless concluded that there
was ample evidence in the record that Small Gucci misled or confused consumers as to
the source or sponsorship. The Court relied on the similarity of marks between the
two and Small Gucci’s bad faith to trade upon the goodwill of the Gucci trademarks to
conclude that they had ample evidence to establish a likelihood of confusion.398
The fifth “bridging the gap” factor refers to the “probability that the trademark
owner might enter the defendant’s noncompeting product market and sell the same
product as the defendant sells.”399 This factor is one of the factors, along with the third
“proximity of products” factor, developed to analyze possible expansion of a product
line by the plaintiff when the goods at issue are non-competitive goods.400 This factor

Id. at *17.
Id.
394 Id. at *19.
395 The intent factor was originally limited to subjective intent to deceive. See 4 MCCARTHY
§ 23:113. Over time, it has been construed broadly to be inferred from the defendant’s adoption of a
similar mark with knowledge of the plaintiff’s mark. Some courts find an intent of bad faith when the
defendant aims to copy the plaintiff’s mark or to free ride on the plaintiff’s goodwill even without an
intent to deceive. See, e.g., Gen. Motors Corp. v. Keystone Auto Indus. Inc., 453 F.3d 351, 354 (6th Cir.
2006) (finding bad faith intent from the fact that defendant copied plaintiff’s grilles design without
requiring direct evidence of intent to deceive); Ferrari S.P.A. Esercizio v. Roberts, 944 F.2d 1235, 1242
– 43 (6th Cir. 1991) (emphasizing the defendant’s intent to capitalize on the plaintiff’s goodwill and
reputation).
396 Generation X Int’l Corp. v. No Excuses Sportswear, 1998 U.S. Dist. Lexis 4693, 22 (S.D.N.Y.
1998) (“Plaintiff need not provide evidence of a single instance of actual confusion to prevail on the
merits”).
397 LAFRANCE, supra note 247, at 166 – 67.
398 Gucci Am., 2009 WL 8531026 at *19.
399 Robert G. Bone, Taking the Confusion Out of the “Likelihood of Confusion”: Toward a More
Sensible Approach to Trademark Infringement, 106 NW. U.L. REV. 1308, 1340 (2012).
400 The eight-factor Polaroid test was developed in the Second Circuit to analyze cases of alleged
infringement of noncompetitive goods, however, the Second Circuit said that the Polaroid test could
392
393
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initially played a gatekeeping role to focus on the seller’s harm by requiring a showing
of the plaintiff’s actual plans to enter the defendant market.401
Today, many courts treat this factor not as a subjective inquiry into the plaintiff’s
plans, but rather as an objective inquiry into whether firms similar to the plaintiff
have a tendency, in general, to enter product markets like the defendant’s. This
objective version of the bridge-the- gap analysis focuses on exactly the same question
that the proximity factor evaluates: whether consumers would believe that the plaintiff
has entered the defendant’s market. The Court in Gucci America found that the
plaintiff and defendants occupy the same market with respect to cosmetics, bedding,
handbags, and hosiery, and thus concluded that there is no gap to bridge.402 For coffee,
water, wine, and gelato, the Court ruled that “consumers may well assumed in this era
of corporate diversification that the parties are related companies,” and hence weighed
the evidence in favor of Big Gucci.403 Commentators criticize the bridging the gap
factor as inappropriate in the analysis of infringement.404
The Second Circuit is inconsistent in applying the seventh “product quality”
factor and not clear about the seventh factor’s role in the confusion analysis. In the
case at hand, the Court asks whether defendants Small Gucci were able to exercise
quality control and concluded that they did not, thus finding in favor of Big Gucci for
this factor. The Second Circuit relied on Small Gucci’s experience or expertise in the
fashion industry to determine that they were unable to exercise quality control. In
some cases, the Second Circuit concludes that if the quality of the junior user’s product
is low relative to the senior user’s consumer, then confusion is less likely to occur given
the obvious difference between two products.405 In other cases, the Court writes that
if the quality of the junior user’s product is low, then this increases the chance of actual
injury.406
This logic is problematic, however, because the injury the court concerns itself
with in evaluating product quality is actually the dilution of a mark, the situation in
which a mark becomes less distinctive as an exclusive source indicator. This has
nothing to do with the confusion analysis. As discussed in the following chapter,
dilution harm is addressed by a separate trademark claim specifically for dilution.
When the quality of goods is at least equal, courts have squarely held that there is less
likelihood of confusion because any consumer confusion might injure the plaintiff’s
reputation. 407 However, a plaintiff’s reputation has no relevance in determining
be used in cases of competition goods or services as well. See Polaroid, 287 F. 2d at 128; Physicians
Formula Cosmetics, Inc. v W. Cabot Cosmetics, Inc., 857 F. 2d 80 (2d Cir. 1988).
401 Bone, supra note 399, at 1340.
402Gucci Am., 2009 WL 8531026 at *18.
403 Id.
404 Bone, supra note 399, at 1341.
405 Plus Prods. V. Plus Discount Foods, Inc., 722 F. 2d 999, 1007 (2d Cir. 1983) (inferior quality of
defendant’s goods lessens likelihood of confusion).
406 Savin Corp. v. Savin Group, 391 F.3d 439, 460 – 61 (2d Cir. 2004). This logic is problematic,
however, because injury the court concerns is the dilution of a mark, that is, a mark becomes less
distinctive to serve as exclusive source indicator and this has nothing to do with confusion analysis.
As shown in the following chapter, dilution harm is addressed by a separate trademark claim called
dilution by blurring.
407 Lever Bros. Co. v. Am. Bakeries Co., 693 F.2d 251 (2d Cir. 1982) (high quality of both
products reduces likelihood of confusion); M&G Elecs. Sales Corp. v. Sonay Kabushiki Kaisha,
250 F. Supp. 2d 91 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) (where plaintiff did not dispute high quality of defendant’s
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confusion, and harm to a mark’s reputation should also be addressed by the separate
legal claim of trademark dilution.408 The Second Circuit analysis in Gucci seems to
inappropriately use the seventh factor of their confusion analysis to assess the extent
of the Big Gucci’s injury in terms of dilution of their famous mark.
For the eighth “consumer sophistication” factor, the Second Circuit in Gucci
concluded that sophisticated purchasers of designer goods could associate Big Gucci
with Small Gucci products, and thus found in favor of Big Gucci. However, this logic
is counter-intuitive because more sophisticated consumers, such as those who
purchase designer goods, would not be confused about the source because they can
recognize the difference between two products better than the ordinary purchaser. In
some cases, the Second Circuit finds that when a product is relatively expensive, it
involves a higher level of purchaser engagement, which tends to mitigate the likelihood
of confusion.409 In other cases, however, the Court finds that “purchasers of designer
goods may more likely be confused by similar marks” because these purchasers would
easily associate the two manufacturers.”410
Part One, set out that it is the association that constitutes brand image beyond
the signification activities made by marketing efforts. This chapter demonstrated how
the expansion of confusion theory contributes to maintaining the image of established
brands by regulating consumer associations. The confusion-based infringement claim
of trademark law has expanded its scope from source to sponsorship and from thepoint-of-sale to post-sale confusion. These expansions provide established brands a
legal device to maintain the prestigious image of their brand by protecting consumer
association with the brand. The next chapter turns to how the dilution-based
infringement claim contributes to keeping the image of the established brands by
preventing the possibility of subverting the original through parodies.
B. How Trademark Dilution Claims Help Established Brands Maintain Prestigious
Brand Image
Federal trademark protection expanded to anti-dilution with the adoption of the
Federal Trademark Dilution Act (FTDA) in 1995.411 The FTDA specifically aimed to
recognize the protection for “famous” marks against the “blurring” of their
distinctiveness or the “tarnishment” of their reputation. “Famous mark” refers to a
mark that is “widely recognized by the general consuming public.”412 Blurring” is
products, seventh factor favored defendants); Gruner + Jahr USA Pub’g v. Meredith Corp., 991
F.2d 1072, 1079 (2d Cir. 1993) (treating seventh factor neutral, because “[g]enerally, quality is
weighed as a factor when there is an allegation that a low quality product is taking unfair
advantage of the public good will earned by a well-established high quality product”).
408 Dilution by tarnishment claim addresses harm to the plaintiff marks’ reputation. For details,
see infra chapter seven.
409 See, e.g. Deere & Co. v. MTD Holdings, Inc., 70 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1009, 1023-24 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
410 See, e.g. Lois Sportswear, U.S.A., Inc. v. Levis Strauss & Co., 799 F.2d 867, 875 (2d Cir. 1986),
“[i]t is a sophisticated jeans consumer who is most likely to assume that the presence of appellee’s
trademark stitching pattern on appellant’s jeans indicates some sort of association between the two
manufacturers.”
411 Federal Trademark Dilution Act (FTDA) of 1995, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1125, 1127 (effective June 16,
1996).
412 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(A).
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defined as an “association arising from the similarity between a mark or trade name
and a famous mark that impairs the distinctiveness of the famous mark.”413 The
canonical dilution by blurring case involved Kodak bicycles.414 Even though the Court
recognized that consumers were not likely to assume a connection between Kodak film
and camera makers and the bicycle seller, the Court nonetheless issued an injunction
to ban the use of the mark because Kodak bicycles interfere with the singular meaning
of the Kodak mark as a film company.415
Economic theory claims that once a unique designation loses its uniqueness, it
makes it difficult for consumers to link that designation with a single source, thus
increasing the consumer’s search costs by diffusing the identification power of that
designation.416 “Tarnishment” is defined as an “association arising from the similarity
between a mark or trade name and a famous mark that harms the reputation of the
famous mark.”417 For example, the court found tarnishment for the advertising posters
printed with the word “Enjoy Cocaine” that feature the same typeface and red and
white color scheme as Coca-Cola’s “Enjoy Coca-Cola” advertisements.418 In another
example, the Court found dilution in the use of costumes resembling the Dallas Cowboy
Cheerleading uniforms in a pornographic movie because it suggested that the Dallas
Cowboys Cheerleaders were participants.419 Dilution claims address the harm that
occurs when there is erosion of the strength of a mark even in the absence of consumer
confusion. 420 Judge Cedarbaum writes that the essence of tarnishment is “the
15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B) (2018).
See Eastman Photographic Materials Co. v. Kodak Cycle Co., 15 [British] R.P.C. 105 (1898).
415 The US trademark lawyer and scholar Frank Schechter first advocated for the development of
anti-dilution protection in emphasizing “preservation of the uniqueness or individuality of the
trademark,” “its singularity,” and “arresting uniqueness.” Schechter argued that the use of famous
marks to all manner of goods and services would result in the “gradual whittling away or dispersion
of the distinctiveness. This results in harm to consumers because of the theoretically weakened
connection between products and the brand. See Frank I. Scheter, The Rational Basis of Trademark
Protection, 40 HARV. L. REV. 813, 821 – 24 (1927). But some scholars argue that anti-dilution is not a
harm for non-competing goods because uses by non-competing products actually tend to raise the
profile of a famous mark by reinforcing the connection between products and a brand. See Jennifer
Files Beerline, Anti-Dilution Law, New and Improved: The Trademark Dilution Act of 2006, 23
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 511, 513 n. 30 (2008). Also, unlike 1927 when Koda-brand bicycles were
inconceivable, a diverse portfolio of one company is entirely possible today. See id. at 515.
416 Richard Posner, When Is Parody Fair Use?, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 67, 75 (1992). But Professor
Tushnet questions whether the theoretical economic harms are a legally significant risk in the real
world without unknown and unproven harm. See Rebecca Tushnet, Trademark Law and Cognitive
Science, 86 TEX. L. REV. 507, 528 (2008).
417 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(C). Some legal commentators question whether tarnishment is really a
form of dilution. Professor Barton Beebe writes, “[w]hile dilution of the distinctive quality of a mark
may in some sense constitute injury to business reputation, injury to business reputation does not
necessarily entail dilution of the distinctive quality of the mark.” Professor Beebe cites the case of New
York Stock Exchange v. New York, New York Hotel, 293 F.3d 550 (2d Cir. 2002), in which the Second
Circuit held that the phrase “New York, New York $lot Exchange” did not dilute the capacity of
NYSE’s marks to serve as a unique identifier of its products and services, but held that the use of the
phrase constituted tarnishment and caused harm to NYSE’s reputation. See Barton Beebe, Semiotic
Analysis of Trademark Law, 51 UCLA L. Rev. 621, 696 (2004).
418 Coca-Cola Co. v. Gemini Rising, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 1183 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
419 Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1979).
420 MCCARTHY, supra note 233, at § 24:69; The rationale for protection against dilution was first
articulated by trademark lawyer Frank I. Schechter. See Frank I. Schechter, The Rational Basis of
Trademark Protection, 40 HARV. L. REV. 813 (1927). But see Kenneth L. Port, The Unnatural
413
414

[17:492 2018] The John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law

572

displacement of positive with negative associations of the mark, like a blurring,
reduces the value of the mark to the trademark owner. 421 The dilution-based
trademark infringement claim, therefore, is an effective legal device for the famous
brands to maintain the exclusive association with their marks.
But this legal tool is only offered for famous mark holders. The FTDA has led to
inconsistent judicial holdings with regard to level of fame a trademark had to possess
to be protected.422 The FTDA states that only trademarks that were famous prior to
the date of the challenged mark’s first use in commerce are “famous marks,” but did
not provide elaboration. Given little guidance, courts applied different standards to
define what constitutes “famous” marks. 423 The Second Circuit held that only
inherently distinctive marks could be famous.424 In contrast, the Ninth Circuit held
that marks that have acquired distinctiveness can be famous.425 Most circuit courts
have held that the FTDA protects trademarks even when their fame was limited to a
geographic region or an industry niche.426 However, the Trademark Dilution Revision
Act (TDRA) requires nationwide fame, not simply regional recognition, raising the bar
in comparison to the FTDA “wide recognition by the general consuming public”
standard.427 Therefore, a company that is well known within a particular industry but
less known by nationwide consumers does not meet the TDRA fame standard.428
Under the FTDA, judicial holdings were also inconsistent on the issue of whether
trade dress is protected from dilution. The Second Circuit granted trade dress antidilution protection to product packaging and design. In contrast, the First Circuit
concluded that Congress did not intend to provide anti-dilution protection for trade
dress because such protection would bypass the design patent requirements by
trademark holders.429
The FTDA provides a definition of dilution, but provides no guidance to help
courts to identity blurring.430 Courts followed the “Sweet Factors” test, named after
Expansion of Trademark Rights: Is a Federal Dilution Statute Necessary?, 85 T.M.R. 525 (1995);
Megan Gray, Defending Against a Dilution Claim: A Practitioner’s Guide, 4 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J.
205 (1996).
421 New York Stock Exchange, Inc. v New York, New York Hotel, LLC, 293 F.3d 550 (2d Cir. 2002).
422 H.R. Rep. No. 109-23 (2005).
423 FTDA, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2000) (amended 2006).
424 New York Stock Exchange, 293 F.3d at 550 (holding that plaintiff’s mark cannot be famous
because it is descriptive and therefore not inherently distinctive).
425 Thane Intern., Inc. v. Trek Bicycle Corp., 305 F.3d 894, 912 n.14 (9th Cir. 2002).
426 Wawa Diary Farms v. Haaf, 939 F.3d (3d Cir. 1997) (concluding Wawa mark to be famous
which has a chain of 600 convenience stores located in Pennsylvania and surrounding states);
Nailtiques Cosmetic Corp. v. Salon Sci. Corp., 41 U.S.P.Q. 2d (1995) (holding that a mark is
famous within its niche). But see TCPIP Holidng Co v. Harr Communications, Inc., 244 F.3d 88,
(2d Cir. 2001) (requiring a broader level of fame beyond “in a small part of the country”, or “among
a small segment of the population”).
427 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1).
428 Files Beerline, supra note 415, at 525.
429 Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 229 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding that the shape of
goldfish crackers was protected trade dress under dilution claim); IP Lund Tradeing ApS v. Kohler
Co., 163 F.3d 27, 50 (1d Cir. 1998) (reasoning that anti-dilution remedies for trade dress would award
an enduring degree of protection that is specifically for design patents without forcing trademark
owners to clear the hurdles required for patent protection).
430 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2000) (amended 2006) (“The lessening of the capacity of a famous
mark to identify and distinguish goods or services, regardless of the presence or absence of (1)
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the judge who developed the test in New York, but this test was criticized for
incorporating “consumer confusion” and “the similarity of the markets for the
products,” which are irrelevant to the dilution claim.431 Later, the improved test in
Nabisco provided a ten-factor list, but it was not that helpful because of its great
flexibility for courts to choose among ten and difficulty in predicting possible outcomes
to determine blurring.432 Courts frequently found tarnishment as a form of dilution
under the FTDA although the statute did not explicitly protection against harm to
business reputation.433 The TDRA provided increased guidance for courts in analyzing
blurring claims by outlining six optional factors for consideration.434 Also, the TDRA
made clear that tarnishment is a type of dilution protected under the statute. However,
it did not provide guidance on how to determine tarnishment.435
The standard of harm to prove dilution was divided under FTDA before the
Supreme Court decision in Moseley.436 There was a circuit split between the Fourth
and Second Circuits on the issue of whether the FTDA requires a plaintiff to prove
specific harm to allege dilution (Fourth Circuit), or if a plaintiff need only to prove a
“likelihood of dilution” without proving any “actual harm” or “actual dilution” (Second
Circuit). In 2003, the Supreme Court in Moseley suggested that dilution claims must
be based on specific harm rather than just a “likelihood of dilution.” After Moseley,
trademark lawyers widely criticized the decision because that the main remedy under
the FTDA was injunctive relief, which is a forward-looking remedy. Once a mark is
diluted, recovery is not possible and therefore remedy afterwards is essentially

competition between the owner of the famous mark and other parties, or (2) likelihood of
confusion, mistake, or deception”).
431 Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, USA Inc., 875 F.2d 1026, 1035 (2d Cir.
1989) (Sweet J Concurring) (suggesting six factors: “(i) similarity of the marks; (ii) similarity
of the products covered by the marks; (iii) sophistication of consumers; (iv) predatory intent;
(v) renown of the senior mark; and (vi) renown of the junior mark”); Files Beerline, supra note
415, at 519.
432 Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 217 – 23 (suggesting ten factors:
(1) distinctiveness of the senior mark; (ii) similarity of the marks; (iii) proximity of the
products and likelihood of bridging the gap; (iv) interrelationship among the
distinctiveness of the senior mark, the similarity of the junior mark, and the proximity of
the products; (v) shared consumers and geographic limitations; (vi) sophistication of
consumers; (viii) actual confusion; (viii) adjectival or referential quality of the junior use;
(ix) harm to the junior user and delay by the senior user; (x) effect of senior’s prior laxity
in protecting the mark
Files Beerline, supra note 415, at 519.
433 MCCARTHY, supra note 233, at § 24:89.
434 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)2(B)
[t]he court may consider all relevant factors, including the following: i) the degree of
similarity between the mark or trade name and the famous mark; (ii) the degree of inherent
or acquired distinctiveness of the famous mark; (iii) the extent to which the owner of the
famous mark is engaging in substantially exclusive use of the mark; (iv) the degree of
recognition of the famous mark; (v) whether the user of the mark or trade name intended
to create an association with the famous mark; and vi) any actual association between the
mark or trade name and the famous mark.
435 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)2(C) (providing only a definition of “tarnishment” to be “association arising
from the similarity between a mark or trade name and a famous mark that harms the reputation of
the famous mark.”).
436 Moseley v. Victoria Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418 (2003).
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meaningless.437 Congress fixed the Supreme Court’s position in the 2006 Trademark
Dilution Revision Act (TDRA) by articulating that dilution claims need not prove
actual dilution but a likelihood of dilution.438
C. How Trademark Law Protects Prestigious Brands from Parodies
The expansion of trademark law against anti-dilution of the mark triggered
criticism from free speech advocates concerned that the law grants powerful
corporations excessive control over legitimate parody, comments, and other forms of
speech. The Supreme Court defines parody as the “use of some elements of a prior
author’s composition to create a new one that, at least in part, comments on that
author’s works.”439 By contrast, works that use elements from an original for comic
effect but that do not comment directly on the original are satire, the Court classifies,
not parody.440 In Campbell, the Supreme Court did not say that parody was protected
and satire was not. The Court suggested that both satire and parody had claims for
fair use under copyright law. 441 However, “[i]n the wake of Campbell,” Professor
Dogan and Lemely states, “many courts in copyright and trademark cases have treated
the parody/satire distinction . . . as a bright line rule.”442 The most notable trademark
law case is Dr. Seuss in the Ninth Circuit.443 The court held that The Cat NOT In the
Hat was satire, not a parody of Dr. Seuss’s book, and thus not speech protected from
trademark infringement.
A parody has social value as critical speech. The Court acknowledged the value
of parody as the following: “Like less ostensibly humorous forms of criticism, [parody]
can provide social benefit, by shedding light on an earlier work, and, in the process,
creating a new one.”444 Parodies offer us a unique platform to think anew through a
“funny and often biting lens.”445 As legal commentators explain, “parodies make fun
of a thing by copying enough of it to make it recognizable while subverting the message
of the original.”446
There has been an increasing new phenomenon of lawsuits against parodies that
serve as brands. Black Bear Roastery sells “Charbucks” coffee to offer its own darkroast alternative to famous coffee brand “Starbucks;”447 Hogg Wyld sells plus-size jeans
under the brand name “Lardach” to poke fun at the famous Jeans-maker, “Jordach;”448
See H.R. Rep. No. 109-23 (2005).
Trademark Dilution Revision Act (TDRA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1125, 1127 (effective Oct. 6, 2006). For
a discussion on the improvement of TDRA from the previous dilution act FTDA, see generally Files
Beerline, supra note 415, at 511.
439 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 580 (1994).
440 Id. at 580 – 81.
441 Id. at 580 n. 14. Justice Kennedy alone limited fair use to parody and said it should not extend
to satire, see id. at 597 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
442 Stacy L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Parody as Brand, 47 UC DAVIS L. REV. 473, 498 (20132014).
443 Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P., v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1405 – 06 (9th Cir. 1997).
444 Dogan & Lemley, supra note 442, at 579.
445 Id. at 490.
446 Id. at 473.
447 Starbucks Corp. v. Wolfe’s Borough Coffee, Inc., 588 F.3d 97, 102 – 03 (2d Cir. 2009).
448 Jordache Enters., Inc. v. Hogg Wyld. Ltd., 828 F.2d 14822, 1438 – 84 (10th Cir. 1987).
437
438
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Haute Diggity Dog sells dog toys named “Chewy Vuitton” as a reference to the image
of luxury goods associated with the global luxury company “Louis Vuitton;”449 Macy’s
sells a diaper bag named “Gucchi Goo.”450 Legal commentators note that trademark
owners criticize these parodists for getting a free ride on and taking advantage of the
allure of their brands.451 Some commentators counter argue that parody brands offer
the opportunity to critically reflect “on the role of brands in society,” and pose “little
threat to trademark law’s core values” as to protect marks as a truthful source
indicator or to protect a mark from dilution of its distinctiveness.452 The following
paragraphs demonstrate that trademark law offers doctrinal devices to acknowledge
the classic example of parody that a parodist uses the brand to make some comments.
As a matter of trademark law doctrine, however, a new form of parody, that is, parody
that is also a brand used as a source indicator, complicates the trademark analysis.453
1. Trademark Law Offers Special Treatments to Traditional Parodies
Courts have applied different theories for cases involving classic commentary
using brands. The Second Circuit in Rogers v. Grimaldi 454 allowed the use of a
trademark as long as it bears artistic relevance to the expressive work and does not
explicitly mislead as to source. The Rogers case involved the use of a dancer’s name as
the title of a fictional film. The film copied the famous dancers Fred Astaire and Ginger
Rogers. Ginger Rogers filed a lawsuit against the filmmaker on the ground that the
film violated Lanham Act by falsely suggesting her involvement in the film and
therefore confusing consumers about her affiliation with the movie.455 The Court held
in favor of the film to allow continued use of the names in titles of expressive works,
stating that the First Amendment protects such use “unless the title has no artistic
relevance to the underlying work whatsoever, or if it has some artistic relevance,
unless the title explicitly misleads as to the source or the content of the work.”456 The
Rogers test has been adopted in subsequent cases.457
Other courts justify the use of mark in expressive work by reference to trademark
law’s infringement test. In Hormel Foods Corp. v. Jim Henson Productions, Inc.,458 the
Court finds no likelihood of confusion or dilution in the use of a name “SPA’AM,” in a
Muppets movie, which is a parody use of plaintiff’s “Spam” mark for potted meat. In
Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Haute Diggity Dog, LLC., 507 F.3d 252, 256 (4th Cir. 2007).
Gucci Shops, Inc. v. R.H. Macy & Co., 446 F. Supp. 838, 839, 841 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
451 Dogan & Lemley, supra note 358, at 478 – 95.
452 Dogan & Lemley, supra note 442, at 486.
453 Id.
454 Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 999 (2d Cir. 1989).
455 Rogers’ claim was based on Lanham Act false designations of origin (15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)).
Rogers also claimed violation of common law publicity rights and privacy against movie producers.
456 Rogers, 875 F.2d at 999.
457 Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792 (9th Cir. 2003) (the Artist defendant
used the trademarked Barbie dolls in nude for photographs and one of the titles for the work
involved Barbie name (“Malted Barbie” for example)); E.S.S. Entm’t, Inc., v. Rock Star Videos, Inc.,
547 F.3d 1095 (9th Cir. 2008) (defendant is a video game manufacturer and depicted a strip bar
(called “Pig Pen”) similar to a plaintiff’s (called “Play Pen”) in the game; the court finds sufficient
relevancy to the game’s expression and no explicit misleading about the use).
458 73 F.3d 497 (2d Cir. 1996).
449
450
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Black Dog Tavern Co. v. Hall,459 the Court concluded that the use of the “Dead Dog”
mark is unlikely to be confused with the “Black Dog” trademark. In some other cases,
however, courts banned use of a mark in parody works, finding likelihood of
confusion.460 In Mutual of Omaha Insurance Co. v. Novak,461 defendant used the words
“Mutant of Omaha” on antinuclear T-shirts, and the Court held that the use likely
confuses consumers as to plaintiff insurance company’s sponsorship of the shirts. In
Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Publications,462 the Court found confusion as to the
use of “Michelob Oily” on the fake advertisement in a humor magazine to make fun of
brand differentiation and water pollution. In Deere & Co. v. MTD Products, Inc.,463
the Court concluded there was dilution for the use of the John Deere deer logo by the
competing tractor company in a comparative advertisement.
Cases that involve classic commentary use of the brand have some doctrinal tools
that allow avoiding the need to reach the likelihood of confusion or dilution inquiry.
The TDRA provides a parody defense, making clear that when parody is used “other
than for a designation of source” it cannot be dilutive.464 As for confusion claims, a
nominative fair use defense could protect legitimate free-speech interest.465 Professor
Dogan and Lemley argue that the ‘trademark use requirement’ can function as a
logical filter to eliminate cases from the threat of lawsuits for any of a variety of uses
of marks that don’t involve branding, such as parodies featured in magazines, movies,
TV shows, or social medias, 466 though they find courts unevenly applying of this
requirement.467
When parody serves as a brand – when using a mark to brand one’s own products
– it complicates analysis because the parody defense or special treatments do not
apply.468 However, the line between classic commentary use and parody as brands is

823 F. Supp. 48 (D. Mass.1993)
Professor Dogan and Lemley suggest that there are at least three factors present when courts
find parody infringing: i) courts are misled by poor evidence of confusion; ii) courts are driven by a
misunderstanding of the nature of dilution ; and iii) courts generally do not like to see defendants
free-riding or capitalizing on a famous mark’s popularity for their commercial use.
461 836 F.2d 397 (8th Cir. 1987).
462 28 F.3d 769 (8th Cir. 1987).
463 41 F.3d 39 (2d Cir. 1994).
464 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3).
465 See, e.g. Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, 296 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2002) (Aqua’s song “Barbie Girl”
was a nominative use of Mattel’s Barbie mark because the song was about Barbie).
466 Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Grounding Trademark Law Through Trademark Use, 92
IOWA L. REV. 1669 (2007).
467 Dogan & Lemley, supra note 442, at 479 n. 28. But the Second Circuit in Rescuecom Corp.
rejected to recognize the trademark use doctrine, writing a
defendant must do more than use another’s mark in commerce to violate the Lanham Act.
The gist of a Lanham Act violation is an unauthorized use, which ‘is likely to cause
confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation, . . . or as to the origin,
sponsorship, or approval of . . . goods [or] services.’
See Rescuecom Corp. v. Google, Inc., 562 F.3d 123, 131 (2d Cir. 2009). Professor McCarthy also argues
that the trademark use doctrine does not exist and that likelihood of confusion is the only requirement
for infringement. See MCCARTHY, supra note 233, at § 11:115:50.
468 Dogan & Lemley, supra note 442, at 486. Examples of parody as brands include the following
as described in chapter seven: Black Bear Roastery selling CHARBUCKS coffee in parodying
STARBUCKS; LARDACH selling plus-size jeans poking fun at JORDACH; dog toy seller selling
CHEWY VUITTON product referencing the image of LOUIS VUITTON as a luxury goods producer.
459
460
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not a clear cut. Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Hyundai Motors America 469 illustrates
the tricky nature of distinguishing the two. The car manufacturer Hyundai launched
a new commercial called the “Luxury” and aired the commercial during the 2010 Super
Bowl game. The thirty second ad features: “policemen eating caviar in a patrol car;
large yachts parked beside modest homes; blue-collar workers eating lobster during
their lunch break; a four-second scene of an inner-city basketball game played on a
lavish marble court with a gold hoop (Figure 27); and a ten-second scene of the Sonata
driving down a street lined with chandeliers and red-carpet crosswalks.”470
Figure 27. Allegedly Infringing Logo of Louis Vuitton on Basketball471

The purpose of this commercial, Hyundai explains, is to “redefine the concept of
luxury” by “poking fun at the silliness of luxury-as-exclusivity by juxtaposing symbols
of luxury with everyday life.” 472 The mark at issue appeared, with alleged
modification, on the basketball bearing the Louis Vuitton mark known as the Toil
Monogram on the brown background.473 Hyundai further explained that they adopted
and modified the Louis Vuitton mark as a symbol of ‘old’ luxury in “part of the
Commercial’s humorous social commentary,” and thus to “challenge consumers” to
rethink the meaning of luxury. 474 Hyundai made a First Amendment argument,
among other things, claiming the ad’s expressive value under the TDRA parody

469

2012).

Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Hyundai Motors Am., 2012 WL 1022247 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 22,

Id. at *1.
Alison Gendar, Luxury fashion house Louis Vuitton sues automaker Hyundai for using its logo
in Super Bowl ad, DAILY NEWS (Mar. 1, 2010), http://www.nydailynews.com/news/money/luxuryfashion-house-louis-vuitton-sues-automaker-hyundai-logo-super-bowl-ad-article-1.171249.
472 Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A, 2012 WL 1022247 at *1.
473 Id. at *2.
474 Id.
470
471
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defense.475 But the Court denied Hyundai’s argument, holding that Hyundai did not
“comment on the Louis Vuitton mark, but instead offered a broader social critique,”
which, the Court concluded, is unworthy of protection because it is satire rather than
a parody.476 So the Court applied statutory dilution factors477 and found in favor of
Louis Vuitton.
This is problematic, Professors Dogan and Lemley argue, because the inquiry –
“having focused on strength and fame of the plaintiff’s mark and the possibility of
association between the two marks”478– is largely “tangential to the issues that matter
in evaluating a parody.”479 The inquiry misses, the professors argue, the whole point
of parody works that intend to create association between the parody and the famous
mark. 480 But for the fashion industry, this is how trademark law helps to create
fashion innovation. The operation of the trademark doctrine is an effective instrument
protecting the luxury brands’ meaning and thus protects the early adopters’ status and
their contribution to fashion innovations. If trademark law did not protect luxury
brands from parodies, would this lead to less fashion innovation? This remains an
empirical question.
2. Parody as Brands Does Not Receive a Parody Defense or Any Special Treatment
Of course, the fact that brand parodies do not qualify for parody defense or any
other doctrinal tools to defend themselves does not mean that brand parody is dilutive.
The Fourth Circuit found there was no dilution for the Louis Vuitton parody brand
that sells plush dog toys (Figure 28) named “Chewy Vuitton.”481 But Professors Dogan
and Lemley point out that outcomes are uncertain because of judicial discomfort over
the commercial nature of the accused use as a brand and the perception of free
riding.482

15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3)(A)(ii).
Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A, 2012 WL 1022247 at *26.
477 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B).
478 Dogan & Lemley, supra note 442, at 488.
479 Id. See also id. at 488 n. 67 (commenting “A rote application of the statutory factors for
dilution by blurring will almost always result in a finding in favor of the plaintiff”).
480 Dogan & Lemley, supra note 442, at 488.
481 Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Haute Diggity Dog, LLC., 507 F.3d 252, 256 (4th Cir. 2007).
482 Dogan & Lemley, supra note 442, at 490.
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Figure 28. Chewy Vuitton Dog Toy Products483

The concern is not so much about whether the right result can be guaranteed, but
the chilling effect that zealous trademark enforcement could cause to the interest of
free-speech. Some may argue that parodists do not always fear the possibility of
litigation because defense courts acknowledge the fair use defense and plaintiffs have
the ability to publicly shame defendants through social media. But among the circuit
courts, the potential result of defending a parody is not predictable enough to loosen
the chilling-effect. The Second Circuit distinguished itself from the Fourth Circuit and
held that the mark MISTER CHARBUCKS did not qualify as a parody because
defendant selected a mark to identify defendant’s coffee as competing at the same level
and quality as STARBUCKS coffee in producing dark-roasted coffee.484
The Dutch artist Nadia Plesner designed T-shirts in participation of a fundraising
campaign to help genocide victims in Darfur. The artist depicted one of the victims as
an African boy holding a Louis Vuitton bag (Figure 29).

483 Susan Scafidi, Twice Bitten: Louis Vuitton v. Haute Diggity Dog, COUNTERFEIT CHIC (Nov.
14, 2007), http://www.counterfeitchic.com/2007/11/twice_bitten_louis_vuitton_v_h.php; ELLVY,
http://www.ellvy.com/2011/06/my-first-chewy-vuitton/ (last visited Apr. 8, 2018).
484 Starbucks Corp. v. Wolfe’s Borough Coffee, Inc., 588 F.3d 97, 113 (2d Cir. 2009) (concluding no
tarnishment of a Starbucks mark and remanding to the district court on the issue of dilution by
blurring). The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s holding, following the second remand from
the Second Circuit, to find no dilution by blurring. See Starbucks Corp. v. Wolfe’s Borough Coffee,
Inc.,736 F.3d 198 (2013). See also Gucci Shops, Inc. v. R.H. Macy & Co., 446 F. Supp. 838, 839, 841
(S.D.N.Y. 1977). Gucci sued and won a lawsuit against Macy’s for selling a diaper bag called Gucci
Goo.
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Figure 29. The Artist Nadia Plesner Wearing and Holding her Parody TShirt Design485

According to Plesner, this design was an image parody of Paris Hilton, twisting
the fact that celebrities receive rigorous public attention while people are ignorant of
the political issues that deserve awareness, such as the genocide in Darfur. However,
Louis Vuitton marketers knew that the association of genocide in Africa with a Louis
Vuitton bag would have a detrimental impact on the aura of Louis Vuitton and filed
an ex parte injunction to stop the use of the image of the boy holding the Louis Vuitton
bag on t-shirts. This case eventually went all the way to trial in Europe to the Hague,
and the Court acknowledged Plesner’s artistic freedom over Louis Vuitton’s interest in
protecting its trademark.486
Trademark law has been continuing to expand its scope and, in doing so, appears
to effectively operate to cut off possible associations that would contradict the
established brands’ original meaning in general as a prestigious goods producer. The
expansion of actionable type of confusion claims from source of origin to connection,
sponsorship, or affiliation and the multifactor confusion test itself contributed to
protecting the established brands from being associated with any inferior quality
products. The expansion of trademark protection to an anti-dilution purpose further
offered an exclusive legal device for the famous mark owners to avoid any unwanted
485 Susanna Varis, Konsten att häda ett varumärke, SUSANNA'S CROWBAR (Oct. 25, 2011),
http://www.susannavaris.com/blogg/2011/10/konsten-att-hada-ett-varumarke/.
486 For the unofficial translation of the Hague Court judgment in matter of Louis Vuitton v.
Plesner, see http://www.nadiaplesner.com/upl/website/simple-living-- darfurnica1/VerdictEnglish.pdf
(last visited Apr. 8, 2018).
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association with their brands. The trademark owners’ interest in anti-dilution of their
marks often conflicts with the free speech interest, including parody works.
The courts use various theories to avoid holding obvious parodies illegal, and the
trademark doctrines of parody defense or nominative fair use provide a doctrinal tool
to avoid involving confusion or dilution analysis. However, these tools do not
effectively work for a new form of parody, a parody as brands, because they are used
to designate the source of products and thus often result in barring parody works.
Even though the law could guarantee the right result, most parodies are created by
small artists or designers who usually choose to drop their parody works in the threat
of lawsuits.487 These legal mechanisms overall help to maintain a prestigious image
for the established brands and thus to the thriving fashion industry in which the highend fashion brands play a key role in generating fashion innovations.
V. CONCLUSION
This Article explored the copying conundrum in the fashion industry, referring to
flourishing fashion innovation within the legal environment that offers limited IP
protections for designs. It explained that the thriving industry relies on trademark
law’s capacity to protect the brand image of established brands as a luxury goods
producer. This contention requires a close-examination of the concept of a brand. A
brand is not a simple logo, name, or package that attaches at the end of dress-making
process to indicate the source of a product; rather, it is a semantic vehicle by which
people engage in “fashion.” Drawing upon the observations of the fashion industry
from various primary sources, this Article suggested understanding fashion as a trendmaking process. It illuminated that the contemporary fashion cycle is systemically set
to change along with biannually held fashion week events, each hosted by the major
fashion cities, including New York and Paris. These fashion events play a critical role
in the birth of new trends. Contemporary fashion is an institutional practice through
which new styles or designs are introduced, selected, and communicated socially for
material designs to be recognized as a trend.
This Article applied diffusion theory to elaborate how the trend-making process is
a communication process. Brands provide a forum through which substantive
messages come in and out to communicate with people what is in fashion now. By
drawing upon marketing scholarship, brands should be conceptualized as a sum of
associations, which emerge in relation to other signs or in a specific social context.
From the brand perspective, the fashion week event provides a social context for the
participant brands to situate their collections of designs as desirable prestigious goods.
This symbolic creation of prestige, luxury, or exclusivity is what entices people to join
trends, either by purchasing the brand products or, if not affordable, by purchasing
copied products. But if one cannot differentiate the original from a copy, established
brands cannot recoup the costs invested in research and design, and thus the ecology
of contemporary fashion innovation flowing from the established brands to lower-end
manufacturers would collapse. Through case law analysis, this Article showed how
trademark law is well-suited to protect, especially for established brands, symbolic
brand meaning as a luxury goods producer, by governing signifiers. After all, the
487
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interplay between trademark law, brands, and fashion innovation that was intended
to unfold to explain the copying conundrum.
The inquiry on the relationship between law and fashion innovation casts two
meaningful points in the legal discourse on this topic. First, it pushes the analysis to
evaluate what we mean by innovation as well as who makes innovation. Innovation is
a word that is at the heart of discussion for any patent law and copyright law issue,
since these two branches of IP law exist to foster innovation. Often, innovation is
thought of as a material production of goods. Yet, as the diffusion scholarship shows,
innovation depends on a meaningful number of people acknowledging and adopting
new ideas or practices. It is more accurate to say that trademark law helps fashion
innovation of established brands, which underpins the trend-making process.
The role of copying for fashion innovation lies in the fact that rampant copying
fosters a rapid adoption of new designs generated by established brands. Copying
helps diffuse a trend by increasing the visibility of similar designs. Lower-end
manufacturers or fast fashion retailers are adopters, not innovators. The trendmaking process today heavily relies on the high-end fashion houses’ capacity to offer
status, lifestyle, and identity as distinguished from other copies via symbolic meaning
through the brand, as well as their capacity to induce copies, remix works or inspire
works whose design sells only because they offer the opportunity to flock with the
trend. The task for policy makers, then, is finding a way to direct adopters to be
innovators.
Many more diverse social venues may be required, other than the fashion week
events, because these events essentially shut out small designers with limited spaces,
board admission, and the high costs associated with a fashion show. There is a need
to decentralize Fashion Week’s authority to claim trends and make other equally
powerful social venues to claim trends to allow more opportunity for small and
independent designers.
Second, this Article illuminates the unintended consequences or effect of
trademark law in the fashion industry. Trademark law promotes fashion innovation
(which is a policy goal for patent law and copyright law) of established brands at the
risk of hampering competition, which is the opposite of its existential purpose. It
showed how the trade dress doctrine prevents iconic designs from being copied and
thus maintains the capacity to signal status with the design. This entails the risk of
privatizing basic designs, colors, or patterns for other designers to use, and the
aesthetic functionality doctrine seems unreliable in preventing this risk as it is
intended to do. This article further elaborated how two types of trademark claims,
based on confusion and dilution theory, govern consumer association, which eventually
constructs a brand image of established brands. It also showed how these claims
protect famous brands’ reputation from parodies that could subvert or challenge its
original meaning. The current fashion industry may be explained as a result of the
combined role between trademark law in keeping the power of making trends and
copyright law in allowing the distribution of trends with copied designs.
The level of design copying regulation by copyright law, however, remains to be
seen after the Supreme Court recently offered a new separability test in Varsity
Brands.488 The Court seems to vitalize the copyright infringement claim as a tool to
prevent design copying with a new separability test. The sportswear company Puma
488
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filed a lawsuit against the fast fashion retailer Forever 21 citing Star Athletica on its
copyright infringement claim. This will be the first high profile fashion case that the
lower-level courts decide with the new separability test.489 This case provides a good
example to illuminate how intellectual property law governs fashion designs for
established brands given that Puma filed a lawsuit on the grounds of patent, trade
dress, and copyright claims for its shoes – the Creeper sneaker, Bow Slide sandal, and
Fur Slide sandal (Figure 30 and 31). These three kinds of shoes are named the
Rihanna Fenty line because they were produced in collaboration with pop star
Rihanna. Puma condemns Forever 21, alleging that Forever 21’s “business model is
based on trading-off the established goodwill of reputable, name-brand companies,
such as Puma.” 490 The crucial reason that Puma filed a lawsuit against copied
products is that the Fenty line was produced to meet the demand of manufacturing
high-end footwear. The shoes are considered “luxury products,” the complaint states,
and Puma produces only small quantities “to create desirability, not only for the Fenty
line products but for the Puma brand as well.”491
Figure 30. Creeper sneaker

Complaint, Puma SE v. Forever 21 Inc., Case No 2:17-cv-02523 (C.D. Cal. filed Mar. 31, 2017).
Bonnie Esllnger, Puma Seeks Injunction Against ‘Serial Infringer’ Forever 21, LAW360 (Apr.
12, 2017), https://www.law360.com/articles/912845.
491 Id.
489
490
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Puma claims design infringement for the Creeper sneaker in connection with its
registered patent (Figure 30).492 A design patent is only available for an ornamental
surface that is not separable from the useful article. 493 Having received a design
patent over its shoe designs, Puma may have lost the basis for its copyright claim for
the Creeper, since copyright law requires design to be a work of art separable from the
useful article. The Supreme Court in Varsity Brands states that the design of a useful
article is eligible for copyright protection only if the feature “(1) can be perceived as a
two-or-three dimensional work of art separate from the useful article, and (2) would
qualify as a protectable pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work – either on its own or
fixed in some other tangible medium of expression.” 494 Nevertheless, Puma filed a
copyright claim for the Creeper, particularly citing the design to be copyrighted as the
following: the “ridged vertical tooling and grainy texture encompassing the thick
umber outer sole.”495
This claim has no merit since the design patent functions as proof that that the
design cannot be separable from the shoes, and thus it fails to meet the second prong
of the test, the independent-existence requirement. Also, for the first prong, the
identification-requirement, the Court was instructed to “look” at the article and “spot”
a work of art.496 The ridged vertical tooling and texture are hardly observable as an
artistic expression; it seems nothing more than a functional rubber outsole that exists
as a necessity for the utilitarian shoe purpose. As for the bow and fur strap, the
independent-existence requirement test is not clear-cut. One may find the bow to be
an artistic expression conceptually separable from the sandal. However, the fur strap
is a little harder to view as qualified artwork since it is the fur material itself at issue
rather than artwork embodying an artistic vision. But where can you draw the line
between the bow and the fur to decide independent existence from the useful article?
Puma also claims trade dress infringement for the Bow Slide and Fur Slide shoes.
For the Fur Slide, Puma claims that the trade dress consists of a “thick sandal base
with a wide plush fur strap extending to the base of the sandal, and a satin foam
backing, and shares the deep bowl for the foot.” For the Bow Slide, Puma claims trade
dress for “a thick sandal base decorated by a wide, casually knotted satin bow with
pointed endings atop the side strap in addition to satin foam backing, and the same
deep bowl for the foot.”497 In connection with the Bow Slide design, Puma also claims
trade dress rights in the pale pink and olive green colors.
The Court may ask whether the product designs Puma claims as trade dress
acquired a secondary meaning to qualify as a source designator.498 Puma may try to
prove secondary meaning by submitting its sales volumes, advertisings, and media
coverage. Forever 21 may raise the aesthetic functionality defense even if Puma proves
492 Puma Files Patent, Copyright, Trade Dress Suit Against Forever 21 Over Rihanna Shoes, THE
FASHION LAW (Apr 3, 2017), http://www.thefashionlaw.com/home/puma-files-design-patentcopyright-trade-dress-suit-against-forever-21-over-rihanna-footwear.
493
USPTO,
A
Guide
To
Filing
A
Design
Patent
Application,
https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/iip/pdf/brochure_05.pdf (last visited Apr. 8, 2018).
494 Varsity Brands, 137 S. Ct. at 1005.
495 See supra note 492.
496 Varsity Brands, 137 S. Ct. at 1006.
497 Id.
498 The Supreme Court in Wal-Mart held that product designs can only be protected upon the
showing of secondary meaning. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 205 (2000).
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that people associate Puma with the Forever 21 shoes at issue. The pale pink and olive
green colors may hardly be functional since the restriction of those colors does not put
Forever 21 at a non-reputation related competitive disadvantage.499 Forever 21 can
use alternative colors to manufacture sandals. The Court may conclude that a bow and
fur strap in connection with a thick base is too basic and that it should remain in the
public domain for others to freely use.
Hopefully, this Article triggers future research on intellectual property law’s
constitutive power on creative industries. The Model of Trend Adoption and Product
Diffusion that the author built to explain fashion innovation as a trend-making process
may be applicable to other creative industries. Some creative industries share similar
patterns of innovation with the fashion industry in that a power to claim trends
through the brand is critical for the viable operation of the industry as a whole. The
car industry was a good example that was demonstrated elsewhere in the Article.
The new car design is introduced and recognized from auto shows. For instance,
in 1948, the General Motors Company introduced for the first time, tailfins on its
Cadillac model. Car designers in the world picked up fin styling trends from the US
automobile industry and soon other manufacturers adopted fin styling, with variations
such as fins growing larger and bolder, peaking between 1957-1961. Cars serve more
than a utilitarian function. There is a message that a car brand sends to a driver to
relate with and for the general public to read. Some brands are more or less functional
than others. Mercedes-Benz may signal high social status; Tesla may imply that you
are an environmentally conscious and technology savvy person; and Toyota Prius may
be more about economic choices than about a choice of a self-expression.
The cosmetic industry is all about brand name competition too: the chemical
materials used or qualities for cosmetics do not differ much between drug store brands
and luxury cosmetic brands. The wine industry also largely depends on nurturing a
brand name, specifically in connection with geographical locations such as Napa Valley
in California and Bordeaux in France. This author would welcome much more critical
research revealing the constitutive power of law in cultural life.
This Article reflects a constitutive role of law, beyond sanctions and punishments,
in our life. In exploring the role of trademark law in the thriving fashion industry, it
reflected that trademark law is capable of protecting the brand of established fashion
houses, and this, in turn, affects these fashion houses’ ability to make new designs. As
shown by Dior’s Haute Couture preparation process, new designs are the
reinterpretation of the brand’s identity. Further, this Article showed that maintaining
the symbolic meaning of established brands in general as a luxury goods producer
contributes to the operation of the whole fashion industry. The courts’ recognition of
some meaning-making activities via granting or banning the use of signifiers creates
a power structure among producers as it decides who gets what for the purpose of
diffusing fashion houses’ newly created designs. Whether the trademark law hampers
small designers’ opportunity to grow in the fashion industry requires another research
that is specifically designed to answer the question. The Article showed a coincidental
effect to small designers in some cases, as the trademark law protects established
fashion houses. However, this should not lead to an abrupt conclusion that the
trademark law has a detrimental effect to small designers. A well-designed future
research to explore the effect of trademark law to small designers may also reveal us
499
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a constitutive role of law in our cultural life. Law creates cultural products, cultural
products create our identity and lifestyle, and we create law. After all, law and culture
can hardly be distinguished as autonomous realms.

